The time had now come for the great combined movement which was to
sweep the main Boer army off the line of the Delagoa railway, Cut its
source of supplies, and fllow it into that remote and mountainous
Lydenburg district which had always been proclaimed as the last refuge
of the burghers. Before entering upon this most difficult of all his
advances Lord Roberts waited until the cavalry and mounted infantry
were well mounted again. Then, when all was ready, the first step in
this last stage of the regular campaign was taken by General Buller,
who moved his army of Natal veterans off the railway line and advanced
to a position from which he could threaten the flank and rear of Botha
if he held his ground against Lord Roberts. Buller's cavalry had been
reinforced by the arrival of Strathcona's Horse, a fine body of
Canadian troopers, whose services had been presented to the nation by
the public-spirited nobleman whose name they bore. They were
distinguished by their fine physique, and by the lassoes, cowboy
stirrups, and large spurs of the North-Western plains.

It was in the first week of July that Clery joined hands with the
Heidelberg garrison, while Coke with the 10th Brigade cleared the
right flank of the railway by an expedition as far as Amersfoort. On
July 6th the Natal communications were restored, and on the 7th Buller
was able to come through to Pretoria and confer with the
Commander-in-Chief.  A Boer force with heavy guns still hung about the
line, and several small skirmishes were fought between Vlakfontein and
Greylingstad in order to drive it away. By the middle of July the
immediate vicinity of the railway was clear save for some small
marauding parties who endeavoured to tamper with the rails and the
bridges.  Up to the end of the month the whole of the Natal army
remained strung along the line of communications from Heidelberg to
Standerton, waiting for the collection of forage and transport to
enable them to march north against Botha's position.

On August 8th Buller's troops advanced to the northeast from
Paardekop, pushing a weak Boer force with five guns in front of
them. At the cost of twenty-five wounded, principally of the 60th
Rifles, the enemy was cleared off, and the town of Amersfoort was
occupied. On the 13th, moving on the same line, and meeting with very
slight opposition, Buller took possession of Ermelo. His advance was
having a good effect upon the district, for on the 12th the Standerton
commando, which numbered 182 men, surrendered to Clery.  On the 15th,
st~l skirmishing, Buller's men were at Twyfelaar, and had taken
possession of Carolina.  Here and there a distant horseman riding over
the olive-coloured hills showed how closely and incessan~y be was
watched; but, save for a little sniping upon his flanks, there was no
fighting. He was coming now within touch of French's cavalry,
operating from Middelburg, and on the 14th heliographic communication
was established with Gordon's Brigade.

Buller's column had come nearer to its friends, but it was also nearer
to the main body of Boers who were waiting in that very rugged piece
of country which lies between Belfast in the west and Machadodorp in
the east. From this rocky stronghold they had thrown out mobile bodies
to harass the British advance from the south, and every day brought
Buller into closer touch with these advance guards of the enemy.  On
August 21st he had moved eight miles nearer to Belfast, French
operating upon his left flank.  Here he found the Boers in
considerable numbers, but he pushed them northward with his cavalry,
mounted infantry, and artillery, losing between thirty and forty
killed and wounded, the greater part from the ranks of the 18th
Hussars and the Gordon Highlanders.  This march brought him within
fifteen miles of Belfast, which lay due north of him. At the same time
Pole-Carew with the central column of Lord Roberts's force had
advanced along the railway line, and on August 24th he occupied
Belfast with little resistance.  He found, however, that the enemy
were holding the formidable ridges which lie between that place and
Dalmanutha, and that they showed every sign of giving battle,
presenting a firm front to Buller on the south as well as to Roberts's
army on the west.

On the 23rd some successes attended their efforts to check the advance
from the south.  During the day Buller had advanced steadily, though
under incessant fire.  The evening found him only six miles to the
south of Dalmanutha, the centre of the Boer position. By some
misfortune, however, after dark two companies of the Liverpool
Regiment found themselves isolated from their comrades and exposed to
a very heavy fire.  They had pushed forward too far, and were very
near to being surrounded and destroyed.  There were fifty-six
casualties in their ranks, and thirty-two, including their wounded
captain, were taken.  The total losses in the day were 121.

On August 25th it was evident that important events were at hand, for
on that date Lord Roberts arrived at Belfast and held a conference
with Buller, French, and Pole-Carew.  The general communicated his
plans to his three lieutenants, and on the 26th and following days the
fruits of the interview were seen in a succession of rapid manoeuvres
which drove the Boers out of this, the strongest position which they
had held since they left the banks of the Tugela.

The advance of Lord Roberts was made, as his wont is, with two
widespread wings, and a central body to connect them.  Such a movement
leaves the enemy in doubt as to which flank will really be attacked,
while if he denudes his centre in order to strengthen both flanks
there is the chance of a frontal advance which might cut him in two.
French with two cavalry brigades formed the left advance, Pole-Carew
the centre, and Buller the right, the whole operations extending over
thirty miles of infamous country.  It is probable that Lord Roberts
had reckoned that the Boer right was likely to be their strongest
position, since if it were turned it would cut off their retreat upon
Lydenburg, so his own main attack was directed upon their left. This
was carried out by General Buller on August 26th and 27th.

On the first day the movement upon Buller's part consisted in a very
deliberate reconnaissance of and closing in upon the enemy's position,
his troops bivouacking upon the ground which they had won.  On the
second, finding that all further progress was barred by the strong
ridge of Bergendal, he prepared his attack carefully with artillery
and then let loose his infantry upon it. It was a gallant feat of arms
upon either side.  The Boer position was held by a detachment of the
Johannesburg Police, who may have been bullies in peace, but were
certainly heroes in war.  The fire of sixty guns was concentrated for
a couple of hours upon a position only a few hundred yards in
diameter.  In this infernal fire, which left the rocks yellow with
lyddite, the survivors still waited grimly for the advance of the
infantry.  No finer defence was made in the war.  The attack was
carried out across anglacis by the 2nd Rifle Brigade and by the
Inniskilling Fusiliers, the men of Pieter's Hill.  Through a deadly
fire the gallant infantry swept over the position, though Metcalfe,
the brave colonel of the Rifles, with eight other officers, and
seventy men were killed or wounded. Lysley, Steward, and Campbell were
all killed in leading their companies, but they could not have met
their deaths upon an occasion more honourable to their battalion.
Great credit must also be given to A and B companies of the
Inniskilling Fusiliers, who were actually the first over the Boer
position.  The cessation of the artillery fire was admirably timed.
It was sustained up to the last possible instant.  'As it was,' said
the captain of the leading company, 'a 94-lb. shell burst about thirty
yards in front of the right of our lot.  The smell of the lyddite was
awful.'  A pom-pom and twenty prisoners, including the commander of
the police, were the trophies of the day.  An outwork of the Boer
position had been carried, and the rumour of defeat and disaster had
already spread through their ranks. Braver men than the burghers have
never lived, but they had reached the limits of human endurance, and a
long experience of defeat in the field had weakened their nerve and
lessened their morale.  They were no longer men of the same fibre as
those who had crept up to the trenches of Spion Kop, or faced the lean
warriors of Ladysmith on that grim January morning at Caesar's Camp.
Dutch tenacity would not allow them to surrender, and yet they
realised how hopeless was the fight in which they were engaged.
Nearly fifteen thousand of their best men were prisoners, ten thousand
at the least had returned to their farms and taken the oath.  Another
ten had been killed, wounded, or incapacitated.  Most of the European
mercenaries had left; they held only the ultimate corner of their own
country, they had lost their grip upon the railway line, and their
supply of stores and of ammunition was dwindling.  To such a pass had
eleven months of war reduced that formidable army who had so
confidently advanced to the conquest of South Africa.

While Buller had established himself firmly upon the left of the Boer
position, Pole-Carew had moved forward to the north of the railway
line, and French had advanced as far as Swart Kopjes upon the Boer
right. These operations on August 26th and 27th were met with some
resistance, and entailed a loss of forty or fifty killed and wounded;
but it soon became evident that the punishment which they had received
at Bergendal had taken the fight out of the Boers, and that this
formidable position was to be abandoned as the others had been. On the
28th the burghers were retreating, and Machadodorp, where Kruger had
sat so long in his railway carriage, protesting that he would
eventually move west and not east, was occupied by Buller.  French,
moving on a more northerly route, entered Watervalonder with his
cavalry upon the same date, driving a small Boer force before
him. Amid rain and mist the British columns were pushing rapidly
forwards, but still the burghers held together, and still their
artillery was uncaptured.  The retirement was swift, but it was not
yet a rout.

On the 30th the British cavalry were within touch of Nooitgedacht, and
saw a glad sight in a long trail of ragged men who were hurrying in
their direction along the railway line.  They were the British
prisoners, eighteen hundred in number, half of whom had been brought
from Waterval when Pretoria was captured, while the other half
represented the men who had been sent from the south by De Wet, or
from the west by De la Rey.  Much allowance must be made for the
treatment of prisoners by a belligerent who is himself short of food,
but nothing can excuse the harshness which the Boers showed to the
Colonials who fell into their power, or the callous neglect of the
sick prisoners at Waterval. It is a humiliating but an interesting
fact that from first to last no fewer than seven thousand of our men
passed into their power, all of whom were now recovered save some
sixty officers, who had been carried off by them in their flight.

On September 1st Lord Roberts showed his sense of the decisive nature
of these recent operations by publishing the proclamation which had
been issued as early as July 4th, by which the Transvaal became a
portion of the British Empire.  On the same day General Buller, who
had ceased to advance to the east and retraced his steps as far as
Helvetia, began his northerly movement in the direction of Lydenburg,
which is nearly fifty miles to the north of the railway line.  On that
date his force made a march of fourteen miles, which brought them over
the Crocodile River to Badfontein. Here, on September 2nd, Buller
found that the indomitable Botha was still turning back upon him, for
he was faced by so heavy a shell fire, coming from so formidable a
position, that he had to be content to wait in front of it until some
other column should outflank it.  The days of unnecessary frontal
attacks were for ever over, and his force, though ready for anything
which might be asked of it, had gone through a good deal in the recent
operations.  Since August 21st they had been under fire almost every
day, and their losses, though never great on any one occasion,
amounted in the aggregate during that time to 365. They had crossed
the Tugela, they had relieved Ladysmith, they had forced Laing's Nek,
and now it was to them that the honour had fallen of following the
enemy into this last fastness.  Whatever criticism may be directed
against some episodes in the Natal campaign, it must never be
forgotten that to Buller and to his men have fallen some of the
hardest tasks of the war, and that these tasks have always in the end
been successfully carried out.  The controversy about the unfortunate
message to White, and the memory of the abandoned guns at Colenso,
must not lead us to the injustice of ignoring all that is to be set to
the credit account.

On September 3rd Lord Roberts, finding how strong a position faced
Buller, despatched Ian Hamilton with a force to turn it upon the
right.  Brocklehurst's brigade of cavalry joined Hamilton in his
advance.  On the 4th he was within signalling distance of Buller, and
on the right rear of the Boer position.  The occupation of a mountain
called Zwaggenhoek would establish Hamilton firmly, and the difficult
task of seizing it at night was committed to Colonel Douglas and his
fine regiment of Royal Scots.  It was Spion Kop over again, but with a
happier ending.  At break of day the Boers discovered that their
position had been rendered untenable and withdrew, leaving the road to
Lydenburg clear to Buller. Hamilton and he occupied the town upon the
6th.  The Boers had split into two parties, the larger one with the
guns falling back upon Kruger's Post, and the others retiring to
Pilgrim's Rest.  Amid cloud-girt peaks and hardly passable ravines the
two long-enduring armies still wrestled for the final mastery.

To the north-east of Lydenburg, between that town and Spitzkop, there
is a formidable ridge called the Mauchberg, and here again the enemy
were found to be standing at bay.  They were even better than their
word, for they had always said that they would make their last stand
at Lydenburg, and now they were making one beyond it.  But the
resistance was weakening.  Even this fine position could not be held
against the rush of the three regiments, the Devons, the Royal Irisb,
and the Royal Scots, who were let loose upon it.  The artillery
supported the attack admirably.  'They did nobly,' said one who led
the advance.  'It is impossible to overrate the value of their
support.  They ceased also exactly at the right moment.  One more
shell would have hit us.'  Mountain mists saved the defeated burghers
from a close pursuit, but the hills were carried.  The British losses
on this day, September 8th, were thirteen killed and twenty-five
wounded; but of these thirty-eight no less than half were accounted
for by one of those strange malignant freaks which can neither be
foreseen nor prevented. A shrapnel shell, fired at an incredible
distance, burst right over the Volunteer Company of the Gordons who
were marching in column. Nineteen men fell, but it is worth recording
that, smitten so suddenly and so terribly, the gallant Volunteers
continued to advance as steadily as before this misfortune befell
them.  On the 9th Buller was still pushing forward to Spitzkop, his
guns and the 1st Rifles overpowering a weak rearguard resistance of
the Boers.  On the 10th he had reached Klipgat, which is halfway
between the Mauchberg and Spitzkop.  So close was the pursuit that the
Boers, as they streamed through the passes, flung thirteen of their
ammunition wagons over the cliffs to prevent them from falling into
the hands of the British horsemen.  At one period it looked as if the
gallant Boer guns had waited too long in covering the retreat of the
burghers.  Strathcona's Horse pressed closely upon them.  The
situation was saved by the extreme coolness and audacity of the Boer
gunners.  'When the cavalry were barely half a mile behind the rear
gun' says an eye-witness 'and we regarded its capture as certain, the
LEADING Long Tom deliberately turned to bay andd with case shot
at the pursuers streaming down the hill in single file over the head
of his brother gun. It was a magnificent coup, and perfectly
successful.  The cavalry had to retire, leaving a few men wounded, and
by the time our heavy guns had arrived both Long Toms had got clean
away.'  But the Boer riflemen would no longer stand. Demoralised after
their magnificent struggle of eleven months the burghers were now a
beaten and disorderly rabble flying wildly to the eastward, and only
held together by the knowledge that in their desperate situation there
was more comfort and safety in numbers. The war seemed to be swiftly
approaching its close. On the 15th Buller occupied Spitzkop in the
north, capturing a quantity of stores, while on the 14th French took
Barberton in the south, releasing all the remaining British prisoners
and taking possession of forty locomotives, which do not appear to
have been injured by the enemy.  Meanwhile Pole-Carew had worked along
the railway line, and had occupied Kaapmuiden, which was the junction
where the Barberton line joins that to Lourenço Marques.  Ian
Hamilton's force, after the taking of Lydenburg and the action which
followed, turned back, leaving Buller to go his own way, and reached
Komatipoort on September 24th, having marched since September 9th
without a halt through a most difficult country.

On September 11th an incident had occurred which must have shown the
most credulous believer in Boer prowess that their cause was indeed
lost.  On that date Paul Kruger, a refugee from the country which he
had ruined, arrived at Lourenço Marques, abandoning his beaten
commandos and his deluded burghers.  How much had happened since those
distant days when as a little herdsboy he had walked behind the
bullocks on the great northward trek. How piteous this ending to all
his strivings and his plottings!  A life which might have closed amid
the reverence of a nation and the admiration of the world was destined
to finish in exile, impotent and undignified.  Strange thoughts must
have come to him during those hours of flight, memories of his virile
and turbulent youth, of the first settlement of those great lands, of
wild wars where his hand was heavy upon the natives, of the triumphant
days of the war of independence, when England seemed to recoil from
the rifles of the burghers. And then the years of prosperity, the
years when the simple farmer found himself among the great ones of the
earth, his name a household word in Europe, his State rich and
powerful, his coffers filled with the spoil of the poor drudges who
worked so hard and paid taxes so readily. Those were his great days,
the days when he hardened his heart against their appeals for justice
and looked beyond his own borders to his kinsmen in the hope of a
South Africa which should be all his own. And now what had come of it
all? A handful of faithful attendants, and a fugitive old man,
clutching in his flight at his papers and his moneybags. The last of
the old-world Puritans, he departed poring over his well-thumbed
Bible, and proclaiming that the troubles of his country arose, not
from his own narrow and corrupt administration, but from some
departure on the part of his fellow burghers from the stricter tenets
of the dopper sect.  So Paul Kruger passed away from the country which
he had loved and ruined.

Whilst the main army of Botha had been hustled out of their position
at Machadodorp and scattered at Lydenburg and at Barberton, a number
of other isolated events had occurred at different points of the seat
of war, each of which deserves some mention.  The chief of these was a
sudden revival of the war in the Orange River Colony, where the band
of Olivier was still wandering in the north-eastern districts.
Hunter, moving northwards after the capitulation of Prinsloo at
Fouriesburg, came into contact on August 15th with this force near
Heilbron, and had forty casualties, mainly of the Highland Light
Infantry, in a brisk engagement. For a time the British seemed to have
completely lost touch with Olivier, who suddenly on August 24th struck
at a small detachment consisting almost entirely of Queenstown Rifle
Volunteers under Colonel Ridley, who were reconnoitring near
Winburg. The Colonial troopers made a gallant defence.  Throwing
themselves into the farmhouse of Helpmakaar, and occupying every post
of vantage around it, they held off more than a thousand assailants,
in spite of the three guns which the latter brought to bear upon them.
A hundred and thirty-two rounds were fired at the house, but the
garrison still refused to surrender.  Troopers who had been present at
Wepener declared that the smaller action was the warmer of the
two. Finally on the morning of the third day a relief force arrived
upon the scene, and the enemy dispersed.  The British losses were
thirty-two killed and wounded. Nothing daunted by his failure, Olivier
turned upon the town of Winburg and attempted to regain it, but was
defeated again and scattered, he and his three sons being taken.  The
result was due to the gallantry and craft of a handful of the
Queenstown Volunteers, who laid an ambuscade in a donga, and disarmed
the Boers as they passed, after the pattern of Sanna's Post.  By this
action one of the most daring and resourceful of the Dutch leaders
fell into the hands of the British.  It is a pity that his record is
stained by his dishonourable conduct in breaking the compact made on
the occasion of the capture of Prinsloo. But for British magnanimity a
drumhead court-martial should have taken the place of the hospitality
of the Ceylon planters.

On September 2nd another commando of Free State Boers under Fourie
emerged from the mountain country on the Basuto border, and fell upon
Ladybrand, which was held by a feeble garrison consisting of one
company of the Worcester regiment and forty-three men of the Wiltshire
Yeomanry.  The Boers, who had several guns with them, appear to have
been the same force which had been repulsed at Winburg.  Major White,
a gallant marine, whose fighting qualities do not seem to have
deteriorated with his distance from salt water, had arranged his
defences upon a hill, after the Wepener model, and held his own most
stoutly.  So great was the disparity of the forces that for days acute
anxiety was felt lest another of those humiliating surrenders should
interrupt the record of victories, and encourage the Boers to further
resistance.  The point was distant, and it was some time before relief
could reach them.  But the dusky chiefs, who from their native
mountains looked down on the military drama which was played so close
to their frontier, were again, as on the Jammersberg, to see the Boer
attack beaten back by the constancy of the British defence. The thin
line of soldiers, 150 of them covering a mile and a half of ground,
endured a heavy shell and rifle fire with unshaken resolution,
repulsed every attempt of the burghers, and held the flag flying until
relieved by the forces under White and Bruce Hamilton.  In this march
to the relief Hamilton's infantry covered eighty miles in four and a
half days.  Lean and hard, inured to warfare, and far from every
temptation of wine or women, the British troops at this stage of the
campaign were in such training, and marched so splendidly, that the
infantry was often very little slower than the cavalry. Methuen's fine
performance in pursuit of De Wet, where Douglas's infantry did
sixty-six miles in seventy-five hours, the City Imperial Volunteers
covering 224 miles in fourteen days, with a single forced march of
thirty miles in seventeen hours, the Shropshires forty-three miles in
thirty-two hours, the forty-five miles in twenty-five hours of the
Essex Regiment, Bruce Hamilton's march recorded above, and many other
fine efforts serve to show the spirit and endurance of the troops.

In spite of the defeat at Winburg and the repulse at Ladybrand, there
still remained a fair number of broken and desperate men in the Free
State who held out among the difficult country of the east. A party of
these came across in the middle of September and endeavoured to cut
the railway near Brandfort.  They were pursued and broken up by
Macdonald, who, much aided in his operations by the band of scouts
which Lord Lovat had brought with him from Scotland, took several
prisoners and a large number of wagons and of oxen.  A party of these
Boers attacked a small post of sixteen Yeomanry under Lieutenant
Slater at Buitfontein, but were held at bay until relief came from
Brandfort.

At two other points the Boer and British forces were in contact during
these operations.  One was to the immediate north of Pretoria1 where
Grobler's commando was faced by Paget's brigade.  On August 18th the
Boers were forced with some loss out of Hornies Nek, which is ten
miles to the north of the capital.  On the 22nd a more important
skirmish took place at Pienaar's River, in the same direction, between
Baden-Powell's men, who had come thither in pursuit of De Wet, and
Grobler's band.  The advance guards of the two forces galloped into
each other, and for once Boer and Briton looked down the muzzles of
each other's rifles. The gallant Rhodesian Regiment, which had done
such splendid service during the war, suffered most heavily. Colonel
Spreckley and four others were killed, and six or seven wounded.  The
Boers were broken, however, and fled, leaving twenty-five prisoners to
the victors. Baden-Powell and Paget pushed forwards as far as
Nylstroom, but finding themselves in wild and profitless country they
returned towards Pretoria, and established the British northern posts
at a place called Warm Baths. Here Paget commanded, while Baden-Powell
shortly afterwards went down to Cape Town to make arrangements for
taking over the police force of the conquered countries, and to
receive the enthusiastic welcome of his colonial
fellow-countrymen. Plumer, with a small force operating from Warm
Baths, scattered a Boer cornmando on September 1st, capturing a few
prisoners and a considerable quantity of munitions of war.  On the 5th
there was another skirmish in the same neighbourhood, during which the
enemy attacked a kopje held by a company of Munster Fusiliers, and was
driven off with loss.  Many thousands of cattle were captured by the
British in this part of the field of operations, and were sent into
Pretoria, whence they helped to supply the army in the east.

There was still considerable effervescence in the western districts of
the Transvaal, and a mounted detachment met with fierce opposition at
the end of August on their journey from Zeerust to
Krugersdorp. Methuen, after his unsuccessful chase of De Wet, had gone
as far as Zeerust, and had then taken his force on to Mafeking to
refit.  Before leaving Zeerust, however, he had despatched Colonel
Little to Pretoria with a column which consisted of his own third
cavalry brigade, 1st Brabant's, the Kaffrarian Rifles, R battery of
Horse Artillery, and four Colonial guns.  They were acting as guard to
a very large convoy of 'returned empties.' The district which they had
to traverse is one of the most fertile in the Transvaal, a land of
clear streams and of orange groves. But the farmers are numerous and
aggressive, and the column, which was 900 strong, could clear all
resistance from its front, but found it impossible to brush off the
snipers upon its flanks and rear.  Shortly after their start the
column was deprived of the services of its gallant leader, Colonel
Little, who was shot while riding with his advance scouts.  Colonel
Dalgety took over the command.  Numerous desultory attacks culminated
in a fierce skirmish at Quaggafontein on August 31st, in which the
column had sixty casualties. The event might have been serious, as De
la Rey's main force appears to have been concentrated upon the British
detachment, the brunt of the action falling upon the Kaffrarian
Rifles.  By a rapid movement the column was able to extricate itself
and win its way safely to Krugersdorp, but it narrowly escaped out of
the wolf's jaws, and as it emerged into thecountry De la Rey's
guns were seen galloping for the pass which they had just come
through. This force was sent south to Kroonstad to refit.

Lord Methuen's army, after its long marches and arduous work, arrived
at Mafeking on August 28th for the purpose of refitting. Since his
departure from Boshof on May 14th his men had been marching with
hardly a rest, and he had during that time fought fourteen
engagements. He was off upon the war-path once more, with fresh horses
and renewed energy, on September 8th, and on the 9th, with the
co-operation of General Douglas, he scattered a Boer force at Malopo,
capturing thirty prisoners and a great. quantity of stores.  On the
14th he ran down a convoy and regained one of the Colenso guns and
much ammunition. On the 20th he again made large captures. If in the
early phases of the war the Boers had given Paul Methuen some evil
hours, he was certainly getting his own back again.  At the same time
Clements was despatched from Pretoria with a small mobile force for
the purpose of clearing the Rustenburg and Krugersdorp districts,
which had always been storm centres. These two forces, of Methuen and
of Clements, moved through the country, sweeping the scattered Boer
bands before them, and hunting them down until they dispersed. At
Kekepoort and at Hekspoort Clements fought successful skirmishes,
losing at the latter action Lieutenant Stanley of the Yeomanry, the
Somersetshire cricketer, who showed, as so many have done, how close
is the connection between the good sportsman and the good soldier. On
the 12th Douglas took thirty-nine prisoners near Lichtenburg. On the
18th Rundle captured a gun at Bronkhorstfontein. Hart at
Potchefstroom, Hildyard in the Utrecht district, Macdonald in the
Orange River Colony, everywhere the British Generals were busily
stamping out the remaining embers of what had been so terrible a
conflagration.

Much trouble but no great damage was inflicted upon the British during
this last stage of the war by the incessant attacks upon the lines of
railway by roving bands of Boers.  The actual interruption of traffic
was of little consequence, for the assiduous Sappers with their gangs
of Basuto labourers were always at hand to repair the break. But the
loss of stores, and occasionally of lives, was more serious.  Hardly a
day passed that the stokers and drivers were not made targets of by
snipers among the kopjes,[Footnote: It is to be earnestly hoped that
those in authority will see that these men obtain the medal and any
other reward which can mark our sense of their faithful service. One
of them in the Orange River Colony, after narrating to me his many
hairbreadth escapes, prophesied bitterly that the memory of his
services would pass with the need for them.] and occasionally a train
was entirely destroyed.  Chief among these raiders was the wild
Theron, who led a band which contained men of all nations -- the same
gang who had already, as narrated, held up a train in the Orange River
Colony.  On August 31st he derailed another at Flip River to the south
of Johannesburg, blowing up the engine and burning thirteen
trucks. Almost at the same time a train was captured near Kroonstad,
which appeared to indicate that the great De Wet was back in his old
hunting-grounds.  On the same day the line was cut at Standerton. A
few days later, however, the impunity with which these feats had been
performed was broken, for in a similar venture near Krugersdorp the
dashing Theron and several of his associates lost their lives.

Two other small actions performed at this period of the war demand a
passing notice.  One was a smart engagement near Kraai Railway
Station, in which Major Broke of the Sappers with a hundred men
attacked a superior Boer force upon a kopje and drove them off with
loss -- a feat which it is safe to say he could not have accomplished
six months earlier. The other was the fine defence made by 125 of the
Canadian Mounted Rifles, who, while guarding the railway, were attacked
by a considerable Boer force with two guns.  They proved once more, as
Ladybrand and Elands River had shown, that with provisions,
cartridges, and brains, the smallest force can successfully hold its
own if it confines itself to the defensive.

And now the Boer cause appeared to be visibly tottering to its fall.
The flight of the President had accelerated that process of
disintegration which had already set in. Schalk Burger had assumed the
office of Vice-President, and the notorious Ben Viljoen bad become
first lieutenant of Louis Botha in maintaining the struggle. Lord
Roberts had issued an extremely judicious proclamation, in which he
pointed out the uselessness of further resistance, declared that
guerilla warfare would be ruthlessly suppressed, and informed the
burghers that no fewer than fifteen thousand of their
fellow-countrymen were in his hands as prisoners, and that none of
these could he released until the last rifle had been laid down.  From
all sides in the third week of September the British forces were
converging on Komatipoort, the frontier town. Already wild figures,
stained and tattered after nearly a year of warfare, were walking the
streets of Lourenço Marques, gazed at with wonder and some distrust by
the Portuguese inhabitants.  The exiled burghers moodily pacing the
streets saw their exiled President seated in his corner of the
Governor's verandah, the well-known curved pipe still dangling from
his mouth, the Bible by his chair.  Day by day the number of these
refugees increased.  On September 17th special trains were arriving
crammed with the homeless burghers, and with the mercenaries of many
nations -- French, German, Irish-American, and Russian -- all anxious
to make their way home.  By the 19th no fewer than seven hundred had
passed over.

At dawn on September 22nd a half-hearted attempt was made by the
commando of Erasmus to attack Elands River Station, but it was beaten
back by the garrison.  While it was going on Paget fell upon the camp
which Erasmus had left behind him, and captured his stores.  From all
over the country, from Plumer's Bushmen, from Barton at Krugersdorp,
from the Colonials at Heilbron, from Clements on the west, came the
same reports of dwindling resistance and of the abandoning of cattle,
arms, and ammunition.

On September 24th came the last chapter in this phase of the campaign
in the Eastern Transvaal, when at eight in the morning Pole-Carew and
his Guardsmen occupied Komatipoort.  They had made desperate marches,
one of them through thick bush, where they went for nineteen miles
without water, but nothing could shake the cheery gallantry of the
men.  To them fell the honour, an honour well deserved by their
splendid work throughout the whole campaign, of entering and occupying
the ultimate eastern point which the Boers could hold. Resistance had
been threatened and prepared for, but the grim silent advance of that
veteran infantry took the heart out of the defence.  With hardly a
shot fired the town was occupied.  The bridge which would enable the
troops to receive their supplies from Lourenço Marques was still
intact.  General Pienaar and the greater part of his force, amounting
to over two thousand men, had crossed the frontier and had been taken
down to Delagoa Bay, where they met the respect and attention which
brave men in misfortune deserve.  Small bands had slipped away to the
north and the south, but they were insignificant in numbers and
depressed in spirit. For the time it seemed that the campaign was
over, but the result showed that there was greater vitality in the
resistance of the burghers and less validity in their oaths than any
one had imagined.

One find of the utmost importance was made at Komatipoort, and at
Hector Spruit on the Crocodile River. That excellent artillery which
had fought so gallant a fight against our own more numerous guns, was
found destroyed and abandoned. Pole-Carew at Komatipoort got one Long
Tom (96 lb.) Creusot, and one smaller gun. Ian Hamilton at Hector
Spruit found the remains of many guns, which included two of our horse
artillery twelve-pounders, two large Creusot guns, two Krupps, one
Vickers-Maxim quick firer, two pompoms and four mountain guns.

It had been hoped that the dispersal of the main Boer army, the
capture of its guns and the expulsion of many both of the burghers and
of the foreign mercenaries, would have marked the end of the war.
These expectations were, however, disappointed, and South Africa was
destined to be afflicted and the British Empire disturbed by a useless
guerilla campaign. After the great and dramatic events which
characterised the earlier phases of the struggle between the Briton
and the Boer for the mastery of South Africa it is somewhat of the
nature of an anticlimax to turn one's attention to those scattered
operations which prolonged the resistance for a turbulent year at the
expense of the lives of many brave men on either side.  These raids
and skirmishes, which had their origin rather in the hope of vengeance
than of victory, inflicted much loss and misery upon the country, but,
although we may deplore the desperate resolution which bids brave men
prefer death to subjugation, it is not for us, the countrymen of
Hereward or Wallace, to condemn it.

In one important respect these numerous, though trivial, conflicts
differed from the battles in the earlier stages of the war.  The
British had learned their lesson so thoroughly that they often turned
the tables upon their instructors. Again and again the surprise was
effected, not by the nation of hunters, but by those roineks whose
want of cunning and of veldt-craft had for so long been a subject of
derision and merriment. A year of the kopje and the donga had altered
all that. And in the proportion of casualties another very marked
change had occurred.  Time was when in battle after battle a tenth
would have been a liberal estimate for the losses of the Boers
compared with those of the Briton. So it was at Stormberg; so it was
at Colenso; so it may have been at Magersfontein.  But in this last
stage of the war the balance was rather in favour of the British. It
may have been because they were now frequently acting on the
defensive, or it may have been from an improvement in their fire, or
it may have come from the more desperate mood of the burghers, but in
any case the fact remains that every encounter diminished the small
reserves of the Boers rather than the ample forces of their opponents.

One other change had come over the war, which caused more distress and
searchings of conscience among some of the people of Great Britain
than the darkest hours of their misfortunes.  This lay in the
increased bitterness of the struggle, and in those more strenuous
measures which the British commanders felt themselves entitled and
compelled to adopt. Nothing could exceed the lenity of Lord Roberts's
early proclainations in the Free State.  But, as the months went on
and the struggle still continued, the war assumed a harsher aspect.
Every farmhouse represented a possible fort, and a probable depôt for
the enemy.  The extreme measure of burning them down was only carried
out after a definite offence, such as affording cover for snipers, or
as a deterrent to railway wreckers, but in either case it is evident
tbat the women or children who were usually the sole occupants of the
farm could not by their own unaided exertions prevent the line from
being cut or the riflemen from firing. It is even probable that the
Boers may have committed these deeds in the vicinity of houses the
destruction of which they would least regret.  Thus, on humanitarian
grounds there were strong arguments against this policy of destruction
being pushed too far, and the political reasons were even stronger,
since a homeless man is necessarily the last man to settle down, and a
burned-out family the last to become contented British citizens. On
the other hand, the impatience of the army towards what they regarded
as the abuses of lenity was very great, and they argued that the war
would be endless if the women in the farm were allowed always to
supply the sniper on the kopje.  The irregular and brigand-like
fashion in which the struggle was carried out had exasperated the
soldiers, and though there were few cases of individual outrage or
unauthorised destruction, the general orders were applied with some
harshness, and repressive measures were taken which warfare may justify
but which civilisation must deplore.

After the dispersal of the main army at Komatipoort there remained a
considerable number of men in arms, some of them irreconcilable
burghers, some of them foreign adventurers, and some of them Cape
rebels, to whom British arms were less terrible than British law.
These men, who were still well armed and well mounted, spread
themselves over the country, and acted with such energy that they gave
the impression of a large force. They made their way into the settled
districts, and brought fresh hope and fresh disaster to many who had
imagined that the war had passed for ever away from them.  Under
compulsion from their irreconcilable countrymen, a large number of the
farmers broke their parole, mounted the horses which British leniency
had left with them, and threw themselves once more into the struggle,
adding their honour to the other sacrifices which they had made for
their country. In any account of the continual brushes between these
scattered bands and the British forces, there must be such a
similarity in procedure and result, that it would be hard for the
writer and intolerable for the reader if they were set forth in
detail. As a general statement it may be said that during the months
to come there was no British garrison in any one of the numerous posts
in the Transvaal, and in that portion of the Orange River Colony which
lies east of the railway, which was not surrounded by prowling
riflemen, there was no convoy sent to supply those garrisons which was
not liable to be attacked upon the road, and there was no train upon
any one of the three lines which might not find a rail up and a
hundred raiders covering it with their Mausers.  With some two
thousand miles of railroad to guard, so many garrisons to provide, and
an escort to be furnished to every convoy, there remained out of the
large body of British troops in the country only a moderate force who
were available for actual operations.  This force was distributed in
different districts scattered over a wide extent of country, and it
was evident that while each was strong enough to suppress local
resistance, still at any moment a concentration of the Boer scattered
forces upon a single British column might place the latter in a
serious position.  The distribution of the British in October and
November was roughly as follows.  Methuen was in the Rustenburg
district, Barton at Krugersdorp and operating down the line to
Klerksdorp, Settle was in the West, Paget at Pienaar's River, Clements
in the Magaliesberg, Hart at Potchefstroom, Lyttelton at Middelburg,
Smith-Dorrien at Belfast, W. Kitchener at Lydenburg, French in the
Eastern Transvaal, Hunter, Rundle, Brabant, and Bruce Hamilton in the
Orange River Colony. Each of these forces was occupied in the same
sort of work, breaking up small bodies of the enemy, hunting for arms,
bringing in refugees, collecting supplies, and rounding up
cattle. Some, however, were confronted with organised resistance and
some were not.  A short account may be given in turn of each separate
column.

I would treat first the operations of General Barton, because they
form the best introduction to that narrative of the doings of
Christian De Wet to which this chapter will be devoted.

The most severe operations during the month of October fell to the lot
of this British General, who, with some of the faithful fusiliers whom
he had led from the first days in Natal, was covering the line from
Krugersdorp to Klerksdorp.  It is a long stretch, and one which, as
the result shows, is as much within striking distance of the Orange
Free Staters as of the men of the Transvaal. Upon October 5th Barton
left Krugersdorp with a force which consisted of the Scots and Welsh
Fusiliers, five hundred mounted men, the 78th R.F.A., three pom-poms,
and a 4.7 naval gun. For a fortnight, as the small army moved slowly
down the line of the railroad, their progress was one continual
skirmish.  On October 6th they brushed the enemy aside in an action in
which the volunteer company of the Scots Fusiliers gained the applause
of their veteran comrades.  On the 8th and 9th there was sharp
skirmishing, the brunt of which on the latter date fell upon the Welsh
Fusiliers, who had three officers and eleven men injured.  The
commandos of Douthwaite, Liebenberg, and Van der Merve seem to have
been occupied in harassing the column during their progress through
the Gatsrand range.  On the 15th the desultory sniping freshened again
into a skirmish in which the honours and the victory belonged mainly
to the Welshmen and to that very keen and efficient body, the Scottish
Yeomanry.  Six Boers were left dead upon the ground. On October 17th
the column reached Frederickstad, where it halted.  On that date six
of Marshall's Horse were cut off while collecting supplies.  The same
evening three hundred of the Imperial Light Horse came in from
Krugersdorp.

Up to this date the Boer forces which dogged the column had been
annoying but not seriously aggressive. On the 19th, however, affairs
took an unexpected turn. The British scouts rode in to report a huge
dust cloud whirling swiftly northwards from the direction of the Vaal
River -- soon plainly visible to all, and showing as it drew nearer
the hazy outline of a long column of mounted men.  The dark coats of
the riders, and possibly the speed of their advance, showed tbat they
were Boers, and soon it was rumoured that it was no other than
Christian De Wet with his merry men, who, with characteristic
audacity, had ridden back into the Transvaal in the hope of
overwhelming Barton's column.

It is some time since we have seen anything of this energetic
gentleman with the tinted glasses, but as the narrative will be much
occupied with him in the future a few words are needed to connect him
with the past. It has been already told how he escaped through the net
which caught so many of his countrymen at the time of the surrender of
Prinsloo, and how he was chased at furious speed from the Vaal River
to the mountains of Magaliesberg.  Here he eluded his pursuers,
separated from Steyn, who desired to go east to confer with Kruger,
and by the end of August was back again in his favourite recruiting
ground in the north of the Orange River Colony.  Here for nearly two
months he had lain very quiet, refitting and reassembling his
scattered force, until now, ready for action once more, and fired by
the hope of cutting off an isolated British force, he rode swiftly
northwards with two thousand men under that rolling cloud which had
been spied by the watchers of Frederickstad.

The problem before him was a more serious one, however, than any which
he had ever undertaken, for this was no isolated regiment or
ill-manned post, but a complete little field force very ready to do
battle with him. De Wet's burghers, as they arrived, sprang from their
ponies and went into action in their usual invisible but effective
fashion, covered by the fire of several guns.  The soldiers had thrown
up lines of sangars, however, and were able, though exposed to a very
heavy fire coming from several directions, to hold their own until
nightfall, when the defences were made more secure.  On the 20th,
21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the cordon of the attack was drawn
gradually closer, the Boers entirely surrounding the British force,
and it was evident that they were feeling round for a point at which
an assault might be delivered.

The position of the defenders upon the morning of October 25th was as
follows.  The Scots Fusiliers were holding a ridge to the
south. General Barton with the rest of his forces occupied a hill some
distance off. Between the two was a valley down which ran the line,
and also the spruit upon which the British depended for their water
supply.  On each side of the line were ditches, and at dawn on this
seventh day of the investment it was found that these had been
occupied by snipers during the night, and that it was impossible to
water the animals. One of two things must follow. Either the force
must shift its position or it must drive these men out of their cover.
No fire could do it, as they lay in perfect safety.  They must be
turned out at the point of the bayonet.

About noon several companies of Scots and Welsh Fusiliers advanced
from different directions in very extended order upon the
ditcbes. Captain Baillie's company of the former regiment first
attracted the fire of the burghers.  Wounded twice the brave officer
staggered on until a third bullet struck him dead.  Six of his men
were found lying beside him.  The other companies were exposed in
their turn to a severe fire, but rushing onwards they closed rapidly
in upon the ditches. There have been few finer infantry advances
during the war, for the veldt was perfectly flat and the fire
terrific. A mile of ground was crossed by the fusiliers.  Three
gallant officers -- Dick, Elliot, and Best -- went down; but the rush
of the men was irresistible. At the edge of the ditches the supports
overtook the firing line, and they all surged into the trenches
together.  Then it was seen how perilous was the situation of the Boer
snipers. They had placed themselves between the upper and the nether
millstone.  There was no escape for them save across the  It
says much for their courage that they took that perilous choice rather
than wave the white flag, which would have ensured their safety.

The scene which followed has not often been paralleled. About a
hundred and fifty burghers rushed out of the ditches, streaming across
the veldt upon foot to the spot where their horses had been
secreted. Rifles, pom-poms, and shrapnel played upon them during this
terrible race.  'A black running mob carrying coats, blankets, boots,
rifles, &c., was seen to rise as if from nowhere and rush as fast as
they could, dropping the various things they carried as they ran.'
One of their survivors has described how awful was that wild blind
flight, through a dust-cloud thrown up by the shells. For a mile the
veldt was dotted with those who had fallen. Thirty-six were found
dead, thirty were wounded, and thirty more gave themselves up as
prisoners.  Some were so demoralised that they rushed into the
hospital and surrendered to the British doctor.  The Imperial Light
Horse were for some reason slow to charge.  Had they done so at once,
many eye-witnesses agree that not a fugitive should have escaped.  On
the other hand, the officer in command may have feared that in doing
so he might mask the fire of the British guns.

One incident in the action caused some comment at he time.  A small
party of Imperial Light Horse, gallantly led by Captain Yockney of B
Squadron, came to close quarters with a group of Boers.  Five of the
enemy having held up their hands Yockney passed them and pushed on
against their comrades.  On this the prisoners seized their rifles
once more and fired upon their captors.  A fierce fight ensued with
only a few feet between the muzzles of the rifles.  Three Boers were
shot dead, five wounded, and eight taken.  Of these eight three were
shot next day by order of court-martial for having resumed their
weapons after surrender, while two others were acquitted.  The death
of these men in cold blood is to be deplored, but it is difficult to
see how any rules of civilised warfare can be maintained if a flagrant
breach of them is not promptly and sternly punished.

On receiving this severe blow De Wet promptly raised the investment
and hastencd to regain his favourite haunts. Considerable
reinforcements had reached Barton upon the same day, including the
Dublins, the Essex, Strathcona's Horse, and the Elswick Battery, with
some very welcome supplies of ammunition. As Barton had now more than
a thousand mounted men of most excellent quality it is difficult to
imagine why he did not pursue his defeated enemy. He seems to have
underrated the effect which he had produced, for instead of instantly
assuming the offensive he busied himself in strengthening his
defences. Yet the British losses in the whole operations had not
exceeded one hundred, so that there does not appear to have been any
reason why the force should be crippled. As Barton was in direct and
constant telegraphic communication with Pretoria, it is possible that
he was acting under superior orders in the course which he adopted.

It was not destined, however, that De Wet should be allowed to escape
with his usual impunity. On the 27th, two days after his retreat from
Frederickstad he was overtaken -- stumbled upon by pure chance
apparently -- by the mounted infantry and cavalry of Charles Knox and De
Lisle.  The Boers, a great disorganised cloud of horsemen, swept
swiftly along the northern bank of the Vaal, seeking for a place to
cross, while the British rode furiously after them, spraying them with
shrapnel at every opportunity.  Darkness and a violent storm gave De
Wet his opportunity to cross, but the closeness of the pursuit
compelled him to abandon two of his guns, one of them a Krupp and the
other one of the British twelve-pounders of Sanna's Post, which, to the
delight of the gunners, was regained by that very U battery to which
it belonged.

Once across the river and back in his own country De Wet, having
placed seventy miles between himself and his pursuers, took it for
granted that he was out of their reach, and halted near the village of
Bothaville to refit. But the British were hard upon his track, and for
once they were able to catch this indefatigable man unawares. Yet
their knowledge of his position seems to have been most hazy, and on
the very day before that on which they found him, General Charles
Knox, with the main body of the force, turned north, and was out of
the subsequent action. De Lisle's mounted troops also turned north,
but fortunately not entirely out of call.  To the third and smallest
body of mounted men, that under Le Gallais, fell the honour of the
action which I am about to describe.

It is possible that the move northwards of Charles Knox and of De
Lisle had the effect of a most elaborate stratagem, since it persuaded
the Boer scouts that the British were retiring.  So indeed they were,
save only the small force of Le Gallais, which seems to have taken one
last cast round to the south before giving up the pursuit.  In the
grey of the morning of November 6th, Major Lean with forty men of the
5th Mounted Infantry came upon three weary Boers sleeping upon the
veldt. Having secured the men, and realising that they were an
outpost, Lean pushed on, and topping a rise some hundreds of yards
further, he and his men saw a remarkable scene.  There before them
stretched the camp of the Boers, the men sleeping, the horses grazing,
the guns parked, and the wagons outspanned.

There was little time for consideration. The Kaffir drivers were
already afoot and strolling out for their horses, or lighting the
fires for their masters' coffee. With splendid decision, although he
had but forty men to oppose to over a thousand, Lean sent back for
reinforcements andd fire upon the camp.  In an instant it was
buzzing like an overturned hive.  Up sprang the sleepers, rushed for
their horses, and galloped away across the veldt, leaving their guns
and wagons behind. A few stalwarts remained, however, and their
numbers were increased by those whose horses had stampeded, and who
were, therefore, unable to get away.  They occupied an enclosed kraal
and a farmhouse in front of the British, whence theyd a sharp
fire. At the same time a number of the Boers who had ridden away came
back again, having realised how weak their assailants were, and worked
round the British flanks upon either side.

Le Gallais, with his men, had come up, but the British force was still
far inferior to that which it was attacking.  A section of U battery
was able to unlimber, andfire at four hundred yards from the
Boer position.  The British made no attempt to attack, but contented
themselves with holding on to the position from which they could
prevent the Boer guns from being removed.  The burghers tried
desperately to drive off the stubborn fringe of riflemen. A small
stone shed in the possession of the British was the centre of the Boer
fire, and it was within its walls that Ross of the Durhams was
horribly wounded by an explosive ball, and that the brave Jerseyman,
Le Gallais, was killed. Before his fall he had despatched his staff
officer, Major Hickie, to hurry up men from the rear,

On the fall of Ross and Le Gallais the command fell upon Major Taylor
of U battery.  The position at that time was sufficiently alarming.
The Boers were working round each flank in considerable numbers, and
they maintained a heavy fire from a stone enclosure in the centre.
The British forces actually engaged were insignificant, consisting of
forty men of the 5th Mounted Infantry, and two guns in the centre,
forty-six men of the 17th and 18th Imperial Yeomanry upon the right,
and 105 of the 8th Mounted Infantry on the left or 191 rifles in all.
The flanks of this tiny force had to extend to half a mile to hold off
the Boer flank attack, but they were heartened in their resistance by
the knowledge that their comrades were hastening to their assistance.
Taylor, realising that a great effort must be made to tide over the
crisis, sent a messenger back with orders that the convoy should be
parked, and every available man sent up to strengthen the right flank,
which was the weakest.  The enemy got close on to one of the guns, and
swept down the whole detachmcnt, but a handful of the Suffolk Mounted
Infantry under Lieutenant Peebles most galtantly held them off from
it.  For an hour the pressure was extreme.  Then two companies of the
7th Mounted Infantry came up, and were thrown on to each flank.
Shortly afterwards Major Welch, with two more companies of the same
corps, arrived, and the tide began slowly to turn. The Boers were
themselves outflanked by the extension of the British line and were
forced to fall back. At half-past eight De Lisle, whose force had
trotted and galloped for twelve miles, arrived with several companies
of Australians, and the success of the day was assured. The smoke of
the Prussian guns at Waterloo was not a more welcome sight than the
dust of De Lisle's horsemen. But the question now was whether the
Boers, who were in the walled inclosure and farm which formed their
centre, would manage to escape.  The place was shelled, but here, as
often before, it was found how useless a weapon is shrapnel against
buildings. There was nothing for it but to storm it, and a grim little
storming party of fifty men, half British, half Australian, was
actually waiting with fixed bayonets for the whistle which was to be
their signal, when the white flag flew out from the farm, and all was
over.  Warned by many a tragic experience the British still lay low in
spite of the flag.  'Come out! come out!' they shouted. Eighty-two
unwounded Boers filed out of the enclosure, and the total number of
prisoners came to 114, while between twenty and thirty Boers were
killed. Six guns, a pom-pom, and 1,000 head of cattle were the prizes
of the victors.

This excellent little action showed that the British mounted infantry
had reached a point of efficiency at which they were quite able to
match the Boers at their own game. For hours they held them with an
inferior force, and finally, when the numbers became equal, were able
to drive them off and capture their guns.  The credit is largely due
to Major Lean for his prompt initiative on discovering their laager,
and to Major Taylor for his handling of the force during a very
critical time. Above all, it was due to the dead leader, Le Gallais,
who had infected every man under him with his own spirit of reckless
daring.  'If I die, tell my mother that I die happy, as we got the
guns,' said he, with his failing breath.  The British total losses
were twelve killed (four officers) and thirty-three wounded (seven
officers).  Major Welch, a soldier of great promise, much beloved by
his men, was one of the slain. Following closely after the repulse at
Frederickstad this action was a heavy blow to De Wet.  At last, the
British were beginning to take something off the score which they owed
the bold raider, but there was to be many an item on either side
before the long reckoning should be closed.  The Boers, with De Wet,
fled south, where it was not long before they showed that they were
still a military force with which we had to reckon.

In defiance of chronology it may perhaps make a clearer narrative if I
continue at once with the movements of De Wet from the time that he
lost his guns at Bothaville, and then come back to the consideration
of the campaign in the Transvaal, and to a short account of those
scattered and disconnected actions which break the continuity of the
story. Before following De Wet, however, it is necessary to say
something of the general state of the Orange River Colony and of some
military developments which had occurred there.  Under the wise and
conciliatory rule of General Pretyman the farmers in the south and
west were settling down, and for the time it looked as if a large
district was finally pacified.  The mild taxation was cheerfully paid,
schools were red, and a peace party made itself apparent, with
Fraser and Piet de Wet, the brother of Christian, among its strongest
advocates.

Apart from the operations of De Wet there appeared to be no large
force in the field in the Orange River Colony, but early in October of
1900 a small but very mobile and efficient Boer force skirted the
eastern outposts of the British, struck the southern line of
communications, and then came up the western flank, attacking, where
an attack was possible, each of the isolated and weakly garrisoned
townlets to which it came, and recruiting its strength from a district
which had been hardly touched by the ravages of war, and which by its
prosperity alone might have proved the amenity of British military
rule.  This force seems to have skirted Wepener without attacking a
place of such evil omen to their cause.  Their subsequent movements
are readily traced by a sequence of military events.

On October 1st Rouxville was threatened.  On the 9th an outpost of the
Cheshire Militia was taken and the railway cut for a few hours in the
neighbourhood of Bethulie. A week later the Boer riders were dotting
the country round Phillipolis, Springfontein and Jagersfontein, the
latter town being occupied upon October 16th, while the garrison held
out upon the nearest kopje. The town was retaken from the enemy by
King Hall and his men, who were Seaforth Highlanders and police.
There was fierce fighting in the streets, and from twenty to thirty of
each side were killed or wounded.  Fauresmith was attacked on October
19th, but was also in the very safe hands of the Seaforths, who held
it against a severe assault.  Phillipolis was continually attacked
between the 18th and the 24th, but made a most notable defence, which
was conducted by Gostling, the resident magistrate, with forty
civilians. For a week this band of stalwarts held their own against
600 Boers, and were finally relieved by a force from the railway.  All
the operations were not, however, as successful as these three
defences.  On October 24th a party of cavalry details belonging to
many regiments were snapped up in an ambuscade.  On the next day
Jacobadal was attacked, with considerable loss to the British.  The
place was entered in the night, and the enemy occupied the houses
which surrounded the square. The garrison, consisting of about sixty
men of the Capetown Highlanders, bad encamped in the square, and were
helpless when fire wasd upon them in the morning.  There was
practically no resistance, and yet for hours a murderous fire was kept
up upon the tents in which they cowered, so that the affair seems not
to have been far removed from murder.  Two-thirds of the little force
were killed or wounded.  The number of the assailants does not appear
to have been great, and they vanished upon the appearance of a
relieving force from Modder River.

After the disaster at Jacobsdal the enemy appeared on November 1st
near Kimberley and captured a small convoy.  The country round was
disturbed, and Settle was sent south with a column to pacify it.  In
this way we can trace this small cyclone from its origin in the old
storm centre in the north-east of the Orange River Colony, sweeping
round the whole country, striking one post after another, and finally
blowing out at the corresponding point upon the other side of the seat
of war.

We have last seen De Wet upon November 6th, when he fled south from
Bothaville, leaving his guns but not his courage behind him. Trekking
across the line, and for a wonder gathering up no train as he passed,
he made for that part of the eastern Orange River Colony which had
been reoccupied by his countrymen. Here, in the neighbourhood of
Thabanchu, he was able to join other forces, probably the commandos of
Haasbroek and Fourie, which still retained some guns. At the head of a
considerable force he attacked the British garrison of Dewetsdorp, a
town some forty miles to the south-east of Bloemfontein.

It was on November 18th that De Wet assailed the place, and it fell
upon the 24th, after a defence which appears to have been a very
creditable one.  Several small British columns were moving in the
south-east of the Colony, but none of them arrived in time to avert
the disaster, which is the more inexplicable as the town is within one
day's ride of Bloemfontein.  The place is a village hemmed in upon its
western side by a semicircle of steep rocky hills broken in the centre
by a gully.  The position was a very extended one, and had the fatal
weakness that the loss of any portion of it meant the loss of it
all. The garrison consisted of one company of Highland Light Infantry
on the southern horn of the semicircle, three companies of the 2nd
Gloucester Regiment on the northern and central part, with two guns of
the 68th battery.  Some of the Royal Irish Mounted Infantry and a
handful of police made up the total of the defenders to something over
four hundred, Major Massy in command

The attack developed at that end of the ridge which was held by the
company of Highlanders. Every night the Boer riflemen drew in closer,
and every morning found the position more desperate.  On the 20th the
water supply of the garrison was cut, though a little was still
brought up by volunteers during the night.  The thirst in the sultry
trenches was terrible, but the garrison still, with black lips and
parched tongues, held on to their lines.  On the 22nd the attack had
made such progress that the post had by the Highlanders became
untenable, and had to be withdrawn. It was occupied next morning by
the Boers, and the whole ridge was at their mercy. Out of eighteen men
who served one of the British guns sixteen were killed or wounded, and
the last rounds were fired by the sergeant-farrier, who carried,
loaded, and fired all by himself.  All day the soldiers held out, but
the thirst was in itself enough to justify if not to compel a
surrender. At half-past five the garrison laid down their arms, having
lost about sixty killed or wounded. There does not, as far as one can
learn, seem to have been any attempt to injure the two guns which fell
into the hands of the enemy. De Wet himself was one of the first to
ride into the British trenches, and the prisoners gazed with interest
at the short strong figure, with the dark tail coat and the
square-topped bowler hat, of the most famous of the Boer leaders.

British columns were converging, however, from several quarters, and
De Wet had to be at once on the move. On the 26th Dewetsdorp was
reoccupied by General Charles Knox with fifteen hundred men. De Wet
had two days' start, but so swift was Knox that on the 27th he had run
him down at Vaalbank, where he shelled his camp.  De Wet broke away,
however, and trekking south for eighteen hours without a halt, shook
off the pursuit. He had with him at this time nearly 8,000 men with
several guns under Haasbroek, Fourie, Philip Botha, and Steyn. It was
his declared intention to invade Cape Colony with his train of weary
footsore prisoners, and the laurels of Dewetsdorp still green upon
him. He was much aided in all his plans by that mistaken leniency
which had refused to recognise that a borse is in that country as much
a weapon as a rifle, and had left great numbers upon the farms with
which he could replace his useless animals.  So numerous were they
that many of the Boers had two or three for their own use.  It is not
too much to say that our weak treatment of the question of horses will
come to be recognised as the one great blot upon the conduct of the
war, and that our undue and fantastic scruples have prolonged
hostilities for months, and cost the country many lives and many
millions of pounds.

De Wet's plan for the invasion of the Colony was not yet destined to
be realised, for a tenacious man had set himself to frustrate it.
Several small but mobile British columns, those of Pilcher, of Barker,
and of Herbert, under the supreme direction of Charles Knox, were
working desperately to head him off.  In torrents of rain which turned
every spruit into a river and every road into a quagmire, the British
horsemen stuck manfully to their work.  De Wet had hurried south,
crossed the Caledon River, and made for Odendaal's Drift. But Knox,
after the skirmish at Vaalbank, had trekked swiftly south to Bethulie,
and was now ready with three mobile columns and a network of scouts
and patrols to strike in any direction.  For a few days he had lost
touch, but his arrangements were such that he must recover it if the
Boers either crossed the railroad or approached the river. On December
2nd he had authentic information that De Wet was crossing the Caledon,
and in an instant the British columns were all off at full cry once
more, sweeping over the country with a front of fifteen miles.  On the
3rd and 4th, in spite of frightful weather, the two little armies of
horsemen struggled on, fetlock-deep in mud, with the rain lashing
their faces. At night without cover, drenched and bitterly cold, the
troopers threw themselves down on the sodden veldt to snatch a few
hours' sleep before renewing the interminable pursuit.  The drift over
the Caledon flowed deep and strong, but the Boer had passed and the
Briton must pass also.  Thirty guns took to the water, diving
completely under the coffee-coloured surface, to reappear glistening
upon the southern bank.  Everywhere there were signs of the passage of
the enemy. A litter of crippled or dying horses marked their track,
and a Krupp gun was found abandoned by the drift. The Dewetsdorp
prisoners, too, had been set loose, and began to stumble and stagger
back to their countrymen, their boots worn off, and their putties
wrapped round their bleeding feet.  It is painful to add that they had
been treated with a personal violence and a brutality in marked
contrast to the elaborate hospitality shown by the British Government
to its involuntary guests.

On December 6th De Wet had at last reached the Orange River a clear
day in front of his pursuers. But it was only to find that his labours
had been in vain. At Odendaal, where he had hoped to cross, the river
was in spate, the British flag waved from a post upon the further
side, and a strong force of expectant Guardsmen eagerly awaited him
there. Instantly recognising that the game was up, the Boer leader
doubled back for the north and safety.  At Rouxvilie he hesitated as
to whether he should snap up the small garrison, but the commandant,
Rundle, showed a bold face, and De Wet passed on to the Coomassie
Bridge over the Caledon. The small post there refused to be bluffed
into a surrender, and the Boers, still dropping their horses fast,
passed on, and got over the drift at Amsterdam, their rearguard being
hardly across before Knox had also reached the river.

On the 10th the British were in touch again near Helvetia, where there
was a rearguard skirmish. On the 11th both parties rode through
Reddersberg, a few hours separating them.  The Boers in their
cross-country trekking go, as one of their prisoners observed,
'slap-bang at everything,' and as they are past-masters in the art of
ox and mule driving, and have such a knowledge of the country that
they can trek as well by night as by day, it says much for the energy
of Knox and his men that he was able for a fortnight to keep in close
touch with them.

It became evident now that there was not much chance of overtaking the
main body of the burghers, and an attempt was therefore made to
interpose a fresh force who might head them off. A line of posts
existed between Thabanchu and Ladybrand, and Colonel Thorneycroft was
stationed there with a movable column.  It was Knox's plan therefore
to prevent the Boers from breaking to the west and to head them
towards the Basuto border. A small column under Parsons had been sent
by Hunter from Bloemfontein, and pushed in upon the flank of De Wet,
who had on the 12th got back to Dewetsdorp. Again the pursuit became
warm, but De Wet's time was not yet come.  He headed for Springhaan
Nek, about fifteen miles east of Thabanchu.  This pass is about four
miles broad, with a British fort upon either side of it.  There was
only one way to safety, for Knox's mounted infantrymen and lancers were
already dotting the southern skyline. Without hesitation the whole
Boer force, now some 2,500 strong, galloped at full speed in open
order through the Nek, braving the long range fire of riflemen and
guns. The tactics were those of French in his ride to Kimberley, and
the success was as complete. De Wet's force passed through the last
barrier which had been held against him, and vanished into the
mountainous country round Ficksburg, where it could safely rest and
refit.

The result then of these bustling operations had been that De Wet and
his force survived, but that he had failed in his purpose of invading
the Colony, and had dropped some five hundred horses, two guns, and
about a hundred of his men. Haasbroek's commando had been detached by
De Wet to make a feint at another pass while he made his way through
the Springhaan.  Parsons's force followed Haasbroek up and engaged
him, but under cover of night he was able to get away and to join his
leader to the north of Thabanchu. On December 13th, this, the second
great chase after De Wet, may be said to have closed.

Leaving De Wet in the Ficksburg mountains, where he lurked until after
theng of the New Year, the story of the scattered operations in
the Transvaal may now be carried down to the same point -- a story
comprising many skirmishes and one considerable engagement, but so
devoid of any central thread that it is difficult to know how to
approach it. From Lichtenburg to Komati, a distance of four hundred
miles, there was sporadic warfare everywhere, attacks upon scattered
posts, usually beaten off but occasionally successful, attacks upon
convoys, attacks upon railway trains, attacks upon anything and
everything which could harass the invaders. Each General in his own
district had his own work of repression to perform, and so we had best
trace the doings of each up to the end of the year 1900.

Lord Methuen after his pursuit of De Wet in August had gone to
Mafeking to refit.  From that point, with a force which contained a
large proportion of yeomanry and of Australian bushmen, he conducted a
long series of operations in the difficult and important district
which lies between Rustenburg, Lichtenburg, and Zeerust.  Several
strong and mobile Boer commandos with guns moved about in it, and an
energetic though not very deadly warfare raged between Lemmer, Snyman,
and De la Rey on the one side, and the troops of Methuen, Douglas,
Broadwood, and Lord Errol upon the other. Methuen moved about
incessantly through the broken country, winning small skirmishes and
suffering the indignity of continual sniping.  From time to time he
captured stores, wagons, and small bodies of prisoners. Early in
October he and Douglas had successes.  On the 15th Broadwood was
engaged.  On the 20th there was a convoy action.  On the 25th Methuen
had a success and twenty-eight prisoners.  On November 9th he
surprised Snyman and took thirty prisoners. On the 10th he got a
pom-pom.  Early in this month Douglas separated from Methuen, and
marched south from Zeerust through Ventersdorp to Klerksdorp, passing
over a country which had been hardly touched before, and arriving at
his goal with much cattle and some prisoners. Towards the end of the
month a considerable stock of provisions were conveyed to Zeerust, and
a garrison left to hold that town so as to release Methuen's column
for service elsewhere.

Hart's sphere of action was originaUy round Potchefstroom.  On
September 9th he made a fine forced march to surprise this town, which
bad been left some time before with an entirely inadequate garrison to
fall into the hands of the enemy. His infantry covered thirty-six and
his cavalry fifty-four miles in fifteen hours.  The operation was a
complete success, the town with eighty Boers falling into his hands
with little opposition.  On September 30th Hart returned to
Krugersdorp, where, save for one skirmish upon the Gatsrand on
November 22nd, he appears to have had no actual fighting to do during
the remainder of the year.

After the clearing of the eastern border of the Transvaal by the
movement of Pole-Carew along the railway line, and of Buller aided by
Ian Hamilton in the mountainous country to the north of it, there were
no operations of importance in this district.  A guard was kept upon
the frontier to prevent the return of refugees and the smuggling of
ammunition, while General Kitchener, the brother of the Sirdar, broke
up a few small Boer laagers in the neighbourhood of
Lydenburg. Smith-Dorrien guarded the line at Belfast, and on two
occasions, November 1st and November 6th, he made aggressive movements against the enemy. The first, which was a surprise executed in
concert with Colonel Spens of the Shropshires, was frustrated by a
severe blizzard, which prevented the troops from pushing home their
success. The second was a two days' expedition, which met with a
spirited opposition, and demands a fuller notice.

This was made from Belfast, and the force, which consisted of about
fourteen hundred men, advanced south to the Komati River.  The
infantry were Suffolks and Shropshires, the cavalry Canadians and 5th
Lancers, with two Canadian guns and four of the 84th battery. All day
the Boer snipers clung to the column, as they had done to French's
cavalry in the same district. Mere route marches without a very
definite and adequate objective appear to be rather exasperating than
overawing, for so long as the column is moving onwards the most timid
farmer may be tempted into long-range fire from the flanks or rear.
The river was reached and the Boers driven from a position which they
had taken up, but their signal fires brought mounted riflemen from
every farm, and the retreat of the troops was pressed as they returned
to Belfast. There was all the material for a South African Lexington.
The most difficult of military operations, the covering of a
detachment from a numerous and aggressive enemy, was admirably carried
out by the Canadian gunners and dragoons under the command of Colonel
Lessard.  So severe was the pressure that sixteen of the latter were
for a time in the hands of the enemy, who attempted something in the
nature of a charge upon the steadfast rearguard.  The movement was
repulsed, and the total Boer loss would appear to have been
considerable, since two of their leaders, Commandant Henry Prinsloo
and General Joachim Fourie, were killed, while General Johann Grobler
was wounded.  If the rank and file suffered in proportion the losses
must have been severe. The British casualties in the two days amounted
to eight killed and thirty wounded, a small total when the arduous
nature of the service is considered.  The Canadians and the
Shropshires seem to have borne off the honours of these trying
operations.

In the second week of October, General French, with three brigades of
cavalry (Dickson's, Gordon's, and Mahon's), started for a
cross-country ride from Machadodorp.  Three brigades may seem an
imposing force, but the actual numbers did not exceed two strong
regiments, or about 1,500 sabres in all.  A wing of the Suffolk
Regiment went with them.  On October 13th Mahon's brigade met with a
sharp resistance, and lost ten killed and twenty-nine wounded.  On the
14th the force entered Carolina.  On the 16th they lost six killed and
twenty wounded, and from the day that they started until they reached
Heidelberg on the 27th there was never a day that they could shake
themselves clear of their attendant snipers.  The total losses of the
force were about ninety killed and wounded, but they brought in sixty
prisoners and a large quantity of cattle and stores. The march had at
least the effect of making it clear that the passage of a column of
troops encumbered with baggage through a hostile country is an
inefficient means for quelling a popular resistance. Light and mobile
parties acting from a central depôt were in future to be employed,
with greater hopes of success.

Some appreciable proportion of the British losses during this phase of
the war arose from railway accidents caused by the persistent
tampering with the lines.  In the first ten days of October there were
four such mishaps, in which two Sappers, twenty-three of the Guards
(Coldstreams), and eighteen of the 66th battery were killed or
wounded.  On the last occasion, which occurred on October 10th near
Vlakfontein, the reinforcements who came to aid the sufferers were
themselves waylaid, and lost twenty, mostly of the Rifle Brigade,
killed, wounded, or prisoners.  Hardly a day elapsed that the line was
not cut at some point.  The bringing of supplies was complicated by
the fact that the Boer women and children were coming more and more
into refugee camps, where they had to be fed by the British, and the
strange spectacle was frequently seen of Boer snipers killing or
wounding the drivers and stokers of the very trains which were
bringing up food upon which Boer families were dependent for their
lives. Considering that these tactics were continued for over a year,
and that they resulted in the death or mutilation of many hundreds of
British officers and men, it is really inexplicable that the British
authorities did not employ the means used by all armies under such
circumstances -- which is to place hostages upon the trains. A
truckload of Boers behind every engine would have stopped the practice
for ever.  Again and again in this war the British have fought with
the gloves when their opponents used their knuckles.

We will pass now to a consideration of the doings of General Paget,
who was operating to the north and north-east of Pretoria with a force
which consisted of two regiments of infantry, about a thousand
horsemen, and twelve guns. His mounted men were under the command of
Plumer.  In the early part of November this force had been withdrawn
from Warm Baths and had fllen back upon Pienaar's River, where it had
continual skirmishes with the enemy.  Towards the end of November,
news having reached Pretoria that the enemy under Erasmus and Viljoen
were present in force at a place called Rhenoster Kop, which is about
twenty miles north of the Delagoa Railway line and fifty miles
north-east of the capital, it was arranged that Paget should attack
them from the south, while Lyttelton from Middelburg should endeavour
to get behind them.  The force with which Paget started upon this
enterprise was not a very formidable one. He had for mounted troops
some Queensland, South Australian, New Zealand, and Tasmanian Bushmen,
together with the York, Montgomery, and Warwick Yeomanry.  His
infantry were the 1st West Riding regiment and four companies of the
Munsters. His guns were the 7th and 38th batteries, with two naval
quick-firing twelve-pounders and some smaller pieces.  The total could
not have exceeded some two thousand men.  Here, as at other times, it
is noticeable that in spite of the two hundred thousand soldiers whom
the British kept in the field, the lines of communication absorbed so
many that at the actual point of contact they were seldom superior and
often inferior in numbers to the enemy.  Theng of the Natal and
Delagoa lines though valuable in many ways, had been an additional
drain. Where every culvert needs its picket and every bridge its
company, the guardianship of many hundreds of miles of rail is no
light matter.

In the early morning of November 29th Paget's men came in contact with
the enemy, who were in some force upon an admirable position. A ridge
for their centre, a flanking kopje for their cross fire, and a grass
glacis for the approach-it was an ideal Boer battlefield. The
colonials and the yeomanry under Plumer on the left, and Hickman on
the right, pushed in upon them, until it was evident that they meant
to hold their ground.  Their advance being checked by a very severe
fire, the horsemen dismounted and took such cover as they could.
Paget's original idea had been a turning movement, but the Boers were
the more numerous body, and it was impossible for the smaller British
force to find their flanks, for they extended over at least seven
miles.  The infantry were moved up into the centre, therefore, between
the wings of dismounted horsemen, and the guns were brought up to
cover the advance. The country was ill-suited, however, to the use of
artillery, and it was only possible to use an indirect fire from under
a curve of the grass land.  The guns made good practice, however, one
section of the 38th battery being in action all day within 800 yards
of the Boer line, and putting themselves out of action after 300
rounds by the destruction of their own rifling. Once over the curve
every yard of the veldt was commanded by the hidden riflemen.  The
infantry advanced, but could make no headway against the deadly fire
which met them. By short rushes the attack managed to get within 300
yards of the enemy, and there it stuck.  On the right the Munsters
carried a detached kopje which was in front of them, but could do
little to aid the main attack.  Nothing could have exceeded the
tenacity of the Yorkshiremen and the New-Zealanders, who were
immediately to their left. Though unable to advance they refused to
retire, and indeed they were in a position from which a retirement
would have been a serious operation.  Colonel Lloyd of the West
Ridings was hit in three places and killed. Five out of six officers
of the New Zealand corps were struck down.  There were no reserves to
give a fresh impetus to the attack, and the thin scattered line,
behind bullet-spotted stones or anthills, could but hold its own while
the sun sank slowly upon a day which will not be forgotten by those
who endured it.  The Boers were reinforced in the afternoon, and the
pressure became so severe that the field guns were retired with much
difficulty.  Many of the infantry had shot away all their cartridges
and were helpless.  Just one year before British soldiers had lain
under similar circumstances on the plain which leads to Modder River,
and now on a smaller scale the very same drama was being enacted.
Gradually the violet haze of evening deepened into darkness, and the
incessant rattle of the rifle fire died away on either side. Again, as
at Modder River, the British infantry still lay in their position,
determined to take no backward step, and again the Boers stole away in
the night, leaving the ridge which they had defended so well.  A
hundred killed and wounded was the price paid by the British for that
line of rock studded hills -- a heavier proportion of losses than had
befallen Lord Methuen in the corresponding action.  Of the Boer losses
there was as usual no means of judging, but several grave.mounds,
newly dug, showed that they also had something to deplore.  Their
retreat, however, was not due to exhaustion, but to the demonstration
which Lyttelton had been able to make in their rear. The gunners and
the infantry had all done well in a most trying action, but by common
consent it was with the men from New Zealand that the honours lay. It
was no empty compliment when Sir Alfred Milner telegraphed to the
Premier of New Zealand his congratulations upon the distinguished
behaviour of his fellow countrymen.

From this time onwards there was nothing of importance in this part of
the seat of war.

It is necessary now to turn from the north-east to the north-west of
Pretoria, where the presence of De la Rey and the cover afforded by
the Magaliesberg mountains had kept alive the Boer resistance. Very
rugged lines of hill, alternating with fertile valleys, afforded a
succession of forts and of granaries to the army which held them.  To
General Clements' column had been committed the task of clearing this
difficult piece of country. His force fluctuated in numbers, but does
not appear at any time to have consisted of more than three thousand
men, which comprised the Border Regiment, the Yorkshire Light
Infantry, the second Northumberland Fusiliers, mounted infantry,
yeomanry, the 8th R.F.A., P battery R.H.A., and one heavy gun. With
this small army he moved about the district, breaking up Boer bands,
capturing supplies, and bringing in refugees.  On November 13th he was
at Krugersdorp, the southern extremity of his beat.  On the 24th he
was moving north again, and found himself as he approached the hills
in the presence of a force of Boers with cannon.  This was the
redoubtable De la Rey, who sometimes operated in Methuen's country to
the north of the Magaliesberg, and sometimes to the south.  He had now
apparently fixed upon Clements as his definite opponent. De la Rey was
numerically inferior, and Clements had no difficulty in this first
encounter in forcing him back with some loss.  On November 26th
Clements was back at Krugersdorp again with cattle and prisoners. In
the early days of December he was moving northwards once more, where a
serious disaster awaited him.  Before narrating the circumstances
connected with the Battle of Nooitgedacht there is one incident which
occurred in this same region which should be recounted.

This consists of the determined attack made by a party of De la Rey's
men, upon December 3rd, on a convoy which was proceeding from Pretoria
to Rustenburg, and had got as far as Buffel's Hoek.  The convoy was a
very large one, consisting of 150 wagons, which covered about three
miles upon the march. It was guarded by two companies of the West
Yorkshires, two guns of the 75th battery, and a handful of the
Victoria Mounted Rifles. The escort appears entirely inadequate when
it is remembered that these stores, which were of great value, were
being taken through a country which was known to be infested by the
enemy. What might have been foreseen occurred.  Five hundred Boers
suddenly rode down upon the helpless line of wagons and took
possession of them. The escort rallied, however, upon a kopje, and,
though attacked all day, succeeded in holding their own until help
arrived.  They prevented the Boers from destroying or carrying off as
much of the convoy as was under their guns, but the rest was looted
and burned.  The incident was a most unfortunate one, as it supplied
the enemy with a large quantity of stores, of which they were badly in
need. It was the more irritating as it was freely rumoured that a Boer
attack was pending; and there is evidence that a remonstrance was
addressed from the convoy before it left Rietfontein to the General of
the district, pointing out the danger to which it was exposed. The
result was the loss of 120 wagons and of more than half the escort.
The severity of the little action and the hardihood of the defence are
indicated by the fact that the small body who held the kopje lost
fifteen killed and twenty-two wounded, the gunners losing nine out of
fifteen. A relieving force appeared at the close of the action, but no
vigorous pursuit was attempted, although the weather was wet and the
Boers had actually carried away sixty loaded wagons, which could only
go very slowly.  It must be confessed that from its feckless start to
its spiritless finish the story of the Buffel's Hoek convoy is not a
pleasant one to tell.

Clements, having made his way once more to the Magaliesberg range, had
pitched his camp at a place called Nooitgedacht -- not to be confused
with the post upon the Delagoa Railway at which the British prisoners
had been confined.  Here, in the very shadow of the mountain, he
halted for five days, during which, with the usual insouciance of
British commanders, he does not seem to have troubled himself with any
entrenching.  He knew, no doubt, that he was too strong for his
opponent De la Rey, but what he did not know, but might have feared,
was that a second Boer force might appear suddenly upon the scene and
join with De la Rey in order to crush him.  This second Boer force was
that of Commandant Beyers from Warm Baths. By a sudden and skilful
movement the two united, and fell like a thunderbolt upon the British
column, which was weakened by the absence of the Border Regiment. The
result was such a reverse as the British bad not sustained since
Sanna's Post -- a reverse which showed that, though no regular Boer
army might exist, still a sudden coalition of scattered bands could at
any time produce a force which would be dangerous to any British
column which might be taken at a disadvantage.  We had thought that
the days of battles in this war were over, but an action which showed
a missing and casualty roll of 550 proved that in this, as in so many
other things, we were mistaken.

As already stated, the camp of Clements lay under a precipitous cliff,
upon the summit of which he had placed four companies of the 2nd
Northumberland Fusiliers. This strong post was a thousand feet higher
than the camp. Below lay the main body of the force, two more
companies of fusiliers, four of Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd
Mounted Infantry, Kitchener's Horse, yeomanry, and the artillery. The
latter consisted of one heavy naval gun, four guns of the 8th R.F.A.,
and P battery R.H.A. The whole force amounted to about fifteen hundred
men.

It was just at the first break of dawn -- the hour of fate in South
African warfare -- that the battle began. The mounted infantry post
between the camp and the mountains were aware of moving figures in
front of them. In the dim light they could discern that they were
clothed in grey, and that they wore the broad-brimmed hats and
feathers of some of our own irregular corps. They challenged, and the
answer was a shattering volley, instantly returned by the survivors of
the picket.  So hot was the Boer attack that before help could come
every man save one of the picket was on the ground. The sole survivor,
Daley of the Dublins, took no backward step, but continued to steadily
load and fire until help came from the awakened camp.  There followed
a savage conflict at point blank-range.  The mounted infantry men,
rushing half clad to the support of their comrades, were confronted by
an ever-thickening swarm of Boer riflemen, who had already, by working
round on the flank, established their favourite cross fire. Legge, the
leader of the mounted infantry, a hard little Egyptian veteran, was
shot through the head, and his men lay thick around him. For some
minutes it was as hot a corner as any in the war. But Clements himself
had appeared upon the scene, and his cool gallantry turned the tide of
fight. An extension of the line checked the cross fire, and gave the
British in turn a flanking position.  Gradually the Boer riflemen were
pushed back, until at last they broke and fled for their horses in the
rear. A small body were cut off, many of whom were killed and wounded,
while a few were taken prisoners.

This stiff fight of an hour had ended in a complete repulse of the
attack, though at a considerable cost. Both Boers and British had lost
heavily. Nearly all the staff were killed or wounded, though General
Clements had come through untouched.  Fifty or sixty of both sides had
fallen.  But it was noted as an ominous fact that in spite of shell
fire the Boers still lingered upon the western flank.  Were they
coming on again? They showed no signs of it.  And yet they waited in
groups, and looked up towards the beetling crags above them. What were
they waiting for?  The sudden crash of a murderous Mauser fire upon
the summit, with the rolling volleys of the British infantry, supplied
the answer.

Only now must it have been clear to Clements that he was not dealing
merely with some spasmodic attack from his old enemy De la Rey, but
that this was a largely conceived movement, in which a force at least
double the strength of his own had suddenly been concentrated upon
him.  His camp was still menaced by the men whom he had repulsed, and
he could not weaken it by sending reinforcements up the hill. But the
roar of the musketry was rising louder and louder.  It was becoming
clearer that there was the main attack.  It was a Majuba-Hill action
up yonder, a thick swarm of skirmishers closing in from many sides
upon a central band of soldiers.  But the fusiliers were hopelessly
outnumbered, and this rock fighting is that above all others in which
the Boer has an advantage over the regular. A helio on the hill cried
for help.  The losses were heavy, it said, and the assailants
numerous.  The Boers closed swiftly in upon the flanks, and the
fusiliers were no match for their assailants.  Till the very climax
the helio still cried that they were being overpowered, and it is said
that even while working it the soldier in charge was hurled over the
cliff by the onrush of the victorious Boers.

The fight of the mounted infantry men had been at half-past four.  At
six the attack upon the hill had developed, and Clements in response
to those frantic flashes of light had sent up a hundred men of the
yeomanry, from the Fife and Devon squadrons, as a reinforcement.  To
climb a precipitous thousand feet with rifle, bandolier, and spurs, is
no easy feat, yet that roar of battle above them heartened them upon
their way.  But in spite of all their efforts they were only in time
to share the general disaster.  The head of the line of hard-breathing
yeomen reached the plateau just as the Boers, sweeping over the
remnants of the Northumberland Fusiliers, reached the brink of the
cliff. One by one the yeomen darted over the edge, and endeavoured to
find some cover in the face of an infernal point-blank fire. Captain
Mudie of the staff, who went first, was shot down. So was Purvis of
the Fifes, who followed him. The others, springing over their bodies,
rushed for a small trench, and tried to restore the fight. Lieutenant
Campbell, a gallant young fellow, was shot dead as he rallied his men.
Of twenty-seven of the Fifeshires upon the hill six were killed and
eleven wounded.  The statistics of the Devons are equally heroic.
Those yeomen who had not yet reached the crest were in a perfectly
impossible position, as the Boers were firing from complete cover
right down upon them. There was no alternative for them but surrender.
By seven o'clock every British soldier upon the hill, yeoman or
fusilier, had been killed, wounded, or taken.  It is not true that the
supply of csrtridges ran out, and the fusiliers, with the ill-luck
which has pursued the 2nd battalion, were outnumbered and outfought by
better skirmishers than themselves.

Seldom has a General found himself in a more trying position than
Clements, or extricated himself more honourably.  Not only had he lost
nearly half his force, but his camp was no longer tenable, and his
whole army was commanded by the fringe of deadly rifles upon the
cliff.  From the berg to the camp was from 800 to 1,000 yards, and a
sleet of bullets whistled down upon it.  How severe was the fire may
be gauged from the fact that the little pet monkey belonging to the
yeomanry -- a small enough object -- was hit three times, though he
lived to survive as a battle-scarred veteran.  Those wounded in the
early action found themselves in a terrible position, laid out in the
under a withering fire, 'like helpless Aunt Sallies,' as one of
them described it.  'We must get a red flag up, or we shall be blown
off the face of the earth,' says the same correspondent, a corporal of
the Ceylon Mounted Infantry.  'We had a pillow-case, but no red paint.
Then we saw what would do instead, so they made the upright with my
blood, and the horizontal with Paul's.'  It is pleasant to add that
this grim flag was respected by the Boers.  Bullocks and mules fell in
heaps, and it was evident that the question was not whether the battle
could be restored, but whether the guns could be saved. Leaving a
fringe of yeomen, mounted infantry, and Kitchener's Horse to stave off
the Boers, who were already descending by the same steep kloof up
which the yeomen had climbed, the General bent all his efforts to
getting the big naval gun out of danger. Only six oxen were left out
of a team of forty, and so desperate did the situation appear that
twice dynamite was placed beneath the gun to destroy it. Each time,
however, the General intervened, and at last, under a stimulating rain
of pom-pom shells, the great cannon lurched slowly forward, quickening
its pace as the men pulled on the drag-ropes, and the six oxen broke
into a wheezy canter.  Its retreat was covered by the smaller guns
which rained shrapnel upon the crest of the hill, and upon the Boers
who were descending to the camp.  Once the big gun was out of danger,
the others limbered up and followed, their rear still covered by the
staunch mounted infantry, with whom rest all the honours of the
battle.  Cookson and Brooks with 250 men stood for hours between
Clements and absolute disaster.  The camp was abandoned as it stood,
and all the stores, four hundred picketed horses, and, most serious of
all, two wagons of ammunition, fell into the hands of the victors.  To
have saved all his guns, however, after the destruction of half his
force by an active enemy far superior to him in numbers and in
mobility, was a feat which goes far to condone the disaster, and to
increase rather than to impair the confidence which his troops feel in
General Clements. Having retreated for a couple of miles he turned his
big gun round upon the hill, which is called Yeomanry Hill, andd
fire upon the camp, which was being looted by swarms of Boers.  So
bold a face did he present that he was able to remain with his
crippled force upon Yeomanry Hill from about nine until four in the
afternoon, and no attack was pressed home, though he lay under both
shell and rifle fire all day. At four in the afternoon he began his
retreat, which did not cease till he had reached Rietfontein, twenty
miles off, at six o'clock upon the following morning.  His weary men
had been working for twenty-six hours, and actually fighting for
fourteen, but the bitterness of defeat was alleviated by the feeling
that every man, from the General downwards, had done all that was
possible, and that there was every prospect of their having a chance
before long of getting their own back.

The British losses at the battle of Nooitgedacht amounted to 60
killed, 180 wounded, and 315 prisoners, all of whom were delivered up
a few days later at Rustenburg.  Of the Boer losses it is, as usual,
impossible to speak with confidence, but all the evidence points to
their actual casualties being as heavy as those of the British.  There
was the long struggle at the camp in which they were heavily punished,
the fight on the mountain, where they exposed themselves with unusual
recklessness, and the final shelling from shrapnel and from lyddite.
All accounts agree that their attack was morethan usual.  'They
were mowed down in twenties that day, but it had no effect.  They
stood like fanatics,' says one who fought against them.  From first to
last their conduct was most gallant, and great credit is due to their
leaders for the skilful sudden concentration by which they threw their
whole strength upon the exposed force. Some eighty miles separate Warm
Baths from Nooitgedacht, and it seems strange that our Intelligence
Department should have remained in ignorance of so large a movement.

General Broadwood's 2nd Cavalry Brigade had been stationed to the
north of Magaliesberg, some twelve miles westward of Clements, and
formed the next link in the long chain of British forces.  Broadwood
does not appear, however, to have appreciated the importance of the
engagement, and made no energetic movement to take part in it.  If
Colvile isto the charge of having been slow to 'march upon the
cannon' at Sanna's Post, it might be urged that Broadwood in turn
showed some want of energy and judgment upon this occasion.  On the
morning of the 13th his force could hear the heavy firing to the
eastward, and could even see the shells bursting on the top of the
Magaliesberg.  It was but ten or twelve miles distant, and, as his
Elswick guns have a range of nearly five, a very small advance would
have enabled him to make a demonstration against the flank of the
Boers, and so to relieve the pressure upon Clements. It is true that
his force was not large, but it was exceptionally mobile. Whatever the
reasons, no effective advance was made by Broadwood.  On hearing the
result he fell back upon Rustenburg, the nearest British post, his
small force being dangerously isolated.

Those who expected that General Clements would get his own back had
not long to wait. In a few days he was in the field again.  The
remains of his former force had, however, been sent into Pretoria to
refit, and nothing remained of it save the 8th R.F.A. and the
indomitable cow-gun still pocked with the bullets of Nooitgedacht.  He
had also F battery R.H.A., the Inniskillings, the Border regiment, and
a force of mounted infantry under Alderson. More important than all,
however, was the co-operation of General French, who came out from
Pretoria to assist in the operations. On the 19th, only six days after
his defeat, Clements found himself on the very same spot fighting some
at least of the very same men.  This time, however, there was no
element of surprise, and the British were able to approach the task
with deliberation and method.  The result was that both upon the 19th
and 20th the Boers were shelled out of successive positions with
considerable loss, and driven altogether away from that part of the
Magaliesberg.  Shortly afterwards General Clements was recalled to
Pretoria, to take over the command of the 7th Division, General Tucker
having been appointed to the military command of Bloemfontein in the
place of the gallant Hunter, who, to the regret of the whole army, was
invalided home.  General Cunningham henceforward commanded the column
which Clements had led back to the Magaliesberg.

Upon November 13th the first of a series of attacks was made upon the
posts along the Delagoa Railway line.  These were the work of
Viljoen's commando, who, moving swiftly from the north, threw
themselves upon the small garrisons of Balmoral and of Wilge River,
stations which are about six miles apart. At the former was a
detachment of the Buffs, and at the latter of the Royal Fusiliers.
The attack was well delivered, but in each instance was beaten back
with heavy loss to the assailants. A picket of the Buffs was captured
at the first rush, and the detachment lost six killed and nine
wounded.  No impression was made upon the position, however, and the
double attack seems to have cost the Boers a large number of
casualties.

Another incident calling for some mention was the determined attack
made by the Boers upon the town of Vryheid, in the extreme south-east
of the Transvaal near the Natal border.  Throughout November this
district had been much disturbed, and the small British garrison had
evacuated the town and taken up a position on the adjacent hills.
Upon December 11th the Boers attempted to carry the trenches.  The
garrison of the town appears to have consisted of the 2nd Royal
Lancaster regiment, some five hundred strong, a party of the
Lancashire Fusiliers, 150 strong, and fifty men of the Royal Garrison
Artillery, with a small body of mounted infantry.  They held a hill
about half a mile north of the town, and commanding it.  The attack,
which was a surprise in the middle of the night, broke upon the
pickets of the British, who held their own in a way which may have
been injudicious but was certainly heroic.  Instead of falling back
when seriously attacked, the young officers in charge of these
outposts refused to move, and were speedily under such a fire that it
was impossible to reinforce them.  There were four outposts, under
Woodgate, Theobald, Lippert, and Mangles. The attack at 2.15 on a cold
dark morning began at the post held by Woodgate, the Boers coming
hand-to-hand before they were detected.  Woodgate, who was unarmed at
the instant, seized a hammer, and rushed at the nearest Boer, but was
struck by two bullets and killed.  His post was dispersed or taken.
Theobald and Lippert, warned by the firing, held on behind their
sangars, and were ready for the storm which burst over them. Lippert
was unhappily killed, and his ten men all hit or taken, but young
Theobald held his own under a heavy fire for twelve hours.  Mangles
also, the gallant son of a gallant father, held his post all day with
the utmost tenacity.  The troops in the trenches behind were never
seriously pressed, thanks to the desperate resistance of the outposts,
but Colonel Gawne of the Lancasters was unfortunately killed.  Towards
evening the Boers abandoned the attack, leaving fourteen of their
number dead upon the ground, from which it may be guessed that their
total casualties were not less than a hundred.  The British losses
were three officers and five men killed, twenty-two men wounded, and
thirty men with one officer missing -- the latter being the survivors
of those outposts which were overwhelmed by the Boer advance.

A few incidents stand out among the daily bulletins of snipings,
skirmishes, and endless marchings which make the dull chronicle of
these, the last months of the year 1900.  These must be enumerated
without any attempt at connecting them.  The first is the
longdrawn-out siege or investment of Schweizer-Renecke. This small
village stands upon the Harts River, on the western border of the
Transvaal.  It is not easy to understand why the one party should
desire to hold, or the other to attack, a position so insignificant.
>From August 19th onwards it was defended by a garrison of 250 men,
under the very capable command of Colonel Chamier, who handled a small
business in a way which marks him as a leader. The Boer force, which
varied in numbers from five hundred to a thousand, never ventured to
push home an attack, for Chamier, fresh from the experience of
Kimberley, had taken such precautions that his defences were
formidable, if not impregnable. Late in September a relieving force
under Colonel Settle threw fresh supplies into the town, but when he
passed on upon his endless march the enemy closed in once more, and
the siege was renewed.  It lasted for several months, until a column
withdrew the garrison and abandoned the position.

Of all the British detachments, the two which worked hardest and
marched furthest during this period of the war was the 21st Brigade
(Derbysbires, Sussex, and Camerons) under General Bruce Hamilton, and
the column under Settle, which operated down the western border of the
Orange River Colony, and worked round and round with such pertinacity
that it was familiarly known as Settle's Imperial Circus.  Much hard
and disagreeable work, far more repugnant to the soldier than the
actual dangers of war, fell to the lot of Bruce Hamilton and his men.
With Kroonstad as their centre they were continually working through
the dangerous Lindley and Heilbron districts, returning to the railway
line only to start again immediately upon a fresh quest. It was work
for mounted police, not for infantry soldiers, but what they were
given to do they did to the best of their ability. Settle's men had a
similar thankless task. From the neighbourhood of Kimberley he marched
in November with his small column down the border of the Orange River
Colony, capturing supplies and bringing in refugees.  He fought one
brisk action with Hertzog's commando at Kloof, and then, making his
way across the colony, struck the railway line again at Edenburg on
December 7th, with a train of prisoners and cattle.

Rundle also had put in much hard work in his efforts to control the
difficult district in the north-east of the Colony which had been
committed to his care. He traversed in November from north to south
the same country which he had already so painfully traversed from
south to north. With occasional small actions he moved about from
Vrede to Reitz, and so to Bethlehem and Harrismith.  On him, as on all
other commanders, the vicious system of placing small garrisons in the
various towns imposed a constant responsibility lest they should be
starved or overwhelmed.

The year and the century ended by a small reverse to the British arms
in the Transvaal.  This consisted in the capture of a post at Helvetia
defended by a detachment of the Liverpool Regiment and by a 4.7
gun. Lydenburg, being seventy miles off the railway line, had a chain
of posts connecting it with the junction at Machadodorp.  These posts
were seven in number, ten miles apart, each defended by 250 men.  Of
these Helvetia was the second.  The key of the position was a strongly
fortified hill about three-quarters of a mile from the headquarter
camp, and commanding it. This post was held by Captain Kirke with
forty garrison artillery to work the big gun, and seventy Liverpool
infantry.  In spite of the barbed-wire entanglements, the Boers most
gallantly rushed this position, and their advance was so rapid, or the
garrison so slow, that the place was carried with hardly a shot fired.
Major Cotton, who commanded the main lines, found himself deprived in
an instant of nearly half his force and fiercely attacked by a
victorious and exultant enemy. His position was much too extended for
the small force at his disposal, and the line of trenches was pierced
and enfiladed at many points.  It must be acknowledged that the
defences were badly devised -- little barbed wire, frail walls, large
loopholes, and the outposts so near the trenches that the assailants
could reach them as quickly as the supports.  With the dawn Cotton's
position was serious, if not desperate.  He was not only surrounded,
but was commanded from Gun Hill. Perhaps it would have been wiser if,
after being wounded, he had handed over the command to Jones, his
junior officer. A stricken man's judgement can never be so sound as
that of the hale. However that may be, he came to the conclusion that
the position w~s untenable, and that it was best to prevent further
loss of life. Fifty of the Liverpools were killed and wounded, 200
taken.  No ammunition of the gun was captured, but the Boers were able
to get safely away with this humiliating evidence of their victory.
One post, under Captain Wilkinson with forty men, held out with
success, and harassed the enemy in their retreat.  As at Dewetsdorp
and at Nooitgedacht. the Boers were unable to retain their prisoners,
so that the substantial fruits of their enterprise were small, but it
forms none the less one more of those incidents which may cause us to
respect our enemy and to be critical towards ourselves.[Footnote:
Considering that Major Stapelton Cotton was himself wounded in three
places during the action (one of these wounds being in the head), he
has had hard measure in being deprived of his commission by a
court-martial which sat eight months after the event. It is to be
earnestly hoped that there may be sowe revision of this severe
sentence.]

In the last few months of the year some of those corps which had
served their time or which were needed elsewhere were allowed to leave
the seat of war. By the middle of November the three different corps
of the City Imperial Volunteers, the two Canadian contingents,
Lumsden's Horse, the Composite Regiment of Guards, six hundred
Australians, A battery R.H.A., and the volunteer companies of the
regular regiments, were all homeward bound.  This loss of several
thousand veteran troops before the war was over was to be deplored,
and though unavoidable in the case of volunteer contingents, it is
difficult to explain where regular troops are concerned. Early in the
new year the Government was compelled to send out strong
reinforcements to take their place.

Early in December Lord Roberts also left the country, to take over the
duties of Commander-in-Chief. High as his reputation stood when, in
January, he landed at Cape Town, it is safe to say that it had been
immensely enhanced when, ten months later, he saw from the
quarter-deck of the 'Canada' the Table Mountain growing dimmer in the
distance.  He found a series of disconnected operations, in which we
were uniformly worsted.  He speedily converted them into a series of
connected operations in which we were almost uniformly successful.
Proceeding to the front at the beginiung of February, within a
fortnight he had relieved Kimberley, within a month he had destroyed
Cronje's force, and within six weeks he was in Bloemfontein.  Then,
after a six weeks' halt which could not possibly have been shortened,
he made another of his tiger leaps, and within a month had occupied
Johannesburg and Pretoria. From that moment the issue of the campaign
was finally settled, and though a third leap was needed, which carried
him to Komatipoort, and though brave and obstinate men might still
struggle against their destiny, he had done what was essential, and
the rest, however difficult, was only the detail of the campaign. A
kindly gentleman, as well as a great soldier, his nature revolted from
all harshness, and a worse man might. have been a better leader in the
last hopeless phases of the war.  He remembered, no doubt, how Grant
had given Lee's army their horses, but Lee at the time had been
thoroughly beaten, and his men had laid down their arms.  A similar
boon to the partially conquered Boers led to very different results,
and the prolongation of the war is largely due to this act of
clemency.  At the same time political and military considerations were
opposed to each other upon the point, and his moral position in the
use of harsher measures is the stronger since a policy of conciliation
had been tried and failed.  Lord Roberts returned to London with the
respect and love of his soldiers and of his fellow-countrymen.  A
passage from his farewell address to his troops may show the qualities
which endeared him to them

'The service which the South African Force has performed is, I venture
to think, unique in the annals of war, inasmuch as it has been
absolutely almost incessant for a whole year, in some cases for more
than a year. There has been no rest, no days off to recruit, no going
into winter quarters, as in other campaigns which have extended over a
long period. For months together, in fierce heat, in biting cold, in
pouring rain, you, my comrades, have marched and fought without halt,
and bivouacked without shelter from the elements. You frequently have
had to continue marching with your clothes in rags and your boots
without soles, time being of such consequence that it was impossible
for you to remain long enough in one place to refit. When not engaged
in actual battle you have been continually shot at from behind kopjes
by invisible enemies to whom every inch of the country was familiar,
and who, from the peculiar nature of the country, were able to inflict
severe punishment while perfectly safe themselves. You have forced
your way through dense jungles, over precipitous mountains, through
and over which with infinite manual labour you have had to drag heavy
guns and ox-wagons.  You have covered with almost incredible speed
enormous distances, and that often on very short supplies of food. You
have endured the sufferings inevitable in war to sick and wounded men
far from the base, without a murmur and even with cheerfulness.'

The words reflect honour both upon the troops addressed and upon the
man who addressed them. From the middle of December 1900 Lord
Kitchener took over the control of the campaign.

During the whole war the task of the British had been made very much
more difficult by they expressed sympathy with the Boers from
the political association known as the Afrikander Bond, which either
inspired or represented the views which prevailed among the great
majority of the Dutch inhabitants of Cape Colony.  How strong was this
rebel impulse may be gauged by the fact that in some of the border
districts no less than ninety per cent. of the voters joined the Boer
invaders upon the occasion of their first entrance into the Colony.
It is not pretended that these men suffered from any political
grievances whatever, and their action is to be ascribed partly to a
natural sympathy with their northern kinsmen, and partly to racial
ambition and to personal dislike to their British neighbours.  The
liberal British policy towards the natives had especially alienated
the Dutch, and had made as well-marked a line of cleavage in South
Africa as the slave question had done in the States of the Union.

With the turn of the war the discontent in Cape Colony became less
obtrusive, if not less acute, but in the later months of the year 1900
it increased to a degree which became dangerous.  The fact of the
farm-burning in the conquered countries, and the fiction of outrages
by the Brjtish troops, raised a storm of indignation.  The annexation
of the Republics, meaning the final disappearance of any Dutch flag
from South Africa, was a racial humiliation which was bitterly
resented.  The Dutch papers became very violent, and the farmers much
excited.  The agitation culminated in a conference at Worcester upon
December 6th, at which some thousands of delegates were present. It is
suggestive of the Imperial nature of the struggle that the assembly of
Dutch Afrikanders was carried out under the muzzles of Canadian
artillery, and closely watched by Australian cavalry.  Had violent
words transformed themselves into deeds, all was ready for the crisis.

Fortunately the good sense of the assembly prevailed, and the
agitation, though bitter, remained within those wide limits which a
British constitution permits. Three resolutions were passed, one
asking that the war be ended, a second that the independence of the
Republics be restored, and a third protesting against the actions of
Sir Alfred Milner.  A deputation which carried these to the Governor
received a courteous but an uncompromising reply.  Sir Alfred Milner
pointed out that the Home Government, all the great Colonies, and half
the Cape were unanimous in their policy, and that it was folly to
imagine that it could be reversed on account of a local agitation. All
were agreed in the desire to end the war, but the last way of bringing
this aboutwas by encouraging desperate men to go on fighting in a
hopeless cause. Such was the general nature of the Governor's reply,
which was, as might be expected, entirely endorsed by the British
Government and people.

Had De Wet, in the operations which have already been described,
evaded Charles Kiox and crossed the Orange River, his entrance into
the Colony would have been synchronous with the congress at Worcester,
and the situation would have become more acute.  This peril was
fortunately averted.  The agitation in the Colony suggested to the
Boer leaders, however, that here was an untouched recruiting ground,
and that small mobile invading parties might gather strength and
become formidable.  It was obvious, also, that by enlarging the field
of operations the difficulties of the British Commander-in-chief would
be very much increased, and the pressure upon the Boer guerillas in
the Republics relaxed.  Therefore, in spite of De Wet's failure to
penetrate the Colony, several smaller bands under less-known leaders
were despatched over the Orange River.  With the help of the
information and the supplies furnished by the local farmers, these
bands wandered for many months over the great expanse of the Colony,
taking refuge, when hard pressed, among the mountain ranges.  They
moved swiftly about, obtaining remounts from their friends, and
avoiding everything in the nature of an action, save when the odds
were overwhelmingly in their favour.  Numerous small posts or patrols
cut off, many skirmishes, and one or two railway smashes were the
fruits of this invasion, which lasted till the end of the war, and
kept the Colony in an extreme state of unrest during that period.  A
short account must be given here of the movement and exploits of these
hostile bands, avoiding, as far as possible, that catalogue of obscure
'fonteins' and 'kops' which mark their progress.

The invasion was conducted by two main bodies, which shed off numerous
small raiding parties.  Of these two, one operated on the western side
of the Colony, reaching the sea-coast in the Clanwilliam district, and
attaining a point which is less than a hundred miles from Cape Town.
The other penetrated even more deeply down the centre of the Colony,
reaching almost to the sea in the Mossel Bay direction. Yet the
incursion, although so far-reaching, had small effect, since the
invaders held nothing save the ground on which they stood, and won
their way, not by victory, but by the avoidance of danger.  Some
recruits were won to their cause, but they do not seem at that time to
have been more than a few hundreds in number, and to have been drawn
for the most part from the classes of the community which had least to
lose and least to offer.

The Western Boers were commanded by Judge Hertzog of the Free State,
having with him Brand, the son of the former president, and about
twelve hundred well-mounted men.  Crossing the Orange Biver at Sand
Drift, north of Colesberg, upon December 16th, they paused at
Kameelfontein to gather up a small post of thirty yeomen and guardsmen
under Lieutenant Fletcher, the wellknown oar. Meeting with a stout
resistance, and learning that British forces were already converging
upon them, they abandoned the attack, and turning away from Colesberg
they headed west, cutting the railway line twenty miles to the north
of De Aar.  On the 22nd they occupied Britstown, which is eighty miles
inside the border, and on the same day they captured a small body of
yeomanry who had been following them.  These prisoners were released
again some days later.  Taking a sweep round towards Prieska and
Strydenburg, they pushed south again.  At the end of the year
Hertzog's column was 150 miles deep in the Colony, sweeping through
the barren and thinly-inhabited western lands, heading apparently for
Fraserburg and Beaufort West.

The second column was commanded by Kritzinger, a burgher of Zastron,
in the Orange River Colony. His force was about 800 strong.  Crossing
the border at Rhenoster Hoek upon December 16th, they pushed for
Burghersdorp, but were headed off by a British column. Passing through
Venterstad, they made for Steynsberg, fighting two indecisive
skirmishes with small British forces.  The end of the year saw them
crossing the rail road at Sherburne, north of Rosmead Junction, where
they captured a train as they passed, containing some Colonial
troops. At this time they were a hundred miles inside the Colony, and
nearly three hundred from Hertzog's western column.

In the meantime Lord Kitchener, who had descended for a few days to De
Aar, had shown great energy in organising small mobile columns which
should follow and, if possible, destroy the invaders.  Martial law was
proclaimed in the parts of the Colony affected, and as the invaders
came further south the utmost enthusiasm was shown by the loyalists,
who formed themselves everywhere into town guards.  The existing
Colonial regiments, such as Brabant's, the Imperial and South African
Light Horse - Thorneycroft's, Rimington's, and the others -- had
already been brought up to strength again, and now two new regiments
were added, Kitchener's Bodyguard and Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, the
latter being raised by Johann Colenbrander, who had made a name for
himself in the Rhodesian wars.  At this period of the war between
twenty and thirty thousand Cape colonists were under arms.  Many of
these were untrained levies, but they possessed the martial spirit of
the race, and they set free more seasoned troops for other duties.

It will be most convenient and least obscure to follow the movements
of the western force (Hertzog's), and afterwards to consider those of
the eastern (Kritzinger's).  Theng of the year saw the mobile
column of Free Staters 150 miles over the border, pushing swiftly
south over the barren surface of the Karoo.  It is a country of
scattered farms and scanty population; desolate plains curving upwards
until they rise into still more desolate mountain ranges.  Moving in a
very loose formation over a wide front, the Boers swept southwards.
On or about January 4th they took possession of the small town of
Calvinia, which remained their headquarters for more than a
month. From this point their roving bands made their way as far as the
seacoast in the Clanwilliam direction, for they expected at Lanmbert's
Bay to meet with a vessel with mercenaries and guns from Europe.  They
pushed their outposts also as far as Sutherland and Beaufort West in
the south.  On January 15th strange horsemen were seen hovering about
the line at Touws River, and the citizens of Cape Town learned with
amazement that the war had been carried to within a hundred miles of
their own doors.

Whilst the Boers were making this daring raid a force consisting of
several mobile columns was being organised by General Settle to arrest
and finally to repel the western invasion.  The larger body was under
the command of Colonel De Lisle, an oficer who brought to the
operations of war the same energy and thoroughness with which he had
made the polo team of an infantry regiment the champions of the whole
British Army. His troops consisted of the 6th Mounted Infantry, the
New South Wales Mounted Infantry, the Irish Yeomanry, a section of R
battery R.H.A., and a pom-pom. With this small but mobile and hardy
force he threw himself in front of Hertzog's line of advance. On
January 13th be occupied Piquetburg, eighty miles south of the Boer
headquarters.  On the 23rd he was at Clanwilliam, fifty miles
south-~vest of them.  To his right were three other small British
columns under Bethune, Thorneycroft, and Henniker, the latter resting
upon the railway at Matjesfontein, and the whole line extending over
120 miles -- barring the southern path to the invaders.

Though Hertzog at Calvinia and De Lisle at Clanwilliam were only fifty
miles apart, the intervening country is among the most broken and
mountainous in South Africa.  Between the two points, and nearer to De
Lisle than to Hertzog, flows the Doorn River.  The Boers advancing
from Calvinia came into touch with the British scouts at this point,
and drove them in upon January 21st.  On the 28th De Lisle, having
been reinforced by Bethune's column, was able at last to take the
initiative. Bethune's force consisted mainly of Colonials, and
included Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, the Cape Mounted Police, Cape
Mounted Rifles, Brabant's Horse, and the Diamond Field Horse.  At the
end of January the united forces of Bethune and of De Lisle advanced
upon Calvinia.  The difficulties lay rather in the impassable country
than in the resistance of an enemy who was determined to refuse
battle. On February 6th, after a fine march, De Lisle and his men took
possession of Calvinia, which had been abandoned by the Boers. It is
painful to add that during the month that they had held the town they
appear to have behaved with great harshness, especially to the
kaffirs.  The flogging and shooting of a coloured man named Esan forms
one more incident in the dark story of the Boer and his relations to
the native.

The British were now sweeping north on a very extended front.
Colenbrander had occupied Van Rhyns Dorp, to the east of Calvinia,
while Bethune's force was operating to the west of it. De Lisle hardly
halted at Calvinia, but pushed onwards to Williston, covering
seventy-two miles of broken country in forty-eight hours, one of the
most amazing performances of the war. Quick as he was, the Boers were
quicker still, and during his northward march he does not appear to
have actually come into contact with them. Their line of retreat lay
through Carnarvon, and upon February 22nd they crossed the railway
line to the north of De Aar, and joined upon February 26th the new
invading force under De Wet, who had now crossed the Orange River. De
Lisle, who had passed over five hundred miles of barren country since
he advanced from Piquetburg, made for the railway at Victoria West,
and was despatched from that place on February 22nd to the scene of
action in the north. From all parts Boer and Briton were concentrating
in their effort to aid or to repel the inroad of the famous guerilla.

Before describing this attempt it would be well to trace the progress
of the eastern invasion (Kritzinger's), a movement which may be
treated rapidly, since it led to no particular military result at that
time, though it lasted long after Hertzog's force had been finally
dissipated.  Several small columns, those of Williams, Byng, Grenfell,
and Lowe, all under the direction of Haig, were organised to drive
back these commandos; but so nimble were the invaders, so vast the
distances and so broken the country, that it was seldom that the
forces came into contact. The operations were conducted over a portion
of the Colony which is strongly Dutch in sympathy, and the enemy,
though they do not appear to have obtained any large number of
recruits, were able to gather stores, horses, and information wherever
they went.

When last mentioned Kritzinger's men had crossed the railway north of
Rosmead on December 30th, and held up a train containing some Colonial
troops. From then onwards a part of them remained in the Middelburg
and Graaf-Reinet districts, while part moved towards the south.  On
January 11th there was a sharp skirmish near Murraysburg, in which
Byng's column was engaged, at the cost of twenty casualties, all of
Brabant's or the South African Light Horse.  On the 16th a very rapid
movement towards the south began. On that date Boers appeared at
Aberdeen, and on the 18th at Willowmore, having covered seventy miles
in two days.  Their long, thin line was shredded out over 150 miles,
and from Maraisburg, in the north, to Uniondale, which is only thirty
miles from the coast, there was rumour of their presence.  In this
wild district and in that of Oudtshoorn the Boer vanguard flitted in
and out of the hills, Haig's column striving hard to bring them to an
action.  So well-informed were the invaders that they were always able
to avoid the British concentrations, while if a British outpost or
patrol was left exposed it was fortunate if it escaped disaster.  On
February 6th a small body of twenty-five of the 7th King's Dragoon
Guards and of the West Australians, under Captain Oliver, were
overwhelmed at Klipplaat, after a very fine defence, in which they
held their own against 200 Boers for eight hours, and lost nearly
fifty per cent. of their number.  On the 12th a patrol of yeomanry was
surprised and taken near Willowmore.

The coming of De Wet had evidently been the signal for all the Boer
raiders to concentrate, for in the second week of February Kritzinger
also began to fall back, as Hertzog had done in the west, followed
closely by the British columns.  He did not, however, actually join De
Wet, and his evacuation of the country was never complete, as was the
case with Hertzog's force. On the 19th Kritzinger was at Bethesda,
with Gorringe and Lowe at his heels.  On the 23rd an important railway
bridge at Fish River, north of Cradock, was attacked, but the attempt
was foiled by the resistance of a handful of Cape Police and
Lancasters.  On March 6th a party of Boers occupied the village of
Pearston, capturing a few rifles and some ammunition.  On the same
date there was a skirmish between Colonel Parsons's column and a party
of the enemy to the north of Aberdeen. The main body of the invading
force appears to have been lurking in this neighbourhood, as they were
able upon April 7th to cut off a strong British patrol, consisting of
a hundred Lancers and Yeomanry, seventy-five of whom remained as
temporary prisoners in the hands of the enemy. With this success we
may for the time leave Kritzinger and his lieutenant, Scheepers, who
commanded that portion of his force which had penetrated to the south
of the Colony.

The two invasions which have been here described, that of Hertzog in
the west and of Kritzinger in the midlands, would appear in themselves
to be unimportant military operations, since they were carried out by
small bodies of men whose policy was rather to avoid than to overcome
resistance.  Their importance, however, is due to the fact that they
were really the forerunners of a more important incursion upon the
part of De Wet. The object of these two bands of raiders was to spy
out the land, so that on the arival of the main body all might be
ready for that general rising of their kinsmen in the Colony which was
the last chance, not of winning, but of prolonging the war.  It must
be confessed that, however much their reason might approve of the
Government under which they lived, the sentiment of the Cape Dutch had
been cruelly, though unavoidably, hurt in the course of the war.  The
appearance of so popular a leader as De Wet with a few thousand
veterans in the very heart of their country might have stretched their
patience to the breaking-point.  Inflamed, as they were, by that
racial hatred which had always smouldered, and had now been fanned
into a blaze by the speeches of their leaders and by the fictions of
their newspapers, they were ripe for mischief, while they had before
their eyes an object-lesson of the impotence of our military system in
those small bands who had kept the country in a ferment for so
long. All was propitious, therefore, for the attempt which Steyn and
De Wet were about to make to carry the war into the enemy's country.

We last saw De Wet when, after a long chase, he had been headed back
from the Orange River, and, winnining clear from Knox's pursuit, had
in the third week of December passed successfully through the British
cordon between Thabanchu and Ladybrand.  Thence he made his way to
Senekal, and proceeded, in spite of the shaking which he had had, to
recruit and recuperate in the amazing way which a Boer army has.
There is no force so easy to drive and so difficult to destroy.  The
British columns still kept in touch with De Wet, but found it
impossible to bring him to an action in the difficult district to
which he had withdrawn. His force had split up into numerous smaller
bodies, capable of reuniting at a signal from their leader.  These
scattered bodies, mobile as ever, vanished if seriously attacked,
while keenly on the alert to pounce upon any British force which might
be overpowered before assistance could arrive.  Such an opportunity
came to the commando led by Philip Botha, and the result was another
petty reverse to the British arms.

Upon January 3rd Colonel White's small column was pushing north, in
co-operation with those of Knox, Pilcher, and the others.  Upon that
date it had reached a point just north of Lindley, a district which
has never been a fortunate one for the invaders.  A patrol of
Kitchener' s newly raised bodyguard, under Colonel Laing, 120 strong,
was sent forward to reconnoitre upon the road from Lindley to Reitz.

The scouting appears to have been negligently done, there being only
two men out upon each flank. The little force walked into one of those
horse-shoe positions which the Boers love, and learned by a sudden
volley from a kraal upon their right that the enemy was present in
strength.  On attempting to withdraw it was instantly evident that the
Boers were on all sides and in the rear with a force which numbered at
least five to one.  The camp of the main column was only four miles
away, however, and the bodyguard, having sent messages of their
precarious position, did all they could to make a defence until help
could reach them. Colonel Laing had fallen, shot through the heart,
but found a gallant successor in young Nairne, the adjutant.  Part of
the force had thrown themselves, under Nairne and Milne, into a donga,
which gave some shelter from the sleet of bullets.  The others, under
Captain Butters, held on to a ruined kraal.  The Boers pushed the
attack very rapidly, however, and were soon able with their superior
numbers to send a raking fire down the donga, which made it a perfect
death-trap.  Still hoping that the laggard reinforcements would come
up, the survivors held desperately on; but both in the kraal and in
the donga their numbers were from minute to minute diminishing.  There
was no formal surrender and no white flag, for, when fifty per
cent. of the British were down, the Boers closed in swiftly and rushed
the position. Philip Botha, the brother of the commandant, who led the
Boers, behaved with courtesy and humanity to the survivors; but many
of the wounds were inflicted with those horrible explosive and
expansive missiles, the use of which among civilised combatants should
now and always be a capital offence.  To disable one's adversary is a
painful necessity of warfare, but nothing can excuse the wilful
mutilation and torture which is inflicted by these brutal devices.

'How many of you are there?' asked Botha.  'A hundred,' said an
officer.  'It is not true.  There are one hundred and twenty.  I
counted you as you came along.'  The answer of the Boer leader shows
how carefully the small force had been nursed until it was in an
impossible position.  The margin was a narrow one, however, for within
fifteen minutes of the disaster White's guns were at work.  There may
be some question as to whether the rescuing force could have come
sooner, but there can be none as to the resistance of the bodyguard.
They held out to the last cartridge. Colonel Laing and three officers
with sixteen men were killed, four officers and twenty-two men were
wounded. The high proportion of fatal casualties can only be explained
by the deadly character of the Boer bullets. Hardly a single horse of
the bodyguard was left unwounded, and the profit to the victors, since
they were unable to carry away their prisoners, lay entirely in the
captured rifles.  It is worthy of record that the British wounded were
despatched to Heilbron without guard through the Boer forces.  That
they arrived there unmolested is due to the forbearance of the enemy
and to the tact and energy of Surgeon-Captain Porter, who commanded
the convoy.

Encouraged by this small success, and stimulated by the news that
Hertzog and Kritzinger had succeeded in penetrating the Colony without
disaster, De Wet now prepared to follow them.  British scouts to the
north of Kroonstad reported horsemen riding south and east, sometimes
alone, sometimes in small parties They were recruits going to swell
the forces of De Wet. On January 23rd five hundred men crossed the
line, journeying in the same direction.  Before the end of the month,
having gathered together about 2,500 men with fresh horses at the
Doornberg, twenty miles north of Winburg, the Boer leader was ready
for one of his lightning treks once more.  On January 28th he broke
south through the British net, which appears to have had more meshes
than cord. Passing the Bloemfontein-Ladybrand line at Israel Poort he
swept southwards, with British columns still wearily trailing behind
him, like honest bulldogs panting after a greyhound.

Before following him upon this new venture it is necessary to say a
few words about that peace movement in the Boer States to which some
allusion has already been made. On December 20th Lord Kitchener had
issued a proclamation which was intended to have the effect of
affording protection to those burghers who desired to cease fighting,
but who were unable to do so without incurring the enmity of their
irreconcilable brethren.  'It is hereby notified,' said the document,
'to all burghers that if after this date they voluntarily surrender
they will be allowed to live with their families in Government laagers
until such time as the guerilla warfare now being carried on will
admit of their returning safely to their homes.  All stock and
property brought in at the time of the surrender of such burghers will
be respected and paid for if requisitioned.'  This wise and liberal
offer was sedulously concealed from their men by the leaders of the
fighting commandos, but was largely taken advantage of by those Boers
to whom it was conveyed.  Boer refugee camps were formed at Pretoria,
Johannesburg, Kroonstad, Bloemfontein, Warrenton; and other points, to
which by degrees the whole civil population came to be transferred.
It was the reconcentrado system of Cuba over again, with the essential
difference that the guests of the British Government were well fed and
well treated during their detention. Within a few months the camps had
50,000 inmates.

It was natural that some of these people, having experienced the
amenity of British rule, and being convinced of the hopelessness of
the struggle, should desire to convey their feelings to their friends
and relations in the field.  Both in the Transvaal and in the Orange
River Colony Peace Committees were formed, which endeavoured to
persuade their countrymen to bow to the inevitable.  A remarkable
letter was published from Piet de Wet, a man who had fought bravely
for the Boer cause, to his brother, the famous general. 'Which is
better for the Republics,' he asked, 'to continue the struggle and run
the risk of total ruin as a nation, or to submit?  Could we for a
moment think of taking back the country if it were offered to us, with
thousands of people to be supported by a Government which has not a
farthing?... Put passionate feeling aside for a moment and use
common-sense, and you will then agree with me that the best thing for
the people and the country is to give in, to be loyal to the new
government, and to get responsible government...  Should the war
continue a few months longer the nation will become so poor that they
will be the working class in the country, and disappear as a nation in
the future... The British are convinced that they have conquered the
land and its people, and consider the matter ended, and they only try
to treat magnanimously those who are continuing the struggle in order
to prevent unnecessary bloodshed.'

Such were the sentiments of those of the burghers who were in favour
of peace.  Their eyes had beend and their bitterness was
transferred from the British Government to those individual Britons
who, partly from idealism and partly from party passion, had
encouraged them to their undoing. But their attempt to convey their
feelings to their countrymen in the field ended in tragedy. Two of
their number, Morgendaal and Wessels, who had journeyed to De Wet's
camp, were condemned to death by order of that leader.  In the case of
Morgendaal the execution actually took place, and seems to have been
attended by brutal circumstances, the man having been thrashed with a
sjambok before being put to death.  The circumstances are still
surrounded by such obscurity that it is impossible to say whether the
message of the peace envoys was to the General himself or to the men
under his command.  In the former case the man was murdered.  In the
latter the Boer leader was within his rights, though the rights may
have been harshly construed and brutally enforced.

On January 29th, in the act of breaking south, De Wet's force, or a
portion of it, had a sharp brush with a small British column (Crewe's)
at Tabaksberg, which lies about forty miles north-east of
Bloemfontein; This small force, seven hundred strong, found itself
suddenly in the presence of a very superior body of the enemy, and had
some difficulty in extricating itself. A pom-pom was lost in this
affair.  Crewe fell back upon Knox, and the combined columns made for
Bloemfontein, whence they could use the rails for their transport. De
Wet meanwhile moved south as far as Smithfield, and then, detaching
several small bodies to divert the attention of the British, he struck
due west, and crossed the track between Springfontein and
Jagersfontein road, capturing the usual supply train as he passed. On
February 9th he had reached Philippolis, well ahead of the British
pursuit, and spent a day or two in making his final arrangements
before carrying the war over the border. His force consisted at this
time of nearly 8,000 men, with two 15-pounders, one pom-pom, and one
maxim.  The garrisons of all the towns in the southwest of the Orange
River Colony had been removed in accordance with the policy of
concentration, so De Wet found himself for the moment in a friendly
country.

The British, realising how serious a situation might arise should De
Wet succeed in penetrating the Colony and in joining Hertzog and
Kritzinger, made every effort both to head him off and to bar his
return.  General Lyttelton at Naauwpoort directed the operations, and
the possession of the railway line enabled him to concentrate his
columns rapidly at the point of danger. On February 11th De Wet forded
the Orange River at Zand Drift, and found himself once more upon
British territory.  Lyttelton's plan of campaign appears to have been
to allow De Wet to come some distance south, and then to hold him in
front by De Lisle's force, while a number of small mobile columns
under Plumer, Crabbe, Henniker, Bethune, Haig, and Thorneycroft should
shepherd him behind.  On crossing, De Wet at once moved westwards,
where, upon February 12th, Plumer's column, consisting of the
Queensland Mounted Infantry, the Imperial Bushmen, and part of the
King's Dragoon Guards, came into touch with his rearguard. All day
upon the 13th and 14th, amid terrific rain, Plumer's hardy troopers
followed close upon the enemy, gleaning a few ammunition wagons, a
maxim, and some prisoners.  The invaders crossed the railway line near
Houtnek, to the north of De Aar, in the early hours of the 15th,
moving upon a front of six or eight miles.  Two armoured trains from
the north and the south closed in upon him as he passed, Plumer still
thundered in his rear, and a small column under Crabbe came pressing
from the south.  This sturdy Colonel of Grenadiers had already been
wounded four times in the war, so that he might be excused if he felt
some personal as well as patriotic reasons for pushing a relentless
pursuit.  On crossing the railroad De Wet turned furiously upon his
pursuers, and, taking an excellent position upon a line of kopjes
rising out of the huge expanse of the Karoo, he fought a stubborn
rearguard action in order to give time for his convoy to get ahead. He
was hustled off the hills, however, the Australian Bushmen with great
dash carrying the central kopje, and the guns driving the invaders to
the westward. Leaving all his wagons and his reserve ammunition behind
him, the guerilla chief struck north-west, moving with great
swiftness, but never succeeding in shaking off Plumer's pursuit.  The
weather continued, however, to be atrocious, rain and hail falling
with such violence that the horses could hardly be induced to face it.
For a week the two sodden, sleepless, mud-splashed little armies swept
onwards over the Karoo.  De Wet passed northwards through Strydenburg,
past Hopetown, and so to the Orange River, which was found to be too
swollen with the rains to permit of his crossing. Here upon the 23rd,
after a march of forty-five miles on end, Plumer ran into him once
more, and captured with very little fighting a fifteen-pounder, a
pom-pom, and close on to a hundred prisoners.  Slipping away to the
east, De Wet upon February 24th crossed the railroad again between
Krankuil and Orange River Station, with Thorneycroft's column hard
upon his heels.  The Boer leader was now more anxious to escape from
the Colony than ever he had been to enter it, and he rushed
distractedly from point to point, endeavouring to find a ford over the
great turbid river which cut him off from his own country. Here he was
joined by Hertzog's commando with a number of invaluable spare
horses. It is said also that he had been able to get remounts in the
Hopetown district, which had not been cleared -- an omission for
which, it is to be hoped, someone has been held responsible.  The Boer
ponies, used to the succulent grasses of the veldt, could make nothing
of the rank Karoo, and had so fallen away that an enormous advantage
should have rested with the pursuers had ill luck and bad management
not combined to enable the invaders to renew their mobility at the
very moment when Plumer's horses were dropping dead under their
riders.

The Boer force was now so scattered that, in spite of the advent of
Hertzog, De Wet had fewer men with him than when he entered the
Colony.  Several hundreds had been taken prisoners, many had deserted,
and a few had been killed.  It was hoped now that the whole force
might be captured, and Thorneycroft's, Crabbe's, Henniker's, and other
columns were closing swiftly in upon him, while the swollen river
still barred his retreat.  There was a sudden drop in the flood,
however; one ford became passable, and over it, upon the last day of
February, De Wet and his bedraggled, dispirited commando escaped to
their own country.  There was still a sting in his tail, however; for
upon that very day a portion of his force succeeded in capturing sixty
and killing or wounding twenty of Colenbrander's new regiment,
Kitchener's Fighting Scouts. On the other hand, De Wet was finally
relieved upon the same day of all care upon the score of his guns, as
the last of them was most gallantly captured by Captain Dallimore and
fifteen Victorians, who at the same time brought in thirty-three Boer
prisoners.  The net result of De Wet's invasion was that he gained
nothing, and that he lost about four thousand horses, all his guns,
all his convoy, and some three hundred of his men.

Once safely in his own country again, the guerilla chief pursued his
way northwards with his usual celerity and success.  The moment that
it was certain that De Wet had escaped, the indefatigable Plumer,
wiry, tenacious man, had been sent off by train to Springfontein,
while Bethune's column followed direct.  This latter force crossed the
Orange River bridge and marched upon Luckhoff and Fauresmith.  At the
latter town they overtook Plumer, who was again hard upon the heels of
De Wet. Together they ran him across the Riet River and north to
Petrusburg, until they gave it up as hopeless upon finding that, with
only fifty followers, he had crossed the Modder River at Abram's
Kraal. There they abandoned the chase and fell back upon Bloemfontein
to refit and prepare for a fresh effort to run down their elusive
enemy.

While Plumer and Bethune were following upon the track of De Wet until
he left them behind at the Modder, Lyttelton was using the numerous
columns which were ready to his hand in effecting a drive up the
south-eastern section of the Orange Biver Colony. It was disheartening
to remember that all this large stretch of country had from April to
November been as peaceful and almost as prosperous as Kent or
Yorkshire.  Now the intrusion of the guerilla bands, and the pressure
put by them upon the farmers, had raised the whole country once again,
and the work of pacification had to be set about once more, with
harsher measures than before. A continuous barrier of barbed-wire
fencing had been erected from Bloemfontein to the Basuto border, a
distance of eighty miles, and this was now strongly held by British
posts.  From the south Bruce Hamilton, Hickman, Thorneycroft, and Haig
swept upwards, stripping the country as they went in the same way that
French had done in the Eastern Transvaal, while Pilcher's column
waited to the north of the barbed-wire barrier.  It was known that
Fourie, with a considerable commando, was lurking in this district,
but he and his men slipped at night between the British columns and
escaped.  Pilcher, Bethune, and Byng were able, however, to send in
200 prisoners and very great numbers of cattle. On April 10th Monro,
with Bethune's Mounted Infantry, captured eighty fighting Boers near
Dewetsdorp, and sixty more were taken by a night attack at Boschberg.
There is no striking victory to record in these operations, but they
were an important part of that process of attrition which was wearing
the Boers out and helping to bring the war to an end.  Terrible it is
to see that barren countryside, and to think of the depths of misery
to which the once flourishing and happy Orange Free State had fallen,
through joining in a quarrel with a nation which bore it nothing but
sincere friendship and goodwill. With nothing to gain and everything
to lose, the part played by the Orange Free State in this South
African drama is one of the most inconceivable things in history.
Never has a nation so deliberately and so causelessly committed
suicide.

Three consecutive chapters have now given some account of the campaign
of De Wet, of the operations in the Transvaal up to the end of the
year 1900, and of the invasion of Cape Colony up to April 1901. The
present chapter will deal with the events in the Transvaal from the
beginning of the new century.  The military operations in that
country, though extending over a very large area, may be roughly
divided into two categories: the attacks by the Boers upon British
posts, and the aggressive sweeping movements of British columns.
Under the first heading come the attacks on Belfast, on Zuurfontein,
on Kaalfontein, on Zeerust, on Modderfontein, and on Lichtenburg,
besides many minor affairs. The latter comprises the operations of
Babington and of Cunningham to the west and south-west of Pretoria,
those of Methuen still further to the south-west, and the large
movement of French in the south-east.  In no direction did the British
forces in the field meet with much active resistance.  So long as they
moved the gnats did not settle; it was only when quiet that they
buzzed about and occasionally stung.

The early days of January 1901 were not fortunate for the British
arms, as the check in which Kitchener's Bodyguard was so roughly
handled, near Lindley, was closely followed by a brisk action at
Naauwpoort or Zandfontein, near the Magaliesberg, in which De la Rey
left his mark upon the Imperial Light Horse.  The Boer commandos,
having been driven into the mountains by French and Clements in the
latter part of December, were still on the look-out to strike a blow
at any British force which might expose itself. Several mounted
columns had been formed to scour the country, one under Kekewich, one
under Gordon, and one under Babington.  The two latter, meeting in a
mist upon the morning of January 5th, actually turned their rifles
upon each other, but fortunately without any casualties resulting. A
more deadly rencontre was, however, awaiting them.

A force of Boers were observed, as the mist cleared, making for a
ridge which would command the road along which the convoy and guns
were moving.  Two squadrons (B and C) of the Light Horse were
instantly detached to seize the point.  They do not appear to have
realised that they were in the immediate presence of the enemy, and
they imagined that the ground over which they were passing had been
already reconnoitred by a troop of the 14th Hussars. It is true that
four scouts were thrown forward, but as both squadrons were cantering
there was no time for these to get ahead. Presently C squadron, which
was behind, was ordered to close up upon the left of B squadron, and
the 150 horsemen in one long line swept over a low grassy ridge.  Some
hundreds of De la Rey's men were lying in the long grass upon the
further side, and their first volley, fired at a fifty-yard range,
emptied a score of saddles.  It would have been wiser, if less
gallant, to retire at once in the presence of a numerous and invisible
enemy, but the survivors were ordered to dismount and return the fire.
This was done, but the hail of bullets was terrific and the casualties
were numerous.  Captain Norman, of C squadron, then retired his men,
who withdrew in good order.  B squadron having lost Yockney, its brave
leader, heard no order, so they held their ground until few of them
had escaped the driving sleet of lead.  Many of the men were struck
three and four times.  There was no surrender, and the extermination
of B company added another laurel, even at a moment of defeat, to the
regiment whose reputation was so grimly upheld. The Boer victors
walked in among the litter of stricken men and horses. 'Practically
all of them were dressed in khaki and had the water-bottles and
haversacks of our soldiers.  One of them snatched a bayonet from a
dead man, and was about to despatch one of our wounded when he was
stopped in the nick of time by a man in a black suit, who, I
afterwards heard, was De la Rey himself... The feature of the action
was the incomparable heroism of our dear old Colonel Wools-Sampson.'
So wrote a survivor of B company, himself shot through the body.  It
was four hours before a fresh British advance reoccupied the ridge,
and by that time the Boers had disappeared.  Some seventy killed and
wounded, many of them terribly mutilated, were found on the scene of
the disaster. It is certainly a singular coincidence that at distant
points of the seat of war two of the crack irregular corps should have
suffered so severely within three days of each other.  In each case,
however, their prestige was enhanced rather than lowered by the
result.  These incidents tend, however, to shake the belief that
scouting is better performed in the Colonial than in the regular
forces.

Of the Boer attacks upon British posts to which allusion has been
made, that upon Belfast, in the early morning of January 7th, appears
to have been very gallantly and even desperately pushed.  On the same
date a number of smaller attacks, which may have been meant simply as
diversions, were made upon Wonderfontein, Nooitgedacht, Wildfontein,
Pan, Dalmanutha, and Machadodorp.  These seven separate attacks,
occurring simultaneously over sixty miles, show that the Boer forces
were still organised and under one effective control.  The general
object of the operations was undoubtedly to cut Lord Roberts's
communications upon that side and to destroy a considerable section of
the railway.

The town of Belfast was strongly held by Smith-Dorrien, with 1,750 men,
of which 1,300 were infantry belonging to the Royal Irish, the
Shropshires, and the Gordons. The perimeter of defence, however, was
fifteen miles, and each little fort too far from its neighbour for
mutual support, though connected with headquarters by telephone.  It
is probable that the leaders and burghers engaged in this very gallant
attack were in part the same as those concerned in the successful
attempt at Helvetia upon December 29th, for the assault was delivered
in the same way, at the same hour, and apparently with the same
primary object. This was to gain possession of the big 5-inch gun,
which is as helpless by night as it is formidable by day. At Helvetia
they attained their object and even succeeded not merely in
destroying, but in removing their gigantic trophy.  At Belfast they
would have performed the same feat had it not been for the foresight
of General Smith-Dorrien, who had the heavy gun trundled back into the
town every night.

The attack broke first upon Monument Hill, a post held by Captain
Fosbery with eighty-three Royal Irish. Chance or treason guided the
Boers to the weak point of the wire entanglement and they surged into
the fort, where the garrison fought desperately to hold its own. There
was thick mist and driving rain; and the rush of vague and shadowy
figures amid the gloom was the first warning of the onslaught.  The
Irishmen were overborne by a swarm of assailants, but they nobly
upheld their traditional reputation. Fosbery met his death like a
gallant gentleman, but not more heroically than Barry, the humble
private, who, surrounded by Boers, thought neither of himself nor of
them, but smashed at the maxim gun with a pickaxe until he fell
riddled with bullets.  Half the garrison were on the ground before the
post was carried.

A second post upon the other side of the town was defended by
Lieutenant Marshall with twenty men, mostly Shropshires.  For an hour
they held out until Marshall and nine out of his twelve Shropshires
had been hit.  Then this post also was carried.

The Gordon Highlanders held two posts to the southeast and to the
south-west of the town, and these also were vigorously attacked.
Here, however, the advance spent itself without result.  In vain the
Ermelo and Carolina commandos stormed up to the Gordon pickets. They
were blown back by the steady fire of the infantry. One small post
manned by twelve Highlanders was taken, but the rest defied all
attack.  Seeing therefore that his attempt at a COUP-DE-MAIN was
a failure, Viljoen withdrew his men before daybreak. The Boer
casualties have not been ascertained, but twenty-four of their dead
were actually picked up within the British lines.  The British lost
sixty killed and wounded, while about as many were taken
prisoners. Altogether the action was a brisk and a gallant one, of
which neither side has cause to be ashamed. The simultaneous attacks
upon six other stations were none of them pressed home, and were
demonstrations rather than assaults.

The attempts upon Kaalfontein and on Zuurfontein were both made in the
early morning of January 12th. These two places are small stations
upon the line between Johannesburg and Pretoria.  It is clear that the
Boers were very certain of their own superior mobility before they
ventured to intrude into the very heart of the British position, and
the result showed that they were right in supposing that even if their
attempt were repulsed, they would still be able to make good their
escape. Better horsed, better riders, with better intelligence and a
better knowledge of the country, their ventures were always attended
by a limited liability.

The attacks seem to have been delivered by a strong commando, said to
have been under the command of Beyers, upon its way to join the Boer
concentration in the Eastern Transvaal.  They had not the
satisfaction, however, of carrying the garrison of a British post with
them, for at each point they were met by a stout resistance and beaten
off.  Kaalfontein was garrisoned by 120 men of Cheshire under
Williams-Freeman, Zuurfontein by as many Norfolks and a small body of
Lincolns under Cordeaux and Atkinson.  For six hours the pressure was
considerable, the assailants of Kaalfontein keeping up a brisk shell
and rifle fire, while those of Zuurfontein were without artillery. At
the end of that time two armoured trains came up with reinforcements
and the enemy continued his trek to the eastward.  Knox 's 2nd cavalry
brigade followed them up, but without any very marked result.

Zeerust and Lichtenburg had each been garrisoned and provisioned by
Lord Methuen before he carried his column away to the south-west,
where much rough and useful work awaited him.  The two towns were at
once invested by the enemy, who made an attack upon each of them.
That upon Zeerust, on January 7th, was a small matter and easily
repulsed.  A more formidable one was made on Lichtenburg, on March
3rd.  The attack was delivered by De la Rey, Smuts, and Celliers, with
1,500 men, who galloped up to the pickets in the early morning.  The
defenders were 600 in number, consisting of Paget's Horse and three
companies of the 1st battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers, a
veteran regiment with a long record of foreign service, not to be
confused with that 2nd battalion which was so severely handled upon
several occasions.  It was well that it was so, for less sturdy
material might have been overborne by the vigour of the attack.  As it
was, the garrison were driven to their last trench, but held out under
a very heavy fire all day, and next morning the Boers abandoned the
attack.  Their losses appear to have been over fifty in number, and
included Commandant Celliers, who was badly wounded and afterwards
taken prisoner at Warm Baths. The brave garrison lost fourteen killed,
including two officers of the Northumberlands, and twenty wounded.

In each of these instances the attacks by the Boers upon British posts
had ended in a repulse to themselves. They were more fortunate,
however, in their attempt upon Modderfontein on the Gatsrand at the
end of January.  The post was held by 200 of the South Wales
Borderers, reinforced by the 59th Imperial Yeomanry, who had come in
as escort to a convoy from Krugersdorp. The attack, which lasted all
day, was carried out by a commando of 2,000 Boers under Smuts, who
rushed the position upon the following morning.  As usual, the Boers,
who were unable to retain their prisoners, had little to show for
their success. The British casualties, however, were between thirty
and forty, mostly wounded.

On January 22nd General Cunninghame left Oliphant's Nek with a small
force consisting of the Border and Worcester Regiments, the 6th
Mounted Infantry, Kitchener's Horse, 7th Imperial Yeomanry, 8th
R.F.A., and P battery R.H.A. It had instructions to move south upon
the enemy known to be gathering there.  By midday this force was
warmly engaged, and found itself surrounded by considerable bodies of
De la Rey's burghers.  That night they camped at Middelfontein, and
were strongly attacked in the early morning. So menacing was the Boer
attitude, and so formidable the position, that the force was in some
danger. Fortunately they were in heliographic communication with
Oliphant's Nek, and learned upon the 23rd that Babington had been
ordered to their relief. All day Cunninghame's men were under a
long-range fire, but on the 24th Babington appeared, and the British
force was successfully extricated, having seventy-five
casualties. This action of Middelfontein is interesting as having been
begun in Queen Victoria's reign, and ended in that of Edward VII.

Cunninghame's force moved on to Krugersdorp, and there, having heard
of the fall of the Modderfontein post as already described, a part of
his command moved out to the Gatsrand in pursuit of Smuts. It was
found, however, that the Boers had taken up a strong defensive
position, and the British were not numerous enough to push the
attack. On February 3rd Cunninghame endeavoured to outflank the enemy
with his small cavalry force while pushing his infantry up in front,
but in neither attempt did he succeed, the cavalry failing to find the
flank, while the infantry were met with a fire which made further
advance impossible. One company of the Border Regiment found itself in
such a position that the greater part of it was killed, wounded, or
taken. This check constituted the action of Modderfontein. On the 4th,
however, Cunningham, assisted by some of the South African
Constabulary, made his way round the flank, and dislodged the enemy,
who retreated to the south. A few days later some of Smuts's men made
an attempt upon the railway near Bank, but were driven off with
twenty-six casualties. It was after this that Smuts moved west and
joined De la Rey's commando to make the attack already described upon
Lichtenburg. These six attempts represent the chief aggressive
movements which the Boers made against British posts in the Transvaal
during these months.  Attacks upon trains were still common, and every
variety of sniping appears to have been rife, from the legitimate
ambuscade to something little removed from murder.

It has been described in a previous chapter how Lord Kitchener made an
offer to the burghers which amounted to an amnesty, and how a number
of those Boers who had come under the influence of the British formed
themselves into peace committees, and endeavoured to convey to the
fighting commandos some information as to the hopelessness of the
struggle, and the lenient mood of the British.  Unfortunately these
well-meant offers appear to have been mistaken for signs of weakness
by the Boer leaders, and encouraged them to harden their hearts.  Of
the delegates who conveyed the terms to their fellow countrymen two at
least were shot, several were condemned to death, and few returned
without ill-usage.  In no case did they bear back a favourable answer.
The only result of the proclamation was to burden the British
resources by an enormous crowd of women and children who were kept and
fed in refugee camps, while their fathers and husbands continued in
most cases to fight.

This allusion to the peace movement among the burghers may serve as an
introduction to the attempt made by Lord Kitchener, at the end of
February 1901, to bring the war to a close by negotiation. Throughout
its course the fortitude of Great Britain and of the Empire had never
for an instant weakened, but her conscience had always been sensitive
at the sight of the ruin which had befallen so large a portion of
South Africa, and any settlement would have been eagerly hailed which
would insure that the work done had not been wasted, and would not
need to be done again. A peace on any other terms would simply shift
upon the shoulders of our descendants those burdens which we were not
manly enough to bear ourselves.  There had arisen, as has been said, a
considerable peace movement among the burghers of the refugee camps
and also among the prisoners of war.  It was hoped that some
reflection of this might be found among the leaders of the people.  To
find out if this were so Lord Kitchener, at the end of February, sent
a verbal message to Louis Botha, and on the 27th of that month the
Boer general rode with an escort of Hussars into Middelburg.
'Sunburned, with a pleasant, fattish face of a German type, and
wearing an imperial,' says one who rode beside him. Judging from the
sounds of mirth heard by those without, the two leaders seem to have
soon got upon amiable terms, and there was hope that a definite
settlement might spring from their interview. From the beginning Lord
Kitchener explained that the continued independence of the two
republics was an impossibility.  But on every other point the British
Government was prepared to go great lengths in order to satisfy and
conciliate the burghers.

On March 7th Lord Kitchener wrote to Botha from Pretoria,
recapitulating the points which he had advanced.  The terms offered
were certainly as far as, and indeed rather further than, the general
sentiment of the Empire would have gone.  If the Boers laid down their
arms there was to be a complete amnesty, which was apparently to
extend to rebels also so long as they did not return to Cape Colony or
Natal.  Self-government was promised after a necessary interval,
during which the two States should be administered as Crown colonies.
Law courts should be independent of the Executive from the beginning,
and both languages be official.  A million pounds of compensation
would be paid to the burghers -- a most remarkable example of a war
indemnity being paid by the victors. Loans were promised to the
farmers to restart them in business, and a pledge was made that farms
should not be taxed. The Kaffirs were not to have the franchise, but
were to have the protection of law.  Such were the generous terms
offered by the British Government.  Public opinion at home, strong]y
supported by that of the colonies, and especially of the army, felt
that the extreme step had been taken in the direction of conciliation,
and that to do more would seem not to offer peace, but to implore it.
Unfortunately, however, the one thing which the British could not
offer was the one thing which the Boers would insist upon having, and
the leniency of the proposals in all other directions may have
suggested weakness to their minds.  On March 15th an answer was
returned by General Botha to the effect that nothing short of total
independence would satisfy them, and the negotiations were accordingiy
broken off.

There was a disposition, however, upon the Boer side to renew them,
and upon May 10th General Botha applied to Lord Kitchener for
permission to cable to President Kruger, and to take his advice as to
the making of peace.  The stern old man at The Hague was still,
however, in an unbending mood. His reply was to the effect that there
were great hopes of a successful issue of the war, and that he had
taken steps to make proper provision for the Boer prisoners and for
the refugee women.  These steps, and very efficient ones too, were to
leave them entirely to the generosity of that Government which he was
so fond of reviling.

On the same day upon which Botha applied for leave to use the British
cable, a letter was written by Reitz, State Secretary of the
Transvaal, to Steyn, in which the desperate condition of the Boers was
clearly set forth. This document explained that the burghers were
continually surrendering, that the ammunition was nearly exhausted,
the food running low, and the nation in danger of extinction. 'The
time has come to take the final step,' said the Secretary of
State. Steyn wrote back a reply in which, like his brother president,
he showed a dour resolution to continue the struggle, prompted by a
fatalist conviction that some outside interference would reverse the
result of his appeal to arms. His attitude and that of Kruger
determined the Boer leaders to hold out for a few more months, a
resolution which may have been injudicious, but was certainly heroic.
'It's a fight to a finish this time,' said the two combatants in the'
Punch' cartoon which marked the beginning of the war. It was indeed
so, as far as the Boers were concerned. As the victors we can afford
to acknowledge that no nation in history has ever made a more
desperate and prolonged resistance against a vastly superior
antagonist.  A Briton may well pray that his own people may be as
staunch when their hour of adversity comes round.

The British position at this stage of the war was strengthened by a
greater centralisation.  Garrisons of outlying towns were withdrawn so
that fewer convoys became necessary.  The population was removed also
and placed near the railway lines, where they could be more easily
fed. In this way the scene of action was cleared and the Boer and
British forces left face to face. Convinced of the failure of the
peace policy, and morally strengthened by having tried it, Lord
Kitchener set himself to finish the war by a series of vigorous
operations which should sweep the country from end to end.  For this
purpose mounted troops were essential, and an appeal from him for
reinforcements was most nobly answered.  Five thousand horsemen were
despatched from the colonies, and twenty thousand cavalry, mounted
infantry, and Yeomanry were sent from home.  Ten thousand mounted men
had already been raised in Great Britain, South Africa, and Canada for
the Constabulary force which was being organised by
Baden-Powell. Altogether the reinforcements of horsemen amounted to
more than thirty-five thousand men, all of whom had arrived in South
Africa before the end of April. With the remains of his old regiments
Lord Kitchener had under him at this final period of the war between
fifty and sixty thousand cavalry-such a force as no British General in
his happiest dream had ever thought of commanding, and no British war
minister in his darkest nightmare had ever imagined himself called
upon to supply.

Long before his reinforcements had come to hand, while his Yeomanry
was still gathering in long queues upon the London pavement to wait
their turn at the recruiting office, Lord Kitchener had dealt the
enemy several shrewd blows which materially weakened their resources
in men and material.  The chief of these was the great drive down the
Eastern Transvaal undertaken by seven columns under the command of
French. Before considering this, however, a few words must be devoted
to the doings of Methuen in the south-west.

This hard-working General, having garrisoned Zeerust and Lichtenburg,
had left his old district and journeyed with a force which consisted
largely of Bushmen and Yeomanry to the disturbed parts of Bechuanaland
which had been invaded by De Villiers.  Here he cleared the country as
far as Vryburg, which he had reached in the middle of January, working
round to Kuruman and thence to Taungs.  From Taungs his force crossed
the Transvaal border and made for Klerksdorp, working through an area
which had never been traversed and which contained the difficult
Masakani hills.  He left Taungs upon February 2nd, fighting skirmishes
at Uitval's Kop, Paardefontein and Lilliefontein, in each of which the
enemy was brushed aside. Passing through Wolmaranstad, Methuen turned
to the north, where at Haartebeestefontein, on February 19th, he
fought a brisk engagement with a considerable force of Boers under De
Villiers and Liebenberg. On the day before the fight he successfully
outwitted the Boers, for, learning that they had left their laager in
order to take up a position for battle, he pounced upon the laager and
captured 10,000 head of cattle, forty-three wagons, and forty
prisoners. Stimulated by this success, he attacked the Boers next day,
and after five hours of hard fighting forced the pass which they were
holding against him.  As Methuen had but 1,500 men, and was attacking
a force which was as large as his own in a formidable position, the
success was a very creditable one. The Yeomanry all did well,
especially the 5th and 10th battalions. So also did the Australians
and tho Loyal North Lancashires.  The British casualties amounted to
sixteen killed and thirty-four wounded, while the Boers left eighteen
of their dead upon the position which they had abandoned. Lord
Methuen's little force ret urnedto Klerksdorp, having deserved right
well of their country.  From Klerksdorp Methuen struck back westwards
to the south of his former route, and on March 14th he was reported at
Warrenton.  Here also in April came Erroll's small column, bringing
with it the garrison and inhabitants of Hoopstad, a post which it had
been determined, in accordance with Lord Kitchener's policy of
centralisation, to abandon.

In the month of January, 1901, there had been a considerable
concentration of the Transvaal Boers into that large triangle which is
bounded by the Delagoa railway line upon the north, the Natal railway
line upon the south, and the Swazi and Zulu frontiers upon the
east. The buschveldt is at this season of the year unhealthy both for
man and beast, so that for the sake of their herds, their families,
and themselves the burghers were constrained to descend into the open
veldt.  There seemed the less objection to their doing so since this
tract of country, though traversed once both by Buller and by French,
has still remained a stronghold of the Boers and a storehouse of
supplies.  Within its borders are to be found Carolina, Ermelo,
Vryheid, and other storm centres. Its possession offers peculiar
strategical advantages, as a force lying there can always attack
either railway, and might even make, as was indeed intended, a descent
into Natal.  For these mingled reasons of health and of strategy a
considerable number of burghers united in this district under the
command of the Bothas and of Smuts.

Their concentration had not escaped the notice of the British military
authorities, who welcomed any movement which might bring to a focus
that resistance which had been so nebulous and elusive. Lord Kitchener
having once seen the enemy fairly gathered into this huge cover,
undertook the difficult task of driving it from end to end.  For this
enterprise General French was given the chief command, and had under
his orders no fewer than seven columns, which started from different
points of the Delagoa and of the Natal railway lines, keeping in touch
with each other and all trending south and east.  A glance at the map
would show, however, that it was a very large field for seven guns,
and that it would need all their alertness to prevent the driven game
from breaking back.  Three columns started from the Delagoa line,
namely, Smith-Dorrien's from Wonderfontein (the most easterly),
Campbell's from Middelburg, and Alderson's from Eerstefabrieken, close
to Pretoria. Four columns came from the western railway line: General
Knox's from Kaalfontein, Major Allenby's from Zuurfontein (both
stations between Pretoria and Johannesburg), General Dartnell's from
Springs, close to Johannesburg, and finally General Colville (not to
be confused with Colvile) from Greylingstad in the south. The whole
movement resembled a huge drag net, of which Wonderfontein and
Greylingstad formed the ends, exactly one hundred miles apart.  On
January 27th the net began to be drawn.  Some thousands of Boers with
a considerable number of guns were known to be within the enclosure,
and it was hoped that even if their own extreme mobility enabled them
to escape it would be impossible for them to save their transport and
their cannon.

Each of the British columns was about 2,000 strong, making a total of
14,000 men with about fifty guns engaged in the operations.  A front
of not less than ten miles was to be maintained by each force.  The
first decided move was on the part of the extreme left wing,
Smith-Dorrien's column, which moved south on Carolina, and thence on
Bothwell near Lake Chrissie.  The arduous duty of passing supplies
down from the line fell mainly upon him, and his force was in
consequence larger than the others, consisting of 8,500 men with
thirteen guns.  On the arrival of Smith-Dorrien at Carolina the other
columns started, their centre of advance being Ermelo.  Over seventy
miles of veldt the gleam of the helio by day and the flash of the
signal lamps at night marked the steady flow of the British tide.
Here and there the columns came in touch with the enemy and swept him
before them.  French had a skirmish at Wilge River at the end of
January, and Campbell another south of Middelburg, in which he had
twenty casualties. On February 4th Smith-Dorrien was at Lake Chrissie;
French had passed through Bethel and the enemy was retiring on
Amsterdam.  The hundred-mile ends of the drag net were already
contracted to a third of that distance, and the game was still known
to be within it.  On the 5th Ermelo was occupied, and the fresh deep
ruts upon the veldt told the British horsemen of the huge Boer convoy
that was ahead of them.  For days enormous herds, endless flocks, and
lines of wagons which stretched from horizon to horizon had been
trekking eastward.  Cavalry and mounted infantry were all hot upon the
scent.

Botha, however, was a leader of spirit, not to be hustled with
impunity.  Having several thousand burghers with him, it was evident
that if he threw himself suddenly upon any part of the British line he
might hope for a time to make an equal fight, and possibly to
overwhelm it.  Were Smith-Dorrien out of the way there would be a
clear road of escape for his whole convoy to the north, while a defeat
of any of the other columns would not help him much. It was on
Smith-Dorrien, therefore, that he threw himself with great
impetuosity. That General's force was, however, formidable, consisting
of the Suffolks, West Yorks and Camerons, 5th Lancers, 2nd Imperial
Light Horse, and 3rd Mounted Infantry, with eight field guns and three
heavy pieces. Such a force could hardly be defeated in the but
no one can foresee the effect of a night surprise well pushed home,
and such was the attack delivered by Botha at 3 A.M. upon February
6th, when his opponent was encamped at Bothwell Farm.

The night was favourable to the attempt, as it was dark and
misty. Fortunately, however, the British commander had fortified
himself and was ready for an assault.  The Boer forlorn hope came on
with a gallant dash, driving a troop of loose horses in upon the
outposts, and charging forward into the camp.  The West Yorkshires,
however, who bore the brunt of the attack, were veterans of the
Tugela, who were no more to be flurried at three in the morning than
at three in the afternoon. The attack was blown backwards, and twenty
dead Boers, with their brave leader Spruyt, were left within the
British lines.  The main body of the Boers contented themselves with a
heavy fusillade out of the darkness, which was answered and crushed by
the return fire of the infantry. In the morning no trace, save their
dead, was to be seen of the enemy, but twenty killed and fifty wounded
in Smith-Dorrien's column showed how heavy had been the fire which had
swept through the sleeping camp. The Carolina attack, which was to
have co-operated with that of the Heidelbergers, was never delivered,
through difficulties of the ground, and considerable recriminations
ensued among the Boers in consequence.

Beyond a series of skirmishes and rearguard actions this attack of
Botha's was the one effort made to stay the course of French's
columns. It did not succeed, however, in arresting them for an
hour. From that day began a record of captures of men, herds, guns,
and wagons, as the fugitives were rounded up from the north, the west,
and the south.  The operation was a very thorough one, for the towns
and districts occupied were denuded of their inhabitants, who were
sent into the refugee camps while the country was laid waste to
prevent its furnishing the commandos with supplies in the
future. Still moving south-east, General French's columns made their
way to Piet Betief upon the Swazi frontier, pushing a disorganised
array which he computed at 5,000 in front of them. A party of the
enemy, including the Carolina commando, had broken back in the middle
of February and Louis Botha had got away at the same time, but so
successful were his main operations that French was able to report his
total results at the end of the month as being 292 Boers killed or
wounded, 500 surrendered, 3 guns and one maxim taken, with 600 rifles,
4,000 horses, 4,500 trek oxen, 1,300 wagons and carts, 24,000 cattle,
and 165,000 sheep. The whole vast expanse of the eastern veldt was
dotted with the broken and charred wagons of the enemy.

Tremendous rains were falling and the country was one huge quagmire,
which crippled although it did not entirely prevent the further
operations. All the columns continued to report captures. On March 3rd
Dartnell got a maxim and 50 prisoners, while French reported 50 more,
and Smith-Dorrien 80.  On March 6th French captured two more guns, and
on the 14th he reported 46 more Boer casualties and 146 surrenders,
with 500 more wagons, and another great haul of sheep and oxen.  By
the end of March French had moved as far south as Vryheid, his troops
having endured the greatest hardships from the continual heavy rains,
and the difficulty of bringing up any supplies.  On the 27th he
reported seventeen more Boer casualties and 140 surrenders, while on
the last day of the month he took another gun and two pom-poms.  The
enemy at that date were still retiring eastward, with Alderson and
Dartnell pressing upon their rear.  On April 4th French announced the
capture of the last piece of artillery which the enemy possessed in
that region.  The rest of the Boer forces doubled back at night
between the columns and escaped over the Zululand border, where 200 of
them surrendered.  The total trophies of French's drive down the
Eastern Transvaal amounted to eleven hundred of the enemy killed,
wounded, or taken, the largest number in any operation since the
surrender of Prinsloo. There is no doubt that the movement would have
been even more successful had the weather been less boisterous, but
this considerable loss of men, together with the capture of all the
guns in that region, and of such enormous quantities of wagons,
munitions, and stock, inflicted a blow upon the Boers from which they
never wholly recovered.  On April 20th French was back in Johannesburg
once more.

While French had run to earth the last Boer gun in the south.eastern
corner of the Transvaal, De la Rey, upon the western side, had still
managed to preserve a considerable artillery with which he flitted
about the passes of the Magaliesberg or took refuge in the safe
districts to the south-west of it.  This part of the country had been
several times traversed, but had never been subdued by British
columns.  The Boers, like their own veldt grass, need but a few sparks
to be left behind to ensure a conflagration breaking out again. It was
into this inflammable country that Babington moved in March with
Klerksdorp for his base. On March 21st he had reached
Haartebeestefontein, the scene not long before of a successful action
by Methuen.  Here he was joined by Shekleton's Mounted Infantry, and
his whole force consisted of these, with the 1st Imperial Light Horse,
the 6th Imperial Bushmen, the New-Zealanders, a squadron of the 14th
Hussars, a wing each of the Somerset Light Infantry and of the Welsh
Fusiliers, with Carter's guns and four pom-poms.  With this mobile and
formidable little force Babington pushed on in search of Smuts and De
la Rey, who were known to be in the immediate neighbourhood.

As a matter of fact the Boers were not only there, but were nearer and
in greater force than had been anticipated.  On the 22nd three
squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse under Major Briggs rode into
1,500 of them, and it was only by virtue of their steadiness and
gallantry that they succeeded in withdrawing themselves and their
pom-pom without a disaster.  With Boers in their front and Boers on
either flank they fought an admirable rearguard action. So hot was the
fire that A squadron alone had twenty-two casualties.  They faced it
out, however, until their gun had reached a place of safety, when they
made an orderly retirement towards Babington's camp, having inflicted
as heavy a loss as they had sustained.  With Elandslaagte, Waggon
Hill, the relief of Mafeking, Naauwpoort, and Haartebeestefontein upon
their standards, the Imperial Light Horse, should they take a
permanent place in the Army List, will start with a record of which
many older regiments might be proud.

If the Light Horse had a few bad hours on March 22nd at the hands of
the Boers, they and their colonial comrades were soon able to return
the same with interest. On March 23rd Babington moved forward through
Kafir Kraal, the enemy falling back before him.  Next morning the
British again advanced, and as the New-Zealanders and Bushmen, who
formed the vanguard under Colonel Gray, emerged from a pass they saw
upon the plain in front of them the Boer force with all its guns
moving towards them.  Whether this was done of set purpose or whether
the Boers imagined that the British had turned and were intending to
pursue them cannot now be determined, but whatever the cause it is
certain that for almost the first time in the campaign a considerable
force of each side found themselves in theand face to face.

It was a glorious moment.  Setting spurs to their horses, officers and
men with a yell dashed forward at the enemy.  One of the Boer guns
unlimbered and attempted tofire, but was overwhelmed by the wave
of horsemen.  The Boer riders broke and fled, leaving their artillery
to escape as best it might.  The guns dashed over the veldt in a mad
gallop, but wilder still was the rush of the fiery cavalry behind
them.  For once the brave and cool-headed Dutchmen were fairly
panic-stricken. Hardly a shot was fired at the pursuers, and the
riflemen seem to have been only too happy to save their own skins.
Two field guns, one pom-pom, six maxims, fifty-six wagons and 140
prisoners were the fruits of that one magnificent charge, while
fifty-four stricken Boers were picked up after the action.  The
pursuit was reluctantly abandoned when the spent horses could go no
farther.

While the vanguard had thus scattered the main body of the enemy a
detachment of riflemen had ridden round to attack the British rear and
convoy. A few volleys from the escort drove them off, however, with
some loss.  Altogether, what with the loss of nine guns and of at
least 200 men, the rout of Haartebeestefontein was a severe blow to
the Boer cause. A week or two later Sir H. Rawlinson's column, acting
with Babington, rushed Smuts's laager at daylight and effected a
further capture of two guns and thirty prisoners.  Taken in
conjunction with French's successes in the east and Plumer's in the
north, these successive blows might have seemed fatal to the Boer
cause, but the weary struggle was still destined to go on until it
seemed that it must be annihilation rather than incorporation which
would at last bring a tragic peace to those unhappy lands.

All over the country small British columns had been operating during
these months -- operations which were destined to increase in scope
and energy as the cold weather drew in.  The weekly tale of prisoners
and captures, though small for any one column, gave the aggregate
result of a considerable victory.  In these scattered and obscure
actions there was much good work which can have no reward save the
knowledge of duty done.  Among many successful raids and skirmishes
may be mentioned two by Colonel Park from Lydenburg, which resulted
between them in the capture of nearly 100 of the enemy, including Abel
Erasmus of sinister reputation.  Nor would any summary of these events
be complete without a reference to the very gallant defence of
Mahlabatini in Zululand, which was successfully held by a handful of
police and civilians against an irruption of the Boers.  With the
advent of winter and of reinforcements the British operations became
very energetic in every part of the country, and some account of them
will now be added.

The African winter extends roughly from April to September, and as the
grass during that period would be withered on the veldt, the mobility
of the Boer commandos must be very much impaired. It was recognised
therefore that if the British would avoid another year of war it could
only be done by making good use of the months which lay before
them. For this reason Lord Kitchener had called for the considerable
reinforcements which have been already mentioned, but on the other
hand he was forced to lose many thousands of his veteran Yeomanry,
Australians, and Canadians, whose term of service was at an end. The
volunteer companies of the infantry returned also to England, and so
did nine militia battalions, whose place was taken however by an equal
number of new-comers.

The British position was very much strengthened during the winter by
the adoption of the block-house system. These were small square or
hexagonal buildings, made of stone up to nine feet with corrugated
iron above it. They were loopholed for musketry fire and held from six
to thirty men. These little forts were dotted along the railways at
points not more than 2,000 yards apart, and when supplemented by a
system of armoured trains they made it no easy matter for the Boers to
tamper with or to cross the lines. So effective did these prove that
their use was extended to the more dangerous portions of the country,
and lines were pushed through the Magaliesberg district to form a
chain of posts between Krugersdorp and Rustenburg.  In the Orange
River Colony and on the northern lines of the Cape Colony the same
system was extensively applied.  I will now attempt to describe the
more important operations of the winter, beginning with the incursion
of Plumer into the untrodden ground to the north.

At this period of the war the British forces had overrun, if they had
not subdued, the whole of the Orange River Colony and every part of
the Transvaal which is south of the Mafeking-Pretoria-Komati line.
Through this great tract of country there was not a vilage and hardly
a farmhouse which had not seen the invaders. But in the north there
remained a vast district, two hundred miles long and three hundred
broad, which had hardly been touched by the war.  It is a wild
country, scrub-covered, antelope-haunted plains rising into desolate
hills, but there are many kloofs and valleys with rich water meadows
and lush grazings, which formed natural granaries and depots for the
enemy.  Here the Boer government continued to exist, and here,
screened by their mountains, they were able to organise the
continuation of the struggle. It was evident that there could be no
end to the war until these last centres of resistance had been broken
up.

The british forces had advanced as far north as Rustenburg in the
west, Pienaar in the centre, and Lydenburg in the east, but here they
had halted, unwilling to go farther until their conquests had been
made good behind them. A General might well pause before plunging his
troops into that vast and rugged district, when an active foe and an
exposed line of communication lay for many hundreds of miles to the
south of them. But Lord Kitchener with characteristic patience waited
for the right hour to come, and then with equally characteristic
audacity played swiftly and boldly for his stake.  De Wet, impotent
for the moment, had been hunted back over the Orange River. French had
harried the burghers in the South-east Transvaal, and the main force
of the enemy was known to be on that side of the seat of war.  The
north was exposed, and with one long, straight lunge to the heart,
Pietersburg might be transfixed.

There could only be one direction for the advance, and that must be
along the Pretoria-Pietersburg railroad. This is the only line of
rails which leads to the north, and as it was known to be in working
order (the Boers were running a bi-weekly service from Pietersburg to
Warm Baths), it was hoped that a swift advance might seize it before
any extensive damage could be done. With this object a small but very
mobile force rapidly assembled at the end of March at Pienaar River,
which was the British rail-head forty miles north of Pretoria and a
hundred and thirty from Pietersburg.  This column consisted of the
Bushveldt Carbineers, the 4th Imperial Bushmen's Corps, and the 6th
New Zealand contingent.  With them were the 18th battery R.F.A., and
three pom-poms. A detachment of the invaluable mounted Sappers rode
with the force, and two infantry regiments, the 2nd Gordons and the
Northamptons, were detached to garrison the more vulnerable places
upon the line of advance.

Upon March 29th the untiring Plumer, called off from the chase of De
Wet, was loosed upon this fresh line, and broke swiftly away to the
north.  The complete success of his undertaking has obscured our
estimate of its danger, but it was no light task to advance so great a
distance into a bitterly hostile country with a fighting force of
2,000 rifles.  As an enterprise it was in many ways not unlike Mahon's
dash on Mafeking, but without any friendly force with which to join
hands at the end. However from the beginning all went well.  On the
30th the force had reached Warm Baths, where a great isolated hotel
already marks the site of what will be a rich and fashionable spa.  On
April 1st the Australian scouts rode into Nylstroom, fifty more miles
upon their way. There had been sufficient sniping to enliven the
journey, but nothing which could be caled an action.  Gleaning up
prisoners and refugees as they went, with the railway engineers
working like bees behind them, the force still swept unchecked upon
its way.  On April 5th Piet Potgeitersrust was entered, another
fifty-mile stage, and on the morning of the 8th the British vanguard
rode into Pietersburg.  Kitchener's judgment and Plumer's energy had
met with their reward.

The Boer commando had evacuated the town and no serious opposition was
made to the British entry. The most effective resistance came from a
single schoolmaster, who, in a moment of irrational frenzy or of
patriotic exaltation, shot down three of the invaders before he met
his own death.  Some rolling stock, one small gun, and something under
a hundred prisoners were the trophies of the capture, but the Boer
arsenal and the printing press were destroyed, and the Government sped
off in a couple of Cape carts in search of some new capital.
Pietersburg was principally valuable as a base from which a sweeping
movement might be made from the north at the same moment as one from
the south-east. A glance at the map will show that a force moving from
this point in conjunction with another from Lydenburg might form the
two crooked claws of a crab to enclose a great space of country, in
which smaller columns might collect whatever was to be found.  Without
an instant of unnecessary delay the dispositions were made, and no
fewer than eight columns slipped upon the chase.  It will be best to
continue to follow the movements of Plumer's force, and then to give
some account of the little armies which were operating from the south,
with the results of their enterprise.

It was known that Viljoen and a number of Boers were within the
district which lies north of the line in the Middelburg district.  An
impenetrable bush-veldt had offered them a shelter from which they
made their constant sallies to wreck a train or to attack a post. This
area was now to be systematically cleared up. The first thing was to
stop the northern line of retreat. The Oliphant River forms a loop in
that direction, and as it is a considerable stream, it would, if
securely held, prevent any escape upon that side. With this object
Plumer, on April 14th, the sixth day after his occupation of
Pietersburg, struck east from that town and trekked over the veldt,
through the formidable Chunies Pass, and so to the north bank of the
Oliphant, picking up thirty or forty Boer prisoners upom the way. His
route lay through a fertile country dotted with native kraals. Having
reached the river which marked the line which he was to hold, Plumer,
upon April 17th, spread his force over many miles, so as to block the
principal drifts.  The flashes of his helio were answered by flash
after flash from many points upon the southern horizon. What these
other forces were, and whence they came, must now be made clear to the
reader.

General Bindon Blood, a successful soldier, had confirmed in the
Transvaal a reputation which he had won on the northern frontier of
India.  He and General Elliot were two of the late comers who had been
spared from the great Eastern dependency to take the places of some of
those Generals who had returned to England for a well-earned rest.  He
had distinguished himself by his systematic and effective guardianship
of the Delagoa railway line, and he was now selected for the supreme
control of the columns which were to advance from the south and sweep
the Roos-Senekal district.  There were seven of them, which were
arranged as follows:

Two columns started from Middelburg under Beatson and Benson, which
might be called the left wings of the movement.  The object of
Beatson's column was to hold the drifts of the Crocodile River, while
Benson's was to seize the neighbouring hills called the
Bothasberg. This it was hoped would pin the Boers from the west, while
Kitchener from Lydenburg advanced from the east in three separate
columns. Pulteney and Douglas would move up from Belfast in the
centre, with Dulstoom for their objective.  It was the familiar drag
net of French, but facing north instead of south.

On April 13th the southern columns were started, but already the
British preparations had alarmed the Boers, and Botha, with his main
commandos, had slipped south across the line into that very district
from which he had been so recently driven. Viljoen's commando still
remained to the north, and the British troops, pouring in from every
side, converged rapidly upon it.  The success of the operations was
considerable, though not complete.  The Tantesberg, which had been the
rallying-point of the Boers, was occupied, and Roos-Senekal, their
latest capital, was taken, with their State papers and
treasure. Viljoen, with a number of followers, slipped through between
the columns, but the greater part of the burghers, dashing furiously
about like a shoal of fish when they become conscious of the net, were
taken by one or other of the columns. A hundred of the Boksburg
commando surrendered en masae, fifty more were taken at Roos-Senekal;
forty-one of the formidable Zarps with Schroeder, their leader, were
captured in the north by the gallantry and wit of a young Australian
officer named Reid; sixty more were hunted down by the indefatigable
Vialls, leader of the Bushmen. From all parts of the district came the
same story of captures and surrenders.

Knowing, however, that Botha and Viljoen had slipped through to the
south of the railway line, Lord Kitchener determined to rapidly
transfer the scene of the operations to that side. At the end of
April, after a fortnight's work, during which this large district was
cropped, but by no means shaved, the troops turned south again.  The
results of the operation had been eleven hundred prisoners, almost the
same number as French had taken in the south-east, together with a
broken Krupp, a pom-pom, and the remains of the big naval gun taken
from us at Helvetia.

It was determined that Plumer's advance upon Pietersburg should not be
a mere raid, but that steps should be taken to secure all that he had
gained, and to hold the lines of communication.  With this object the
2nd Gordon Highianders and the 2nd Wiltshires were pushed up along the
railroad, followed by Kitchener's Fighting Scouts.  These troops
garrisoned Pietersburg and took possession of Chunies Poort, and other
strategic positions.  They also furnished escorts for the convoys
which supplied Plumer on the Oliphant River, and they carried out some
spirited operations themselves in the neighbourhood of Pietersburg.
Grenfell, who commanded the force, broke up several laagers, and
captured a number of prisoners, operations in which he was much
assisted by Colenbrander and his men. Finally the last of the great
Creusot guns, the formidable Long Toms, was found mounted near
Haenertsburg. It was the same piece which had in succession scourged
Mafeking and Kimberley.  The huge gun, driven to bay, showed its
powers byng an effective fire at ten thousand yards.  The
British galloped in upon it, the Boer riflemen were driven off, and
the gun was blown up by its faithful gunners.  So by suicide died the
last of that iron brood, the four sinister brothers who had wrought
much mischief in South Africa.  They and their lesson will live in the
history of modern artillery.

The sweeping of the Roos-Senekal district being over, Plumer left his
post upon the River of the Elephants, a name which, like Rhenoster,
Zeekoe, Kameelfontein, Leeuw Kop, Tigerfontein, Elands River, and so
many more, serves as a memorial to the great mammals which once
covered the land.  On April 28th the force turned south, and on May
4th they had reached the railroad at Eerstefabrieken close to
Pretoria. They had come in touch with a small Boer force upon the way,
and the indefatigable Vialls hounded them for eighty miles, and tore
away the tail of their convoy with thirty prisoners.  The main force
had left Pretoria on horseback on March 28th, and found themselves
back once again upon foot on May 5th.  They had something to show,
however, for the loss of their horses, since they had covered a
circular march of 400 miles, had captured some hundreds of the enemy,
and had broken up their last organised capital.  From first to last it
was a most useful and well-managed expedition.

It is the more to be regretted that General Blood was recalled from
his northern trek before it had attained its full results, because
those operations to which he turned did not offer him any great
opportunities for success.  Withdrawing from the north of the railway
with his columns, he at once started upon a sweep of that portion of
the country which forms an angle between the Delagoa line and the
Swazi frontier -- the Barberton district.  But again the two big fish,
Viljoen and Botha, had slipped away, and the usual collection of
sprats was left in the net.  The sprats count also, however, and every
week now telegrams were reaching England from Lord Kitchener which
showed that from three to five hundred more burghers had fallen into
our hands.  Although the public might begin to look upon the war as
interminable, it had become evident to the thoughtful observer that it
was now a mathematical question, and that a date could already be
predicted by which the whole Boer population would have passed into
the power of the British.

Among the numerous small British columns which were at work in
different parts of the country, in the latter half of May, there was
one under General Dixon which was operating in the neighbourhood of
the Magaliesberg Range.  This locality has never been a fortunate one
for the British arms.  The country is peculiarly mountainous and
broken, and it was held by the veteran De la Rey and a numerous body
of irreconcilable Boers.  Here in July we had encountered a check at
Uitval's Nek, in December Clements had met a more severe one at
Nooitgedacht, while shortly afterwards Cunningham had been repulsed at
Middelfontein, and the Light Horse cut up at Naauwpoort.  After such
experiences one would have thought that no column which was not of
overmastering strength would have been sent into this dangerous
region, but General Dixon had as a matter of fact by no means a strong
force with him.  With 1,600 men and a battery he was despatched upon a
quest after some hidden guns which were said to have been buried in
those parts.

On May 26th Dixon's force, consisting of Derbyshires, King's Own
Scottish Borderers, Imperial Yeomanry, Scottish Horse, and six guns
(four of 8th R.F.A. and two of 28th R.F.A.), broke camp at Naauwpoort
and moved to the west.  On the 28th they found themselves at a place
called Vlakfontein, immediately south of Oliphant's Nek.  On that day
there were indications that there were a good many Boers in the
neighbourhood.  Dixon left a guard over his canip and then sallied out
in search of the buried guns.  His force was divided into three parts,
the left column under Major Chance consisting of two guns of the 28th
R.F.A., 230 of the Yeomanry, and one company of the Derbys. The centre
comprised two guns (8th R.F.A.), one howitzer, two companies of the
Scottish Borderers and one of the Derbys; while the right was made up
of two guns (8th R.F.A.), 200 Scottish Horse, and two companies of
Borderers.  Having ascertained that the guns were not there, the force
about midday was returning to the camp, when the storm broke suddenly
and fiercely upon the rearguard.

There had been some sniping during the whole morning, but no
indications of the determined attack which was about to be delivered.
The force in retiring upon the camp had become divided, and the
rearguard consisted of the small column under Major Chance which had
originally formed the left wing. A veldt fire was raging on one flank
of this rearguard, and through the veil of smoke a body of five
hundred Boers charged suddenly home with magnificent gallantry upon
the guns.  We have few records of a more dashing or of a more
successful action in the whole course of the war. So rapid was it that
hardly any time elapsed between the glimpse of the first dark figures
galloping through the haze and the thunder of their hoofs as they
dashed in among the gunners. The Yeomanry were driven back and many of
them shot down.  The charge of the mounted Boers was supported by a
very heavy fire from a covermg party, and the gun-detachments were
killed or wounded almost to a man.  The lieutenant in charge and the
sergeant were both upon the ground.  So far as it is possible to
reconstruct the action from the confused accounts of excited
eye-witnesses and from the exceedingly obscure official report of
General Dixon, there was no longer any resistance round the guns,
which were at once turned by their captors upon the nearest British
detachment.

The company of infantry which had helped to escort the guns proved
however to be worthy representatives of that historic branch of the
British service.  They were northerners, men of Derbyshire and
Nottingham, the same counties which had furnished the brave militia
who had taken their punishment so gamely at Roodeval.  Though hustled
and broken they re-formed and clung doggedly to their task, firing at
the groups of Boers who surrounded the guns.  At the same time word
had been sent of their pressing need to the Scotch Borderers and the
Scottish Horse, who came swarming across the valley to the succour of
their comrades.  Dixon had brought two guns and a howitzer into
action, which subdued the fire of the two captured pieces, and the
infantry, Derbys and Borderers, swept over the position, retaking the
two guns and shooting down those of the enemy who tried to stand.  The
greater number vanished into the smoke, which veiled their retreat as
it had their advance.  Forty-one of them were left dead upon the
ground.  Six officers and fifty men killed with about a hundred and
twenty wounded made up the British losses, to which two guns would
certainly have been added but for the gallant counter-attack of the
infantry.  With Dargai and Vlakfontein to their credit the Derbys have
green laurels upon their war-worn colours.  They share them on this
occasion with the Scottish Borderers, whose volunteer company carried
itself as stoutly as the regulars.

How is such an action to be summed up? To Kemp, the young Boer leader,
and his men belongs the credit of the capture of the guns; to the
British that of their recapture and of the final possession of the
field. The British loss was probably somewhat higher than that of the
Boers, but upon the other hand there could be no question as to which
side could afford loss the better. The Briton could be replaced, but
there were no reserves behind the fighting line of the Boers.

There is one subject which cannot be ignored in discussing this
battle, however repugnant it may be.  That is the shooting of some of
the British wounded who lay round the guns.  There is no question at
all about the fact, which is attested by many independent witnesses.
There is reason to hope that some of the murderers paid for their
crimes with their lives before the battle was over.  It is pleasant to
add that there is at least one witness to the fact that Boer officers
interfered with threats to prevent some of these outrages. It is
unfair to tarnish the whole Boer nation and cause on account of a few
irresponsible villains, who would be disowned by their own decent
comrades.  Very many -- too many -- British soldiers have known by
experience what it is to fall into the hands of the enemy, and it must
be confessed that on the whole they have been dealt with in no
ungenerous spirit, while the British treatment of the Boers has been
unexampled in all military history for its generosity and
humanity. That so fair a tale should be darkened by such ruffianly
outrages is indeed deplorable, but the incident is too well
authenticated to be left unrecorded in any detailed account of the
campaign.  General Dixon, finding the Boers very numerous all round
him, and being hampered by his wounded, fell back upon Naauwpoort,
which he reached on June 1st.

In May, Sir Bindon Blood, having returned to the line to refit, made
yet another cast through that thrice-harried belt of country which
contains Ermelo, Bethel, and Carolina, in which Botha, Viljoen, and
the fighting Boers had now concentrated. Working over the blackened
veldt he swung round in the Barberton direction, and afterwards made a
westerly drive in conjunction with small columns commanded by Walter
Kitchener, Douglas, and Campbell of the Rifles, while Colville,
Garnett, and Bullock co-operated from the Natal line. Again the
results were disappointing when compared with the power of the
instrument employed.  On July 5th he reached Springs, near
Johannesburg, with a considerable amount of stock, but with no great
number of prisoners. The elusive Botha had slipped away to the south
and was reported upon the Zululand border, while Viljoen had succeeded
in crossing the Delagoa line and winning back to his old lair in the
district north of Middelburg, from which he had been evicted in
April. The commandos were like those pertinacious flies which buzz
upwards when a hand approaches them, but only to settle again in the
same place.  One could but try to make the place less attractive than
before.

Before Vujoen's force made its way over the line it had its revenge
for the long harrying it had undergone by a well-managed night attack,
in which it surprised and defeated a portion of Colonel Beatson's
column at a place called Wilmansrust, due south of Middelburg, and
between that town and Bethel. Beatson had divided his force, and this
section consisted of 850 of the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles, with
thirty gunners and two pom-poms, the whole under the command of Major
Morris.  Viljoen's force trekking north towards the line came upon
this detachment upon June 12th.  The British were aware of the
presence of the enemy, but do not appear to have posted any extra
outposts or taken any special precautions.  Long months of commando
chasing had imbued them too much with the idea that these were
fugitive sheep, and not fierce and wily wolves, whom they were
endeavouring to catch. It is said that 700 yards separated the four
pickets. With that fine eye for detail which the Boer leaders possess,
they had started a veldt fire upon the west of the camp and then
attacked from the east, so that they were themselves invisible while
their enemies were silhouetted against the light.  Creeping up between
the pickets, the Boers were not seen until theyd fire at
point-blank range upon the sleeping men.  The rifles were stacked --
another noxious military tradition -- and many of the troopers were
shot down while they rushed for their weapons.  Surprised out of their
sleep and unable to distinguish their antagonists, the brave
Australians did as well as any troops could have done who were placed
in so impossible a position.  Captain Watson, the officer in charge of
the pom-poms, was shot down, and it proved to be impossible to bring
the guns into action. Within five minutes the Victorians had lost
twenty killed and forty wounded, when the survivors surrendered. It is
pleasant to add that they were very well treated by the victors, but
the high-spirited colonials felt their reverse most bitterly.  'It is
the worst thing that ever happened to Australia!' says one in the
letter in which he describes it.  The actual number of Boers who
rushed the camp was only 180, but 400 more had formed a cordon round
it.  To Viljoen and his lieutenant Muller great credit must be given
for this well-managed affair, which gave them a fresh supply of stores
and clothing at a time when they were hard pressed for both.  These
same Boer officers had led the attack upon Helvetia where the 4.7 gun
was taken. The victors succeeded in getting away with all their
trophies, and having temporarily taken one of the blockhouses on the
railway near Brugspruit, they crossed the line in safety and returned,
as already said, to their old quarters in the north, which had been
harried but not denuded by the operations of General Blood.

It would take a volume to catalogue, and a library to entirely
describe the movements and doings of the very large number of British
columns which operated over the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony
during this cold-weather campaign.  If the same columns and the same
leaders were consistently working in the same districts, some system
of narrative might enable the reader to follow their fortunes, but
they were, as a matter of fact, rapidly transferred from one side of
the field of action to another in accordance with the concentrations
of the enemy.  The total number of columns amounted to at least sixty,
which varied in number from two hundred to two thousand, and seldom
hunted alone.  Could their movements be marked in red upon a chart,
the whole of that huge district would be criss-crossed, from Taungs to
Komati and from Touws River to Pietersburg, with the track of our
weary but indomitable soldiers.

Without attempting to enter into details which would be unbecoming to
the modesty of a single volume, one may indicate what the other more
important groupings were during the course of these months, and which
were the columns that took part in them.  Of French's drive in the
south-east, and of Blood's incursion into the Roos-Senekal district
some account has been given, and of his subsequent sweeping of the
south. At the same period Babington, Dixon, and Rawlinson were
co-operating in the Klerksdorp district, though the former officer
transferred his services suddenly to Blood's combination, and
afterwards to Elliot's column in the north of Orange River Colony.
Williams and Fetherstonhaugh came later to strengthen this Klerksdorp
district, in which, after the clearing of the Magaliesberg, De la Rey
had united his forces to those of Smuts.  This very important work of
getting a firm hold upon the Magaliesberg was accomplished in July by
Barton, Allenby, Kekewich, and Lord Basing, who penetrated into the
wild country and established blockhouses and small forts in very much
the same way as Cumberland and Wade in 1746 held down the
Highlands. The British position was much strengthened by the firm grip
obtained of this formidable stronghold of the enemy, which was
dangerous not only on account of its extreme strength, but also of its
proximity to the centres of population and of wealth.

De la Rey, as already stated, had gone down to the Klerksdorp
district, whence, for a time at least, he seems to have passed over
into the north of the Orange River Colony. The British pressure at
Klerksdorp had become severe, and thither in May came the
indefatigable Methuen, whom we last traced to Warrenton.  From this
point on May 1st he railed his troops to Mafeking, whence he trekked
to Lichtenburg, and south as far as his old fighting ground of
Haartebeestefontein, having one skirmish upon the way and capturing a
Boer gun. Thence he returned to Mafeking, where he had to bid adieu to
those veteran Yeomanry who had been his comrades on so many a weary
march.  It was not their fortune to be present at any of the larger
battles of the war, but few bodies of troops have returned to England
with a finer record of hard and useful service.

No sooner, however, had Methuen laid down one weapon than he snatched
up another.  Having refitted his men and collected some of the more
efficient of the new Yeomanry, he was off once more for a three weeks'
circular tour in the direction of Zeerust. It is difficult to believe
that the oldest inhabitant could have known more of the western side
of the Transvaal, for there was hardly a track which he had not
traversed or a kopje from which he had not been sniped. Early in
August he had made a fresh start from Mafeking, dividing his force
into two columns, the command of the second being given to Von Donop.
Having joined hands with Fetherstonhaugh, he moved through the
south-west and finally halted at Klerksdorp.  The harried Boers moved
a hundred miles north to Rustenburg, followed by Methuen,
Fetherstonhaugh, Hamilton, Kekewich, and Allenby, who found the
commandos of De la Rey and Kemp to be scattering in front of them and
hiding in the kloofs and dongas, whence in the early days of September
no less than two hundred were extracted.  On September 6th and 8th
Methuen engaged the main body of De la Rey in the valley of the Great
Marico River which lies to the north-west of Rustenburg.  In these two
actions he pushed the Boers in front of him with a loss of eighteen
killed and forty-one prisoners, but the fighting was severe, and
fifteen of his men were killed and thirty wounded before the position
had been carried. The losses were almost entirely among the newly
raised Yeomanry, who had already shown on several occasions that,
having shed their weaker members and had some experience of the field,
they were now worthy to take their place beside their veteran
comrades.

The only other important operation undertaken by the British columns
in the Transvaal during this period was in the north, where Beyers and
his men were still harried by Grenfell, Colenbrander, and Wilson. A
considerable proportion of the prisoners which figured in the weekly
lists came from this quarter.  On May 30th there was a notable action,
the truth of which was much debated but finally established, in which
Kitchener's Scouts under Wilson surprised and defeated a Boer force
under Pretorius, killing and wounding several, and taking forty
prisoners.  On July 1st Grenfell took nearly a hundred of Beyers' men
with a considerable convoy. North, south, east, and west the tale was
ever the same, but so long as Botha, De la Rey, Steyn, and De Wet
remained uncaptured, the embers might still at any instant leap into a
flame.

It only remains to complete this synopsis of the movements of columns
within the Transvaal that I should add that after the conclusion of
Blood's movement in July, several of his columns continued to clear
the country and to harass Viljoen in the Lydenburg and Dulstroom
districts.  Park, Kitchener, Spens, Beatson, and Benson were all busy
at this work, never succeeding in forcing more than a skirmish, but
continually whittling away wagons, horses, and men from that nucleus
of resistance which the Boer leaders still held together.

Though much hampered by the want of forage for their horses, the Boers
were ever watchful for an opportunity to strike back, and the long
list of minor successes gained by the British was occasionally
interrupted by a petty reverse.  Such a one befell the small body of
South African Constabulary stationed near Vereeniging, who encountered
upon July 13th a strong force of Boers supposed to be the main
commando of De Wet. The Constabulary behaved with great gallantry but
were hopelessly outnumbered, and lost their seven-pounder gun, four
killed, six wounded, and twenty-four prisoners.  Another small reverse
occurred at a far distant point of the seat of war, for the irregular
corps known as Steinacker's Horse was driven from its position at
Bremersdorp in Swaziland upon July 24th, and had to fall back sixteen
miles, with a loss of ten casualties and thirty prisoners.  Thus in
the heart of a native state the two great white races of South Africa
were to be seen locked in a desperate conflict. However unavoidable,
the sight was certainly one to be deplored.

To the Boer credit, or discredit, are also to be placed those repeated
train wreckings, which cost the British during this campaign the lives
and limbs of many brave soldiers who were worthy of some less ignoble
fate.  It is true that the laws of war sanction such enterprises, but
there is something indiscriminate in the results which is repelent to
humanity, and which appears to justify the most energetic measures to
prevent them.  Women, children, and sick must all travel by these
trains and are exposed to a common danger, while the assailants enjoy
a safety which renders their exploit a peculiarly inglorious one. Two
Boers, Trichardt and Hindon, the one a youth of twenty-two, the other
a man of British birth, distinguished, or disgraced, themselves by
this unsavoury work upon the Delagoa line, but with the extension of
the blockhouse system the attempts became less successful.  There was
one, however, upon the northern line near Naboomspruit which cost the
lives of Lieutenant Best and eight Gordon Highlanders, while ten were
wounded.  The party of Gordons continued to resist after the smash,
and were killed or wounded to a man.  The painful incident is
brightened by such an example of military virtue, and by the naive
reply of the last survivor, who on being questioned why he continued
to fight until he was shot down, answered with fine simplicity,
'Because I am a Gordon Highlander.'

Another train disaster of an even more tragic character occurred near
Waterval, fifteen miles north of Pretoria, upon the last day of
August.  The explosion of a mine wrecked the train, and a hundred
Boers who lined the banks of the cuttingd fire upon the derailed
carriages.  Colonel Vandeleur, an officer of great promise, was killed
and twenty men, chiefly of the West Riding regiment, were shot.  Nurse
Page was also among the wounded.  It was after this fatal affair that
the regulation of carrying Boer hostages upon the trains was at last
carried out.

It has been already stated that part of Lord Kitchener's policy of
concentration lay in his scheme for gathering the civil population
into camps along the lines of communication.  The reasons for this,
both military and humanitarian, were overwhelming. Experience had
proved that the men if left at liberty were liable to be persuaded or
coerced by the fighting Boers into breaking their parole and rejoining
the commandos. As to the women and children, they could not be left
upon the farms in a denuded country.  That the Boers in the field had
no doubts as to the good treatment of these people was shown by the
fact that they repeatedly left their families in the way of the
columns so that they might be conveyed to the camps.  Some
consternation was caused in England by a report of Miss Hobhouse,
which called public attention to the very high rate of mortality in
some of these camps, but examination showed that this was not due to
anything insanitary in their situation or arrangement, but to a severe
epidemic of measles which had swept away a large number of the
children. A fund was started in London to give additional comforts to
these people, though there is reason to believe that their general
condition was superior to that of the Uitlander refugees, who still
waited permission to return to their homes.  By the end of July there
were no fewer than sixty thousand inmates of the camps in the
Transvaal alone, and half as many in the Orange River Colony. So great
was the difficulty in providing the supplies for so large a number
that it became more and more evident that some at least of the camps
must be moved down to the sea coast.

Passing to the Orange River Colony we find that during this winter
period the same British tactics had been met by the same constant
evasions on the part of the dwindling commandos.  The Colony had been
divided into four military districts: that of Bloemfontein, which was
given to Charles Knox, that of Lyttelton at Springfontein, that of
Rundle at Harrismith, and that of Elliot in the north.  The latter was
infinitely the most important, and Elliot, the warden of the northern
marches, had under him during the greater part of the winter a mobile
force of about 6,000 men, Commanded by such experienced officers as
Broadwood, De Lisle, and Bethune.  Later in the year Spens, Bullock,
Plumer, and Rimington were all sent into the Orange River Colony to
help to stamp out the resistance.  Numerous skirmishes and snipings
were reported from all parts of the country, but a constant stream of
prisoners and of surrenders assured the soldiers that, in spite of the
difficulty of the country and the obstinacy of the enemy, the term of
their labours was rapidly approaching.

In all the petty and yet necessary operations of these columns, two
incidents demand more than a mere mention.  The first was a
hard-fought skirmish in which some of Elliot's horsemen were engaged
upon June 6th.  His column had trekked during the month of May from
Kroonstad to Harrismith, and then turning north found itself upon that
date near the hamlet of Reitz.  Major Sladen with 200 Mounted
Infantry, when detached from the main body, came upon the track of a
Boer convoy and ran it down.  Over a hundred vehicles with forty-five
prisoners were the fruits of their enterprise.  Well satisfied with
his morning's work, the British leader despatched a party of his men
to convey the news to De Lisle, who was behind, while he established
himself with his loot and his prisoners in a convenient kraal.  Thence
they had an excellent view of a large body of horsemen approaching
them with scouts, flankers, and all military precautions.  One
warm-hearted officer seems actually to have sallied out to meet his
comrades, and it was not till his greeting of them took the extreme
form of handing over his rifle that the suspicion of danger entered
the heads of his companions.  But if there was some lack of wit there
was none of heart in Sladen and his men. With forty-five Boers to hold
down, and 500 under Fourie, De Wet, and De la Rey around them, the
little band made rapid preparation for a desperate resistance: the
prisoners were laid upon their faces, the men knocked loopholes in the
mud walls of the kraal, and a blunt soldierly answer was returned to
the demand for surrender.

But it was a desperate business. The attackers were five to one, and
the five were soldiers of De Wet, the hard-bitten veterans of a
hundred encounters.  The captured wagons in a long double row
stretched out over the plain, and under this cover the Dutchmen
swarmed up to the kraal.  But the men who faced them were veterans
also, and the defence made up for the disparity of numbers. With fine
courage the Boers made their way up to the village, and established
themselves in the outlying huts, but the Mounted Infantry clung
desperately to their position.  Out of the few officers present
Findlay was shot through the head, Moir and Cameron through the heart,
and Strong through the stomach.  It was a Waggon Hill upon a small
scale, two dour lines of skirmishers emptying their rifles into each
other at point-blank range.  Once more, as at Bothaville, the British
Mounted Infantry proved that when it came to a dogged pelting match
they could stand punishment longer than their enemy.  They suffered
terribly.  Fifty-one out of the little force were on the ground, and
the survivors were not much more numerous than their prisoners.  To
the 1st Gordons, the 2nd Bedfords, the South Australians, and the New
South Welsh men belongs the honour of this magnificent defence. For
four hours the fierce battle raged, until at last the parched and
powder-stained survivors breathed a prayer of thanks as they saw on
the southern horizon the vanguard of De Lisle riding furiously to the
rescue. For the last hour, since they had despaired of carrying the
kraal, the Boers had busied themselves in removing their convoy; but
now, for the second time in one day, the drivers found British rifles
pointed at their heads, and the oxen were turned once more and brought
back to those who had fought so hard to hold them.  Twenty-eight
killed and twenty-six wounded were the losses in this desperate
affair.  Of the Boers seventeen were left dead in front of the kraal,
and the forty-five had not escaped from the bulldog grip which held
them.  There seems for some reason to have been no effective pursuit
of the Boers, and the British column held on its way to Kroonstad.

The second incident which stands out amid the dreary chronicle of
hustlings and snipings is the surprise visit paid by Broadwood with a
small British column to the town of Reitz upon July 11th, which
resulted in the capture of nearly every member of the late government
of the Free State, save only the one man whom they particularly
wanted.  The column consisted of 200 yeomen, 200 of the 7th Dragoon
Guards, and two guns. Starting at 11 P.M., the raiders rode hard all
night and broke with the dawn upon the sleeping village.  Racing into
the main street, they secured the startled Boers as they rushed from
the houses.  It is easy to criticise such an operation from a
distance, and to overlook the practical difficulties in the way, but
on the face of it it seems a pity that the holes had not been stopped
before the ferret was sent in. A picket at the farther end of the
street would have barred Steyn's escape.  As it was, he flung himself
upon his horse and galloped half-clad out of the town.  Sergeant Cobb
of the Dragoons snapped a rifle at close quarters upon him, but the
cold of the night had frozen the oil on the striker and the Cartridge
hung fire.  On such trifles do the large events of history turn!  Two
Boer generals, two commandants, Steyn's brother, his secretary, and
several other officials were among the nine-and-twenty prisoners.  The
treasury was also captured, but it is feared that the Yeomen and
Dragoons will not be much the richer from their share of the contents.

Save these two incidents, the fight at Reitz and the capture of a
portion of Steyn's government at the same place, the winter's
campaign furnished little which was of importance, though a great deal
of very hard and very useful work was done by the various columns
under the direction of the governors of the four military
districts. In the south General Bruce Hamilton made two sweeps, one
from the railway line to the western frontier, and the second from the
south and east in the direction of Petrusburg.  The result of the two
operations was about 300 prisoners.  At the same time Monro and
Hickman re-cleared the already twice-cleared districts of Rouxville and
Smithfield.  The country in the east of the Colony was verging now upon
the state which Grant described in the Shenandoah Valley: 'A crow,'
said he, 'must carry his own rations when he flies across it.'

In the middle district General Charles Knox, with the columns of
Pine-Coffin, Thorneycroft, Pilcher, and Henry, were engaged in the
same sort of work with the same sort of results.

The most vigorous operations fell to the lot of Generak Elliot, who
worked over the northern and north-eastern district, which still
contained a large number of fighting burghers.  In May and June Elliot
moved across to Vrede and afterwards down the eastern frontier of the
Colony, joining hands at last with Rundle at Harrismith. He then
worked his way back to Kroonstad through Reitz and Lindley. It was on
this journey that Sladen's Mounted Infantry had the sharp experience
which has been already narrated.  Western's column, working
independently, co-operated with Elliot in this clearing of the
north-east.  In August there were very large captures by Broadwood's
force, which had attained considerable mobility, ninety miles being
covered by it on one occasion in two days.

Of General Rundle there is little to be said, as he was kept busy in
exploring the rough country in his own district -- the same district
which had been the scene of the operations against Prinsloo and the
Fouriesburg surrender.  Into this district Kritzinger and his men
trekked after they were driven from the Colony in July, and many small
skirmishes and snipings among the mountains showed that the Boer
resistance was still alive.

July and August were occupied in the Orange River Colony by energetic
operations of Spens' and Rimington's columns in the midland districts,
and by a considerable drive to the north-eastern corner, which was
shared by three columns under Elliot and two under Plumer, with one
under Henry and several smaller bodies. A considerable number of
prisoners and a large amount of stock were the result of the movement,
but it was very evident that there was a waste of energy in the
employment of such forces for such an end.  The time appeared to be
approaching when a strong force of military police stationed
permanently in each district might prove a more efficient
instrument. One interesting development of this phase of the war was
the enrolment of a burgher police among the Boers who had
surrendered. These men -- well paid, well mounted, and well armed --
were an efficient addition to the British forces.  The movement spread
until before the end of the war there were several thousand burghers
under such well-known officers as Celliers, Villonel, and young
Cronje, fighting against their own guerilla countrymen. Who, in 1899,
could have prophesied such a phenomenon as that!

Lord Kitchener's proclamation issued upon August 9th marked one more
turn in the screw upon the part of the British authorities. By it the
burghers were warned that those who had not laid down their arms by
September 15th would in the case of the leaders be banished, and in
the case of the burghers be compelled to support their families in the
refugee camps.  As many of the fighting burghers were men of no
substance, the latter threat did not affect them much, but the other,
though it had little result at the time, may be useful for the
exclusion of firebrands during the period of reconstruction.  Some
increase was noticeable in the number of surrenders after the
proclamation, but on the whole it had not the result which was
expected, and its expediency is veryto question.  This date may
be said to mark the conclusion of the winter campaign and theng
of a new phase in the struggle.

In the account which has been given in a preceding chapter of the
invasion of Cape Colony by the Boer forces, it was shown that the
Western bands were almost entirely expelled, or at least that they
withdrew, at the time when De Wet was driven across the Orange
River. This was at the beginning of March 1901.  It was also mentioned
that though the Boers evacuated the barren and unprofitable desert of
the Karoo, the Eastern bands which had come with Kritzinger did not
follow the same course, but continued to infest the mountainous
districts of the Central Colony, whence they struck again and again at
the railway ljiies, the small towns, British patrols, or any other
quarry which was within their reach and strength.  From the
surrounding country they gathered a fair number of recruits, and they
were able through the sympathy and help of the Dutch farmers to keep
themselves well mounted and supplied. In small wandering bands they
spread themselves over a vast extent of country, and there were few
isolated farmhouses from the Orange River to the Oudtshoorn Mountains,
and from the Cape Town railroad in the west to the Fish River in the
east, which were not visited by their active and enterprising scouts.
The object of the whole movement was, no doubt, to stimulate a general
revolt in the Colony; and it must be acknowledged that if the powder
did not all explode it was not for want of the match being thoroughly
applied.

It might at first sight seem the simplest of military operations to
hunt down these scattered and insignificant bands; but as a matter of
fact nothing could be more difficult.  Operating in a country which
was both vast and difficult, with excellent horses, the best of
information and supplies ready for them everywhere, it was impossible
for the slow-moving British columns with their guns and their wagons
to overtake them. Formidable even in flight, the Boers were always
ready to turn upon any force which exposed itself too rashly to
retaliation, and so amid the mountain passes the British chiefs had to
use an amount of caution which was incompatible with extreme speed.
Only when a commando was exactly localised so that two or three
converging British forces could be brought to bear upon it, was there
a reasonable chance of forcing a fight. Still, with all these heavy
odds against them, the various little columns continued month after
month to play hide-and-seek with the commandos, and the game was by no
means always on the one side.  The varied fortunes of this scrambling
campaign can only be briefly indicated in these pages.

It has already been shown that Kritzinger's original force broke into
many bands, which were recruited partly from the Cape rebels and
partly from fresh bodies which passed over from the Orange River
Colony. The more severe the pressure in the north, the greater reason
was there for a trek to this land of plenty.  The total number of
Boers who were wandering over the eastern and midland districts may
have been about two thousand, who were divided into bands which varied
from .fifty to three hundred.  The chief leaders of separate commandos
were Kritzinger, Scheepers, Malan, Myburgh, Fouché, Lotter, Smuts, Van
Reenen, Lategan, Maritz, and Conroy, the two latter operating on the
western side of the country.  To hunt down these numerous and active
bodies the British were compelled to put many similar detachments into
the field, known as the columns of Gorringe, Crabbe, Henniker,
Scobell, Doran, Kavanagh, Alexander, and others.  These two sets of
miniature armies performed an intricate devil's dance over the Colony,
the main lines of which are indicated by the red lines upon the map.
The Zuurberg mountains to the north of Steynsburg, the Sneeuwberg
range to the south of Middelburg, the Oudtshoorn Mountains in the
south, the Cradock district, the Murraysburg district, and the
Graaf-Reinet district-these were the chief centres of Boer activity.

In April Kritzinger made his way north to the Orange River Colony, for
the purpose of consulting with De Wet, but he returned with a
following of 200 men about the end of May.  Continual brushes
occurred during this month between the various columns, and much hard
marching was done upon either side, but there was nothing which could
be claimed as a positive success.

Early in May two passengers sailed for Europe, the journey of each
being in its way historical.  The first was the weary and overworked
Pro-Consul who had the foresight to distinguish the danger and the
courage to meet it.  Milner's worn face and prematurely grizzled hair
told of the crushing weight which had rested upon him during three
eventful years. A gentle scholar, he might have seemed more fitted for
a life of academic calm than for the stormy part which the discernment
of Mr. Chamberlain had assigned to him.  The fine flower of an English
university, low-voiced and urbane, it was difficult to imagine what
impression he would produce upon those rugged types of which
South. Africa is so peculiarly prolific. But behind the reserve of a
gentleman there lay within him a lofty sense of duty, a singular
clearness of vision, and a moral courage which would brace him to
follow whither his reason pointed.  His visit to England for three
months' rest was the occasion for a striking manifestation of loyalty
and regard from his fellow-countrymen. He returned in August as Lord
Milner to the scene of his labours, with the construction of a united
and loyal commonwealth of South Africa as the task of his life.

The second traveller who sailed within a few days of the Governor was
Mrs. Botha, the wife of the Boer General, who visited Europe for
private as well as political reasons.  She bore to Kruger an exact
account of the state of the country and of the desperate condition of
the burghers. Her mission had no immediate or visible effect, and the
weary war, exhausting for the British but fatal for the Boers, went
steadily on.

To continue the survey of the operations in the Cape, the first point
scored was by the invaders, for Malan's commando succeeded upon May
13th in overwhelming a strong patrol of the Midland Mounted Rifles,
the local colonial corps, to the south of Maraisburg.  Six killed,
eleven wounded, and forty~one prisoners were the fruits of his little
victory, which furnished him also with a fresh supply of rifles and
ammunition.  On May 21st Crabbe's column was in touch with Lotter and
with Lategan, but no very positive result came from the skirmish.

The end of May showed considerable Boer activity in the Cape Colony,
that date corresponding with the return of Kritzinger from the
north. Haig had for the moment driven Scheepers back from the extreme
southerly point which he had reached, and he was now in the
Graaf-Reinet district; but on the other side of the colony Conroy had
appeared near Kenhart, and upon May 23rd he fought a sharp skirmish
with a party of Border Scouts.  The main Boer force under Kritzinger
was in the midlands, however, and had concentrated to such an extent
in the Cradock district that it was clear that some larger enterprise
was on foot.  This soon took shape, for on June 2nd, after a long and
rapid march, the Boer leader threw himself upon Jamestown, overwhelmed
the sixty townsmen who formed the guard, and looted the town, from
which he drew some welcome supplies and 100 horses.  British columns
were full cry upon his heels, however, and the Boers after a few hours
left the gutted town and vanished into the hills once more.  On June
6th the British had a little luck at last, for on that date Scobell
and Lukin in the Barkly East district surprised a laager and took
twenty prisoners, 166 horses, and much of the Jamestown loot. On the
same day Windham treated Van Reenen in a similar rough fashion near
Steynsburg, and took twenty-two prisoners.

On June 8th the supreme command of the operations in Cape Colony was
undertaken by General French, who from this time forward manoeuvred
his numerous columns upon a connected plan with the main idea of
pushing the enemy northwards. It was some time, however, before his
disposition bore fruit, for the commandos were still better mounted
and lighter than their pursuers.  On Tune 13th the youthful and
dashing Scheepers, who commanded his own little force at an age when
he would have been a junior lieutenant of the British army, raided
Murraysburg and captured a patrol. On Tune 17th Monro with Lovat's
Scouts and Bethune's Mounted Infantry had some slight success near
Tarkastad, but three days later the ill-fated Midland Mounted Rifles
were surprised in the early morning by Kritzinger at Waterkloof, which
is thirty miles west of Cradock, and were badly mauled by him.  They
lost ten killed, eleven wounded, and sixty-six prisoners in this
unfort unate affair.  Again the myth that colonial alertness is
greater than that of regular troops seems to have been exposed.

At the end of Tune, Fouché, one of the most enterprising of the
guerilla chiefs, made a dash from Barkly East into the native reserves
of the Transkei in order to obtain horses and supplies. It was a
desperate measure, as it was vain to suppose that the warlike Kaffirs
would permit their property to be looted without resistance, and if
once the assegais were reddened no man could say how far the mischief
might go. With great loyalty the British Government, even in the
darkest days, had held back those martial races -- Zulus, Swazis, and
Basutos -- who all had old grudges against the Amaboon. Fouché's raid
was stopped, however, before it led to serious trouble. A handful of
Griqualand Mounted Rifles held it in front, while Dalgety and his
colonial veterans moving very swiftly drove him back northwards.

Though baulked, Fouché was still formidable, and on July 14th he made
a strong attack in the neighbourhood of Jamestown upon a column of
Connaught Rangers who were escorting a convoy.  Major Moore offered a
determined resistance, and eventually after some hours of fighting
drove the enemy away and captured their laager.  Seven killed and
seventeen wounded were the British losses in this spirited engagement.

On July 10th General French, surveying from a lofty mountain peak the
vast expanse of the field of operations, with his heliograph calling
up responsive twinkles over one hundred miles of country, gave the
order for the convergence of four columns upon the valley in which he
knew Scheepers to be lurking.  We have it from one of his own letters
that his commando at the time consisted of 240 men, of whom forty were
Free Staters and the rest colonial rebels.  Crewe, Windham, Doran, and
Scobell each answered to the call, but the young leader was a man of
resource, and a long kloof up the precipitous side of the hill gave
him a road to safety.  Yet the operations showed a new mobility in the
British columns, which shed their guns and their baggage in order to
travel faster.  The main commando escaped, but twenty-five laggards
were taken. The action took place among the hills thirty miles to the
west of Graaf-Reinet.

On July 21st Crabbe and Kritzinger had a skirmish in the mountains
near Cradock, in which the Boers were strong enough to hold their own;
but on the same date near Murraysburg, Lukin, the gallant colonial
gunner, with ninety men rode into 150 of Lategan's band and captured
ten of them, with a hundred horses.  On July 27th a small party of
twenty-one Imperial Yeomanry was captured, after a gallant resistance,
by a large force of Boers at the Doorn River on the other side of the
Colony.  The Kaffir scouts of the British were shot dead in cold blood
by their captors after the action.  There seems to be no possible
excuse for the repeated murders of coloured men by the Boers, as they
had themselves from the beginning of the war used their Kaffirs for
every purpose short of actually fighting.  The war had lost much of
the good humour which marked its outset. A fiercer feeling had been
engendered on both sides by the long strain, but the execution of
rebels by the British, though much to be deplored, is still recognised
as one of the rights of a belligerent. When one remembers the
condonation upon the part of the British of the use of their own
uniforms by the Boers, of the wholesale breaking of paroles, of the
continual use of expansive bullets, of the abuse of the pass system
and of the red cross, it is impossible to blame them for showing some
severity in the stamping out of armed rebellion within their own
Colony.  If stern measures were eventually adopted it was only after
extreme leniency had been tried and failed.  The loss of five years'
franchise as a penalty for firing upon their own flag is surely the
most gentle correction which an Empire ever laid upon a rebellious
people.

At the beginning of August the connected systematic work of French's
columns began to tell. In a huge semicircle the British were pushing
north, driving the guerillas in front of them.  Scheepers in his usual
wayward fashion had broken away to the south, but the others had been
unable to penetrate the cordon and were herded over the
Stormberg-Naauwport line.  The main body of the Boers was hustled
swiftly along from August 7th to August 10th, from Graaf-Reinet to
Thebus, and thrust over the railway line at that point with some loss
of men and a great shedding of horses. It was hoped that the
blockhouses on the railroad would have held the enemy, but they
slipped across by night and got into the Steynsburg district, where
Gorringe's colonials took up the running. On August 18th he followed
the commandos from Steynsburg to Venterstad, killing twenty of them
and taking several prisoners. On the 15th, Kritzinger with the main
body of the invaders passed the Orange River near Bethulie, and made
his way to the Wepener district of the Orange River Colony.
Scheepers, Lotter, Lategan, and a few small wandering bands were the
only Boers left in the Colony, and to these the British columns now
turned their attention, with the result that Lategan, towards the end
of the month, was also driven over the river. For the time, at least,
the situation seemed to have very much improved, but there was a drift
of Boers over the north-western frontier, and the long-continued
warfare at their own doors was undoubtedly having a dangerous effect
upon the Dutch farmers.  Small successes from time to time, such as
the taking of sixty of French's Scouts by Theron's commando on August
10th, served to keep them from despair.  Of the guerilla bands which
remained, the most important was that of Scheepers, which now numbered
300 men, well mounted and supplied.  He had broken back through the
cordon, and made for his old haunts in the south-west.  Theron, with a
smaller band, was also in the Uniondale and Willowmore district,
approaching close to the sea in the Mossel Bay direction, but being
headed off by Kavanagh.  Scheepers turned in the direction of Cape
Town, but swerved aside at Montagu, and moved northwards towards Touws
River.

So far the British had succeeded in driving and injuring, but never in
destroying, the Boer bands.  It was a new departure therefore when,
upon September 4th, the commando of Lotter was entirely destroyed by
the column of Scobell.  This column consisted of some of the Cape
Mounted Rifles and of the indefatigable 9th Lancers. It marked the
enemy down in a valley to the west of Cradock and attacked them in the
morning, after having secured all the approaches, The result was a
complete success.  The Boers threw themselves into a building and held
out valiantly, but their position was impossible, aud after enduring
considerable punishment they were forced to hoist the white
flag. Eleven had been killed, forty-six wounded, and fifty-six
surrendered -- figures which are in themselves a proof of the tenacity
of their defence.  Lotter was among the prisoners, 260 horses were
taken, and a good supply of ammunition, with some dynamite.  A few
days later, on September 10th, a similar blow, less final in its
character, was dealt by Colonel Crabbe to the commando of Van der
Merve, which was an offshoot of that of Scheepers. The action was
fought near Laingsburg, which is on the main line, just north of
Matjesfontein, and it ended in the scattering of the Boer band, the
death of their boy leader (he was only eighteen years of age), and the
capture of thirty-seven prisoners.  Seventy of the Beers escaped by a
hidden road.  To Colonials and Yeomanry belongs the honour of the
action, which cost the British force seven casualties.  Colonel Crabbe
pushed on after the success, and on September 14th he was in touch
with Scheepers's commando near Ladismith (not to he confused with the
historical town of Natal), and endured and inflicted some losses.  On
the 17th a patrol of Grenadier Guards was captured in the north of the
Colony, Rebow, the young lieutenant in charge of them, meeting with a
soldier's death.

On the same day a more serious engagement occurred near Tarkastad, a
place ~hich lies to the east of Cradock, a notorious centre of
disaffection in the midland &~stnct.  Smuts's commando, some hundreds
strong, was marked down in this part, and several forces converged
upon it.  One of the outlets, Elands River Poort, was guarded by a
single squadron of the 17th Lancers.  Upon this the Boers made a
sudden and very fierce attack, their approach being facilitated partly
by the mist and partly by the use of khaki, a trick which seems never
to have grown too stale for successful use. The result was that they
were able to ride up to the British camp before any preparations had
been made for resistance, and to shoot down a number of the Lancers
before they could reach their horses.  So terrible was the fire that
the single squadron lost thirty-four killed and thirty-six wounded.
But the regiment may console itself for the disaster by the fact that
the sorely stricken detachment remained true to the spirited motto of
the corps, and that no prisoners appear to have been lost.

After this one sharp engagement there ensued several weeks during
which the absence of historical events, or the presence of the
military censor, caused a singular lull in the account of the
operations.  With so many small commandos and so many pursuing columns
it is extraordinary that there should not have been a constant
succession of actions.  That there was not must indicate a
sluggishness upon the part of the pursuers, and this sluggishness can
only be explained by the condition of their horses.  Every train of
thought brings the critic back always to the great horse question, and
encourages the conclusion that there, at all seasons of the war and in
all scenes of it, is to be found the most damning indictment against
British foresight, common-sense, and power of organisation.  That the
third year of the war should dawn without the British forces having
yet got the legs of the Boers, after having penetrated every portion
of their country and having the horses of the world on which to draw,
is the most amazingly inexplicable point in the whole of this strange
campaign. From the telegram 'Infantry preferred' addressed to a nation
of rough-riders, down to the failure to secure the excellent horses on
the spot, while importing them unfit for use from the ends of the
earth, there has been nothing but one long series of blunders in this,
the most vital question of all.  Even up to the end, in the Colony the
obvious lesson had not yet been learnt that it is better to give 1,000
men two horses each, and EO let them reach the enemy, than give 2,000
men one horse each, with which they can never attain their object. The
chase during two years of the man with two horses by the man with one
horse, has been a sight painful to ourselves and ludicrous to others.

In connection with this account of operations within the Colony, there
is one episode which occurred in the extreme north-west which will not
fit in with this connected narrative, but which will justify the
distraction of the reader's intelligence, for few finer deeds of arms
are recorded in the war.  This was the heroic defence of a convoy by
the 14th Company of Irish Imperial Yeomanry.  The convoy was taking
food to Griquatown, on the Kimberley side of the seat of war. The town
had been long invested by Conroy, and the inhabitants were in such
straits that it was highly necessary to relieve them.  To this end a
convoy, two miles long, was despatched under Major Humby of the Irish
Yeomanry.  The escort consisted of seventy-five Northumberland
Fusiliers, twenty-four local troops, and 100 of the 74th Irish
Yeomanry. Fifteen miles from Griquatown, at a place called Rooikopjes,
the convoy was attacked by the enemy several hundred in number. Two
companies of the Irishmen seized the ridge, however, which commanded
the wagons, and held it until they were almost exterminated.  The
position was covered with bush, and the two parties came to the
closest of quarters, the Yeomen refusing to take a backward step,
though it was clear that they were vastly outnumbered.  Encouraged by
the example of Madan and Ford, their gallant young leaders, they
deliberately sacrificed their lives in order to give time for the guns
to come up and for the convoy to pass.  Oliffe, Bonynge, and Maclean,
who had been children together, were shot side by side on the ridge,
and afterwards buried in one grave.  Of forty-three men in action,
fourteen were killed and twenty severely wounded.  Their sacrifice was
not in vain, however.  The Boers were beaten back, and the convoy, as
well as Griquatown, was saved. Some thirty or forty Boers were killed
or wounded in the skirmish, and Conroy, their leader, declared that it
was the stiffest fight of his life.

In the autumn and winter of 1901 General French had steadily pursued
the system of clearing certain districts, one at a time, and
endeavouring by his blockhouses and by the arrangement of his forces
to hold in strict quarantine those sections of the country which were
still infested by the commandos.  In this manner he succeeded by the
November of this year in confining the active forces of the enemy to
the extreme northeast and to the south-west of the peninsula.  It is
doubtful if the whole Boer force, three-quarters of whom were colonial
rebels, amounted to more than fifteen hundred men.  When we learn that
at this period of the war they were indifferently armed, and that many
of them were mounted upon donkeys, it is impossible, after making
every allowance for the passive assistance of the farmers, and the
difficulties of the country, to believe that the pursuit was always
pushed with the spirit and vigour which was needful.

In the north-east, Myburgh, Wessels, and the truculent Fouché were
allowed almost a free hand for some months, while the roving bands
were rounded up in the' midlands and driven along until they were west
of the main railroad.  Here, in the Calvinia district, several
commandos united in October 1901 under Maritz, Louw, Smit, and Theron.
Their united bands rode down into the rich grain-growing country round
Piquetberg and Malmesbury, pushing south until it seemed as if their
academic supporters at Paarl were actually to have a sight of the
rebellion which they had fanned to a flame. At one period their
patrols were within forty miles of Cape Town.  The movement was
checked, however, by a small force of Lancers and district troops, and
towards the end of October, Maritz, who was chief in this quarter,
turned northwards, and on the 29th captured a small British convoy
which crossed his line of march. Early in November he doubled back and
attacked Piquetberg, but was beaten off with some loss.  From that
time a steady pressure from the south and east drove these bands
farther and farther into the great barren lands of the west, until, in
the following April, they had got as far as Namaqualand, many hundred
miles away.

Upon October 9th, the second anniversary of the Ultimatum, the hands
of the military were strengthened by the proclamation of Cape Town and
all the seaport towns as being in a state of martial law. By this
means a possible source of supplies and recruits for the enemy was
effectually blocked.  That it had not been done two years before is a
proof of how far local political considerations can be allowed to
over-ride the essentials of Imperial policy. Meanwhile treason courts
were sitting, and sentences, increasing rapidly from the most trivial
to the most tragic, were teaching the rebel that his danger did not
end upon the field of battle. The execution of Lotter and his
lieutenants was a sign that the patience of a long-suffering Empire
had at last reached an end.

The young Boer leader, Scheepers, had long been a thorn in the side of
the British. He had infested the southern districts for some months,
and he had distinguished himself both by the activity of his movements
and by the ruthless vigour of some of his actions. Early in October a
serious illness and consequent confinement to his bed brought him at
last within the range of British mobility.  On his recovery he was
tried for repeated breaches of the laws of war, including the murder
of several natives.  He was condemned to death, and was executed in
December. Much sympathy was excited by his gallantry and his youth --
he was only twenty-three.  On the other hand, our word was pledged to
protect the natives, and if he whose hand had been so heavy upon them
escaped, all confidence would have been lost in our promises and our
justice.  That British vengeance was not indiscriminate was shown soon
afterwards in the case of a more irnportant commander, Kritzinger, who
was the chief leader of the Boers within Cape Colony.  Kritzinger was
wounded and captured while endeavouring to cross the line near Hanover
Road upon December 15th.  He was put upon his trial, and his fate
turned upon how far he was responsible for the misdeeds of some of his
subordinates.  It was clearly shown that he had endeavoured to hold
them within the bounds of civilised warfare, and with congratulations
and handshakings he was acquitted by the military court.

In the last two months of the year 1901, a new system was introduced
into the Cape Colony campaign by placing the Colonial and district
troops immediately under the command of Colonial officers and of the
Colonial Government.  It had long been felt that some devolution was
necessary, and the change was justified by the result.  Without any
dramatic incident, an inexorable process of attrition, caused by
continual pursuit and hardship, wore out the commandos. Large bands
had become small ones, and small ones had vanished. Only by the union
of several bodies could any enterprise higher than the looting of a
farmhouse be successfully attempted.

Such a union occurred, however, in the early days of February 1902,
when Smuts, Malan, and several other Boer leaders showed great
activity in the country round Calvinia.  Their commandos seem to have
included a proportion of veteran Republicans from the north, who were
more formidable fighting material than the raw Colonial rebels. It
happened that several dangerously weak British columns were operating
within reach at that time, and it was only owing to the really
admirable conduct of the troops that a serious disaster was averted.
Two separate actions, each of them severe, were fought on the same
date, and in each case the Boers were able to bring very superior
numbers into the field.

The first of these was the fight in which Colonel Doran's column
extricated itself with severe loss from a most perilous plight.  The
whole force under Doran consisted of 350 men with two guns, and this
handful was divided by an expedition which he, with 150 men, undertook
in order to search a distant farm.  The remaining two hundred men,
under Captain Saunders, were left upon February 5th with the guns and
the convoy at a place called Middlepost, which lies about fifty miles
south-west of Calvinia.  These men were of the 11th, 23rd, and 24th
Imperial Yeomanry, with a troop of Cape Police.  The Boer Intelligence
was excellent, as might be expected in a country which is dotted with
farms.  The weakened force at Middlepost was instantly attacked by
Smuts's commando. Saunders evacuated the camp and abandoned the
convoy, which was the only thing he could do, but he concentrated all
his efforts upon preserving his guns.  The night was illuminated by
the blazing wagons, and made hideous by the whoops of the drunken
rebels who caroused among the captured stores.  With the first light
of dawn the small British force was fiercely assailed on all sides,
but held its own in a manner which would have done credit to any
troops.  The much criticised Yeomen fought like veterans. A
considerable position had to be covered, and only a handful of men
were available at the most important points.  One ridge, from which
the guns would be enfiladed, was committed to the charge of
Lieutenants Tabor and Chichester with eleven men of the 11th Imperial
Yeomanry, their instructions being 'to hold it to the death.'  The
order was obeyed with the utmost heroism. After a desperate defence
the ridge was only taken by the Boers when both officers had been
killed and nine out of eleven men were on the ground.  In spite of the
loss of this position the fight was still sustained until shortly
after midday, when Doran with the patrol returned.  The position was
still most dangerous, the losses had been severe, and the Boers were
increasing in strength.  An immediate retreat was ordered, and the
small column, af~er ten days of hardship and anxiety, reached the
railway line in safety.  The wounded were left to the care of Smuts,
who behaved with chivalry and humanity.

At about the same date a convoy proceeding from Beaufort West to
Fraserburg was attacked by Malan's commando.  The escort, which
consisted of sixty Colonial Mounted Rifles and 100 of the West
Yorkshire militia, was overwhelmed after a good defence, in which
Major Crofton, their commander, was killed. The wagons were destroyed,
but the Boers were driven off by the arrival of Crabbe's column,
followed by those of Capper and Lund.  The total losses of the British
in these two actions amounted to twenty-three killed and sixty-five
wounded.

The re-establishment of settled law and order was becoming more marked
every week in those southwestern districts, which had long been most
disturbed. Colonel Crewe in this region, and Colonel Lukin upon the
other side of the line, acting entirely with Colonial troops, were
pushing back the rebels, and holding, by a well-devised system of
district defence, all that they had gained. By the end of February
there were none of the enemy south of the Beaufort West and
Clanwilliam line.  These results were not obtained without much hard
marching and a little hard fighting.  Small columns under Crabbe,
Capper, Wyndham, Nickall, and Lund, were continually on the move, with
little to show for it save an ever-widening area of settled country in
their rear.  In a skirmish on February 20th ludge Hugo, a well-known
Boer leader, was killed, and Vanheerden, a notorious rebel, was
captured. At the end of this month Fouché's tranquil occupation of the
north-east was at last disturbed, and he was driven out of it into the
midlands, where he took refuge with the remains of his commando in the
Camdeboo Mountains. Malan's men had already sought shelter in the same
natural fortresB.  Malan was wounded and taken in a skirmish near
Somerset East a few days before the general Boer surrender. Fouché
gave himself up at Cradock on June 2nd.

The last incident of this scattered, scrambling, unsatisfactory
campaign in the Cape peninsula was the raid made by Smuts, the
Transvaal leader, into the Port Nolloth district of Namaqualand, best
known for its copper mines. A small railroad has been constructed from
the coast at this point, the terminus being the township of Ookiep.
The length of the line is about seventy miles.  It is difficult to
imagine what the Boers expected to gain in this remote corner of the
seat of war, unless they had conceived the idea that they might
actually obtain possession of Port Nolloth itself, and so restore the
communications with their sympathisers and allies.  At the end of
March the Boer horsemen appeared suddenly out of the desert, drove in
the British outposts, and summoned Ookiep to surrender. Colonel
Shelton, who commanded the small garrison, sent an uncompromising
reply, but he was unable to protect the railway in his rear, which was
wrecked, together with some of the blockhouses which had been erected
to guard it.  The loyal population of the surrounding country had
flocked into Ookiep, and the Commandant found himself burdened with
the care of six thousand people.  The enemy had succeeded in taking
the small post of Springbok, and Concordia, the mining centre, was
surrendered into their hands without resistance, giving them welcome
suplies of arms, ammunition, and dynamite.  The latter was used by the
Boers in the shape of hand-bombs, and proved to be a very efficient
weapon when employed against blockhouses.  Several of the British
defences were wrecked by them, with considerable loss to the garrison;
but in the course of a month's siege, in spite of several attacks, the
Boers were never able to carry the frail works which guarded the town.
Once more, at the end of the war as at the beginning of it, there was
shown the impotence of the Dutch riflemen against a British defence.
A relief column, under Colonel Cooper, was quickly organised at Port
Nolloth, and advanced along the railway line, forcing Smuts to raise
the siege in the first week of May.  Immediately afterwards came the
news of the negotiations for peace, and the Boer general presented
himself at Port Nolloth, whence he was conveyed by ship to Cape Town,
and so north again to take part in the deliberations of his
fellow-countrymen. Throughout the war he had played a manly and
honourable part.  It may be hoped that with youth and remarkable
experience, both of diplomacy and of war, he may now find a long and
briliant career awaiting him in a wider arena than that for which he
strove.

The history of the war during the African winter of 1901 has now been
sketched, and some account given of the course of events in the
Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and the Cape Colony.  The hope of
the British tbat they might stamp out resistance before the grass
should restore mobility to the larger bodies of Boers was destined to
be disappointed.  By the middle of September the veldt had turned from
drab to green, and the great drama was fated to last for one more act,
however anxious all the British and the majority of the Boers might be
to ring down the curtain.  Exasperating as this senseless prolongation
of a hopeless struggle might be, there was still some consolation in
the reflection that those who drank this bitter cup to the very lees
would be less likely to thirst for it again.

September 15th was the date which brought into force the British
Proclamation announcing the banishment of those Boer leaders who
continued in arms.  It must be confessed that this step may appear
harsh and unchivalrous to the impartial observer, so long as those
leaders were guilty of no practices which are foreign to the laws of
civilised warfare.  The imposition of personal penalties upon the
officers of an opposing army is a step for which it is difficult to
quote a precedent, nor is it wise to officially rule your enemy
outside the pale of ordinary warfare, since it is equallyto him
to take the same step against you.  The only justification for such a
course would be its complete success, as this would suggest that the
Intelligence Department were aware that the leaders desired some
strong excuse for coming in -- such an excuse as the Proclamation
would afford.  The result proved that nothing of the kind was needed,
and the whole proceeding must appear to be injudicious and
high-handed.  In honourable war you conquer your adversary by superior
courage, strength, or wit, but you do not terrorise him by particular
penalties aimed at individuals.  The burghers of the Transvaal and of
the late Orange Free State were legitimate belligerents, and to be
treated as such -- a statement which does not, of course, extend to
the Afrikander rebels who were their allies.

The tendency of the British had been to treat their antagonists as a
broken and disorganised banditti, but with the breaking of the spring
they were sharply reminded that the burghers were still capable of a
formidable and coherent effort.  The very date which put them beyond
the pale as belligerents was that which they seem to have chosen in
order to prove what active and valiant soldiers they still remained. A
quick succession of encounters occurred at various parts of the seat
of war, the general tendency of which was not entirely in favour of
the British arms, though the weekly export of prisoners reassured all
who noted it as to the sapping and decay of the Boer strength.  These
incidents must now be set down in the order of their occurrence, with
their relation to each other so far as it is possible to trace it.

General Louis Botha, with the double intention of making an offensive
move and of distracting the wavering burghers from a close examination
of Lord Kitchener's proclamation, assembled his forces in the second
week of September in the Ermelo district. Thence he moved them rapidly
towards Natal, with the result that the volunteers of that colony had
once more to grasp their rifles and hasten to the frontier.  The whole
situation bore for an instant an absurd resemblance to that of two
years before -- Botha playing the part of Joubert, and Lyttelton, who
commanded on the frontier, that of White.  It only remained, to make
the parallel complete, that some one should represent Penn Symons, and
this perilous role fell to a gallant officer, Major Gough, commanding
a detached force which thought itself strong enough to hold its own,
and only learned by actual experiment that it was not.

This officer, with a small force consisting of three companies of
Mounted Infantry with two guns of the 69th R.F.A., was operating in
the neighbourhood of Utrecht in the south-eastern corner of the
Transvaal, on the very path along which Botha must descend.  On
September 17th he had crossed De Jagers Drift on the Blood River, not
very far from Dundee, when he found himself in touch with the enemy.
His mission was toa path for an empty convoy returning from
Vryheid, and in order to do so it was necessary that Blood River
Poort, where the Boers were now seen, should be cleared.  With
admirable zeal Gough pushed rapidly forward, supported by a force of
350 Johannesburg Mounted Rifles under Stewart.  Such a proceeding must
have seemed natural to any British officer at this stage of the war,
when a swift advance was the only chance of closing with the small
bodies of Boers; but it is strange that the Intelligence Department
had not warned the patrols upon the frontier tbat a considerable force
was coming down upon them, and that they should be careful to avoid
action against impossible odds.  If Gough had known that Botha's main
commando was coming down upon him, it is inconceivable that he would
have pushed his advance until he could neither extricate his men nor
his guns.  A small body of the enemy, said to have been the personal
escort of Louis Botha, led him on, until a large force was able to
ride down upon him from the flank and rear.  Surrounded at Scheepers
Nek by many hundreds of riflemen in a difficult country, there was no
alternative but a surrender, and so sharp and sudden was the Boer
advance that the whole action was over in a very short time.  The new
tactics of the Boers, already used at Vlakfontein, and afterwards to
be successful at Brakenlaagte and at Tweebosch, were put in force. A
large body of mounted men, galloping swiftly inorder and firing
from the saddle, rode into and over the British.  Such temerity should
in theory have met with severe punishment, but as a matter of fact the
losses of the enemy seem to have been very small.  The soldiers were
not able to return an effective fire from their horses, and had no
time to dismount. The sights and breech-blocks of the two guns are
said to have been destroyed, but the former statement seems more
credible than the latter. A Colt gun was also captured.  Of the small
force twenty were killed, forty wounded, and over two hundred taken.
Stewart's force was able to extricate itself with some difficulty, and
to fall back on the Drift.  Gough managed to escape that night and to
report that it was Botha himself, with over a thousand men, wJio had
eaten up his detachment. The prisoners and wounded were sent in a few
days later to Vryheid, a town which appeared to be in some danger of
capture had not Walter Kitchener hastened to carry reinforcements to
the garrison.  Bruce Hamilton was at the same time despatched to head
Botha off, and every step taken to prevent his southern advance.  So
many columns from all parts converged upon the danger spot that
Lyttelton, who commanded upon the Natal frontier, had over 20,000 men
under his orders.

Botha's plans appear to have been to work through Zululand and then
strike at Natal, an operation which would be the more easy as it would
be conducted a considerable distance from the railway line. Pushing on
a few days after his successful action with Gough, he crossed the Zulu
frontier, and had in front of him an almost unimpeded march as far as
the Tugela.  Crossing this far from the British base of power, his
force could raid the Greytown district and raise recruits among the
Dutch farmers, laying waste one of the few spots in South Africa which
had been untouched by the blight of war.  All this lay before him, and
in his path nothing save only two small British posts which might be
either disregarded or gathered up as he passed.  In an evil moment for
himself, tempted by the thought of the supplies which they might
contain, he stopped to gather them up, and the force of the wave of
invasion broke itself as upon two granite rocks.

These two so-called forts were posts of very modest strength, a chain
of which had been erected at the time of the old Zulu war.  Fort
Itala, the larger, was garrisoned by 300 men of the 5th Mounted
Infantry, drawn from the Dublin Fusiliers, Middlesex, Dorsets, South
Lancashires, and Lancashire Fusiliers -- most of them old soldiers of
many battles.  They had two guns of the 69th R.F.A., the same battery
which had lost a section the week before.  Major Chapman, of the
Dublins, was in command.

Upon September 25th the small garrison heard that the main force of
the Boers was sweeping towards them, and prepared to give them a
soldiers' welcome.  The fort is situated upon the flank of a hill, on
the summit of which, a mile from the main trenches, a strong outpost
was stationed.  It was upon this that the first force of the attack
broke at midnight of September 25th. The garrison, eighty strong, was
fiercely beset by several hundred Boers, and the post was eventually
carried after a sharp and bloody contest.  Kane, of the South
Lancashires, died with the words 'No surrender' upon his lips, and
Potgieter, a Boer leader, was pistolled by Kane's fellow officer,
Lefroy.  Twenty of the small garrison fell, and the remainder were
overpowered and taken.

With this vantage-ground in their possession the Boers settled down to
the task of overwhelming the main position.  They attacked upon three
sides, and until morning the force was raked from end to end by unseen
riflemen.  The two British guns were put out of action and the maxim
was made unserviceable by a bullet. At dawn there was a pause in the
attack, but it recommenced and continued without intermission until
sunset.  The span betwixt the rising of the sun and its last red glow
in the west is a long one for the man who spends it at his ease, but
how never-ending must have seemed the hours to this handful of men,
outnumbered, surrounded, pelted by bullets, parched with thirst, torn
with anxiety, holding desperately on with dwindling numbers to their
frail defences!  To them it may have seemed a hard thing to endure so
much for a tiny fort in a savage land. The larger view of its vital
importance could have scarcely come to console the regimental officer,
far less the private.  But duty carried them through, and they wrought
better than they knew, for the brave Dutchmen, exasperated by so
disproportionate a resistance, stormed up to the very trenches and
suffered as they had not suffered for many a long month.  There have
been battles with 10,000 British troops hotly engaged in which the
Boer losses have not been so great as in this obscure conflict against
an isolated post.  When at last, baffled and disheartened, they drew
off with the waning light, it is said that no fewer than a hundred of
their dead and two hundred of their wounded attested the severity of
the fight.  So strange are the conditions of South African warfare
that this loss, which would have hardly made a skirmish memorable in
the slogging days of the Peninsula, was one of the most severe blows
which the burghers had sustained in the course of a two years' warfare
against a large and aggressive army.  There is a conflict of evidence
as to the exact figures, but at least they were sufficient to beat the
Boer army back and to change their plan of campaign.

Whilst this prolonged contest had raged round Fort Itala, a similar
attack upon a smaller scale was being made upon Fort Prospect, some
fifteen miles to the eastward.  This small post was held by a handful
of Durham Artillery Militia and of Dorsets.  The attack was delivered
by Grobler with several hundred burghers, but it made no advance
although it was pushed with great vigour, and repeated many times in
the course of the day. Captain Rowley, who was in command, handled his
men with such judgment that one killed and eight wounded represented
his casualties during a long day's fighting.  Here again the Boer
losses were in proportion to the resolution of their attack, and are
said to have amounted to sixty killed and wounded.  Considering the
impossibility of replacing the men, and the fruitless waste of
valuable ammunition, September 26th was an evil day for the Boer
cause.  The British casualties amounted to seventy-three.

The water of the garrison of Fort Itala had been cut off early in the
attack, and their ammunition had run low by evening.  Chapman withdrew
his men and his guns therefore to Nkandhla, where the survivors of his
gallant garrison received the special thanks of Lord Kitchener.  The
country around was still swarming with Boers, and on the last day of
September a convoy from Melmoth fell into their hands and provided
them with some badly needed supplies.

But the check which he had received was sufficient to prevent any
important advance upon the part of Botha, while the swollen state of
the rivers put an additional obstacle in his way.  Already the British
commanders, delighted to have at last discovered a definite objective,
were hurrying to the scene of action.  Bruce Hamuton had reached Fort
Itala upon September 28th and Walter Kitchener had been despatched to
Vryheid. Two British forces, aided by smaller columns, were
endeavouring to surround the Boer leader.  On October 6th Botha had
fallen back to the north-east of Vryheid, whither the British forces
had followed him.  Like De Wet's invasion of the Cape, Botha's advance
upon Natal had ended in placing himself and his army in a critical
position.  On October 9th he had succeeded in crossing the Privaan
River, a branch of the Pongolo, and was pushing north in the direction
of Piet Retief, much helped by misty weather and incessant rain.  Some
of his force escaped between the British columns, and some remained in
the kloofs and forests of that difficult country.

Walter Kitchener, who had followed up the Boer retreat, had a brisk
engagement with the rearguard upon October 6th.  The Boers shook
themselves clear with some loss, both to themselves and to their
pursuers.  On the 10th those of the burghers who held together had
reached Luneburg, and shortly afterwards they had got completely away
from the British columns. The weather was atrocious, and the lumbering
wagons, axle-deep in mud, made it impossible for troops who were
attached to them to keep in touch with the light riders who sped
before them.  For some weeks there was no word of the main Boer force,
but at the end of that time they reappeared in a manner which showed
that both in numbers and in spirit they were still a formidable body.

Of all the sixty odd British columns which were traversing the Boer
states there was not one which had a better record than that commanded
by Colonel Benson. During seven months of continuous service this
small force, consisting at that time of the Argyle and Sutherland
Highlanders, the 2nd Scottish Horse, the 18th and 19th Mounted
Infantry, and two guns, had acted with great energy, and had reduced
its work to a complete and highly effective system.  Leaving the
infantry as a camp guard, Benson operated with mounted troops alone,
and no Boer laager within fifty miles was safe from his nocturnal
visits.  So skilful had he and his men become at these night attacks
in a strange, and often difficult country, that out of twenty-eight
attempts twenty-one resulted in complete success.  In each case the
rule was simply to gallop headlong into the Boer laager, and to go on
chasing as far as the horses could go. The furious and reckless pace
may be judged by the fact that the casualties of the force were far
greater from falls than from bullets.  In seven months forty-seven
Boers were killed and six hundred captured, to say nothing of enormous
quantities of munitions and stock.  The success of these operations
was due, not only to the energy of Benson and his men, but to the
untiring exertions of Colonel Wools-Sampson, who acted as intelligence
officer. If, during his long persecution by President Kruger,
Wools-Sampson in the bitterness of his heart had vowed a feud against
the Boer cause, it must be acknowledged that he has most amply
fulfilled it, for it would be difficult to point to any single man who
has from first to last done them greater harm.

In October Colonel Benson's force was reorganised, and it then
consisted of the 2nd Buffs, the 2nd Scottish Horse, the 3rd and 25th
Mounted Infantry, and four guns of the 84th battery. With this force,
numbering nineteen hundred men, he left Middelburg upon the Delagoa
line on October 20th and proceeded south, crossing the course along
which the Boers, who were retiring from their abortive raid into
Natal, might be expected to come.  For several days the column
performed its familiar work, and gathered up forty or fifty prisoners.
On the 26th came news that the Boer commandos under Grobler were
concentrating against it, and that an attack in force might be
expected. For two days there was continuous sniping, and the column as
it moved through the country saw Boer horsemen keeping pace with it on
the far flanks and in the rear.  The weather had been very bad, and it
was in a deluge of cold driving rain that the British set forth upon
October 30th, moving towards Brakenlaagte, which is a point about
forty mi~s due south of Middelburg. It was Benson's intention to
return to his base.

About midday the column, still escorted by large bodies of aggressive
Boers, came to a difficult spruit swollen by the rain.  Here the
wagons stuck, and it took some hours to get them all across.  The Boer
fire was continually becoming more severe, and had broken out at the
head of the column as well as the rear.  The situation was rendered
more difficult by the violence of the rain, which raised a thick steam
from the ground and made it impossible to see for any distance.  Major
Anley, in command of the rearguard, peering back, saw through a rift
of the clouds a large body of horsemen in extended order sweeping
after them.  'There's miles of them, begob! ' cried an excited Irish
trooper. Next instant the curtain had closed once more, but all who
had caught a glimpse of that vision knew that a stern struggle was at
hand.

At this moment two guns of the 84th battery under Major Guinness were
in action against Boer riflemen. As a rear screen on the farther side
of the guns was a body of the Scottish Horse and of the Yorkshire
Mounted Infantry.  Near the guns themselves were thirty men of the
Buffs.  The rest of the Buffs and of the Mounted Infantry were out
upon the flanks or else were with the advance guard, which was now
engaged, under the direction of Colonel Wools-Sampson, in parking the
convoy and in forming the camp.  These troops played a small part in
the day's fighting, the whole force of which broke with irresistible
violence upon the few hundred men who were in front of or around the
rear guns.  Colonel Benson seems to have just ridden back to the
danger point when the Boers delivered their furious attack.

Louis Botba with his commando is said to have ridden sixty miles in
order to join the forces of Grobler and Oppermann, and overwhelm the
British column. It may have been the presence of their commander or a
desire to have vengeance for the harrying which they had undergone
upon the Natal border, but whatever the reason, the Boer attack was
made with a spirit and dash which earned the enthusiastic applause of
every soldier who survived to describe it.  With the low roar of a
great torrent, several hundred horsemen burst through the curtain of
mist, riding at a furious pace for the British guns.  The rear screen
of Mounted Infantry fell back before this terrific rush, and the two
bodies of horsemen came pell-mell down upon the handful of Buffs and
the guns.  The infantry were ridden into and surrounded by the Boers,
who found nothing to stop them from galloping on to the low ridge upon
which the guns were stationed.  This ridge was held by eighty of the
Scottish Horse and forty of the Yorkshire M.I., with a few riflemen
from the 25th Mounted Infantry.  The latter were the escort of the
guns, but the former were the rear screen who had fallen back rapidly
because it was the game to do so, but who were in no way shaken, and
who instantly dismounted and formed when they reached a defensive
position.

These men had hardly time to take up their ground when the Boers were
on them.  With that extraordinary quickness to adapt their tactics to
circumstances which is the chief military virtue of the Boers, the
horsemen did not gallop over the crest, but lined the edge of it, and
poured a withering fire on to the guns and the men beside them.  The
heroic nature of the defence can be best shown by the plain figures of
the casualties.  No rhetoric is needed to adorn that simple record.
There were thirty-two gunners round the guns, and twenty-nine fell
where they stood.  Major Guinness was mortaly wounded while
endeavouring with his own hands to fire a round of case.  There were
sixty-two casualties out of eighty among the Scottish Horse, and the
Yorkshires were practically annihilated. Altogether 123 men fell, out
of about 160 on the ridge.  'Hard pounding, gentlemen,' as Wellington
remarked at Waterloo, and British troops seemed as ready as ever to
endure it.

The gunners were, as usual, magnificent.  Of the two little
bullet-pelted groups of men around the guns there was not one who did
not stand to his duty without flinching.  Corporal Atkin was shot down
with all his comrades, but still endeavoured with his failing strength
to twist the breech-block out of the gun.  Another bullet passed
through his upraised hands as he did it.  Sergant Hayes, badly
wounded, and the last survivor of the crew, seized the lanyard,
crawled up the trail, and fired a last round before he
fainted. Sergeant Mathews, with three bullets through him, kept
steadily to his duty. Five drivers tried to bring up a limber and
remove the gun, but all of them, with all the horses, were hit.  There
have been incidents in this war which have not increased our military
reputation, but you might search the classical records of valour and
fail to find anything finer than the consistent conduct of the British
artillery.

Colonel Benson was hit in the knee and again in the stomach, but
wounded as he was he despatched a message back to Wools-Sampson,
asking him to burst shrapnel over the ridge so as to prevent the Boers
from carrying off the guns.  The burghers had ridden in among the
litter of dead and wounded men which marked the British position, and
some of the baser of them, much against the will of their commanders,
handled the injured soldiers with great brutality.  The shell-fire
drove them back, however, and the two guns were left standing alone,
with no one near them save their prostrate gunners and escort.

There has been some misunderstanding as to the part played by the
Buffs in this action, and words have been used which seem to imply
that they had in some way failed their mounted companions.  It is due
to the honour of one of the finest regiments in the British army to
clear this up.  As a matter of fact, the greater part of the regiment
under Major Dauglish was engaged in defending the camp.  Near the guns
there were four separate small bodies of Buffs, none of which appears
to have been detailed as an escort.  One of these parties, consisting
of thirty men under Lieutenant Greatwood, was ridden over by the
horsemen, and the same fate befell a party of twenty who were far out
upon the flank. Another small body under Lieutenant Lynch was over
taken by the same charge, and was practically destroyed, losing
nineteen killed and wounded out of thirty. In the rear of the guns was
a larger body of Buffs, 130 in number, under Major Eales. When the
guns were taken this handful attempted a counter-attack, but Eales
soon saw that it was a hopeless effort, and he lost thirty of his men
before he could extricate himself. Had these men been with the others
on the gun ridge they might have restored the fight, but they had not
reached it when the position was taken, and to persevere in the
attempt to retake it would have led to certain disaster. The only just
criticism to which the regiment isis that, having just come off
blockhouse duty, they were much out of condition, which caused the men
to straggle and the movements to be unduly slow.

It was fortunate that the command of the column devolved upon so
experienced and cool-headed a soldier as Wools-Sampson.  To attempt a
counter-attack for the purpose of recapturing the guns would, in case
of disaster, have risked the camp and the convoy. The latter was the
prize which the Boers had particularly in view, and to expose it would
be to play their game. Very wisely, therefore, Wools-Sampson held the
attacking Boers off with his guns and his riflemen, while every spare
pair of hands was set to work entrenching the position and making it
impregnable against attack. Outposts were stationed upon all those
surrounding points which might command the camp, and a summons to
surrender from the Boer leader was treated with contempt. All day a
long-range fire, occasionally very severe, rained upon the camp.
Colonel Benson was brought in by the ambulance, and used his dying
breath in exhorting his subordinate to hold out.  'No more night
marches' are said to have been the last words spoken by this gallant
soldier as he passed away in the early morning after the action.  On
October 31st the force remained on the defensive, but early on
November 1st the gleaming of two heliographs, one to the north-east
and one to the southwest, told that two British columns, those of De
Lisle and of Barter, were hastening to the rescue.  But the Boers had
passed as the storm does, and nothing but their swathe of destruction
was left to show where they had been.  They had taken away the guns
during the night, and were already beyond the reach of pursuit.

Such was the action at Brakenlaagte, which cost the British sixty men
killed and 170 wounded, together with two guns.  Colonel Benson,
Colonel Guinness, Captain Eyre Lloyd of the Guards, Major Murray and
Captain Lindsay of the Scottish Horse, with seven other officers were
among the dead, while sixteen officers were wounded.  The net result
of the action was that the British rear-guard had been annihilated,
but that the main body and the convoy, which was the chief object of
the attack, was saved.  The Boer loss was considerable, being about
one hundred and fifty.  In spite of the Boer success nothing could
suit the British better than hard fighting of the sort, since whatever
the immediate result of it might be, it must necessarily cause a
wastage among the enemy which could never be replaced.  The gallantry
of the Boer charge was only equalled by that of the resistance offered
round the guns, and it is an action to which both sides can look back
without shame or regret.  It was feared that the captured guns would
soon be used to break the blockhouse line, but nothing of the kind was
attempted, and within a few weeks they were both recovered by British
columns.

In order to make a consecutive and intelligible narrative, I will
continue with an account of the operations in this south-eastern
portion of the Transvaal from the action of Brakenlaagte down to the
end of the year 1901.  These were placed in the early part of
November. under the supreme command of General Bruce Hamilton, and
that energetic commander set in motion a number of small columns,
which effected numerous captures. He was much helped in his work by
the new lines of blockhouses, one of which extended from Standerton to
Ermelo, while another connected Brugspruit with Greylingstad.  The
huge country was thus cut into manageable districts, and the fruits
were soon seen by the large returns of prisoners which came from this
part of the seat of wvar.

Upon December 3rd Bruce Hamilton, who had the valuable assistance of
Wools-Sampson to direct his intelligcnce, struck swiftly out from
Ermelo and fell upon a Boer laager in the early morning, capturing
ninety-six prisoners.  On the 10th he overwhelmed the Bethel commando
by a similar march, kiling seven and capturing 131.  Williams and
Wing commanded separate columns in this operation, and their energy
may be judged from the fact that they covered fifty-one miles during
the twenty-four hours.  On the 12th Hamilton's columns were on the
war-path once more, and another commando was wiped out.  Sixteen
killed and seventy prisoners were the fruits of this expedition.  For
the second time in a week the columns had done their fifty miles a
day, and it was no surprise to hear from their commander that they
were in need of a rest.  Nearly four hundred prisoners had been taken
from the most warlike portion of the Transvaal in ten days by one
energetic commander, with a list of twenty-five casualties to
ourselves.  The thanks of the Secretary of War were specially sent to
him for his brilliant work.  From then until the end of the year 1901,
numbers of smaller captures continued to be reported from the same
region, where Plumer, Spens, Mackenzie, Rawlinson, and others were
working.  On the other hand there was one small setback which occurred
to a body of two hundred Mounted Infantry under Major Bridgford, who
had been detached from Spens's column to search some farmhouses at a
place called Holland, to the south of Ermelo.  The expedition set
forth upon the night of December 19th, and next morning surrounded and
examined the farms.

The British force became divided in doing this work, and were suddenly
attacked by several hundred of Britz's commando, who came to close
quarters through their khaki dress, which enabled them to pass as
Plumer's vanguard.  The brunt of the fight fell upon an outlying body
of fifty men, nearly all of whom were killed, wounded or taken.  A
second body of fifty men were overpowered in the same way, after a
creditable defence.  Fifteen of the British were killed and thirty
wounded, while Bridgford the commander was also taken.  Spens came up
shortly afterwards with the column, and the Boers were driven
off. There seems every reason to think that upon this occasion the
plans of the British had leaked out, and that a deliberate ambush had
been laid for them round the farms, but in such operations these are
chances against which it is not always possible to guard. Considering
the number of the Boers, and the cleverness of their dispositions, the
British were fortunate in being able to extricate their force without
greater loss, a feat which was largely due to the leading of
Lieutenant Sterling.

Leaving the Eastern Transvaal, the narrative must now return to
several incidents of importance which had occurred at various points
of the seat of war during the latter months of 1901.

On September 19th, two days after Gough's disaster, a misfortune
occurred near Bloemfontein by which two guns and a hundred and forty
men fell temporarily into the hands of the enemy. These guns,
belonging to U battery, were moving south under an escort of Mounted
Infantry, from that very Sanna's Post which had been so fatal to the
same battery eighteen months before. When fifteen miles south of the
Waterworks, at a place called Vlakfontein (another Vlakfontein from
that of General Dixon's engagement), the small force was surrounded
and captured by Ackermann'n commando. The gunner officer, Lieutenant
Barry, died beside his guns in the way that gunner officers have. Guns
and men were taken, however, the latter to be released, and the former
to be recovered a week or two later by the British columns. It is
certainly a credit to the Boers that the spring campaign should have
d by four British guns falling into their hands, and it is
impossible to withhold our admiration for those gallant farmers who,
after two years of exhausting warfare, were still able to turn upon a
formidable and victorious enemy, and to renovate their supplies at his
expense.

Two days later, hard on the heels of Gough's mishap, of the
Vlakfontein incident, and of the annihilation of the squadron of
Lancers in the Cape, there was a serious affair at Elands Kloof, near
Zastron, in the extreme south of the Orange River Colony.  In this a
detachment of the Highland Scouts raised by the public spirit of Lord
Lovat was surprised at night and very severely handled by Kritzinger's
commando.  The loss of Colonel Murray, their commander, of the
adjutant of the same name, and of forty-two out of eighty of the
Scouts, shows how fell was the attack, which broke as sudden and as
strong as a South African thunderstorm upon the unconscious camp. The
Boers appear to have eluded the outposts and crept right among the
sleeping troops, as they did in the case of the Victorians at
Wilmansrust. Twelve gunners were also hit, and the only field gun
taken.  The retiring Boers were swiftly followed up by Thorneycroft's
column, however, and the gun was retaken, together with twenty of
Kritzinger's men.  It must be confessed that there seems some irony in
the fact that, within five days of the British ruling by which the
Boers were no longer a military force, these non-belligerents had
inflicted a loss of nearly six hundred men killed, wounded, or taken.
Two small commandos, that of Koch in the Orange River Colony, and that
of Carolina, had been captured by Williams and Benson.  Combined they
only numbered a hundred and nine men, but here, as always, they were
men who could never be replaced.

Those who had followed the war with care, and had speculated upon the
future, were prepared on hearing of Botha's movement upon Natal to
learn that De la Rey had also made some energetic attack in the
western quarter of the Transvaal.  Those who had formed this
expectation were not disappointed, for upon the last day of September
the Boer chief struck fiercely at Kekewich's column in a vigorous
night attack, which led to as stern an encounter as any in the
campaign. This was the action at Moedwill, near Magato Nek, in the
Magaliesberg.

When last mentioned De la Rey was in the Marico district, near
Zeerust, where he fought two actions with Methuen in the early part of
September.  Thence he made his way to Rustenburg and into the
Magaliesberg country, where he joined Kemp.  The Boer force was
followed up by two British columns under Kekewich and Fetherstonhaugh.
The former commander had camped upon the night of Sunday, September
30th, at the farm of Moedwill, in a strong position within a triangle
formed by the Selous River on the west, a donga on the east, and the
Zeerust-Rustenburg road as a base.  The apex of the triangle pointed
north, with a ridge on the farther side of the river.

The men with Kekewich were for the most part the same as those who had
fought in the Vlakfontein engagement -- the Derbys, the 1st Scottish
Horse, the Yeomanry, and the 28th R.F.A. Every precaution appears to
have been taken by the leader, and his pickets were thrown out so far
that ample warning was assured of an attack.  The Boer onslaught came
so suddenly and fiercely, however, in the early morning, that the
posts upon the river bank were driven in or destroyed and the riflemen
from the ridge on the farther side were able to sweep the camp with
their fire.  In numbers the two forces were not unequal, but the Boers
had already obtained the tactical advantage, and were playing a game
in which they are the schoolmasters of the world. Never has the
British spirit flamed up more fiercely, and from the commander to the
latest yeoman recruit there was not a man who flinched from a
difficult and almost a desperate task.  The Boers must at all hazard
be driven from the position which enabled them to command the camp.
No retreat was possible without such an abandonment of stores as would
amount to a disaster.  In the confusion and the uncertain light of
early dawn there was no chance of a concerted movement, though
Kekewich made such dispositions as were possible with admirable
coolness and promptness. Squadrons and companies closed in upon the
river bank with the one thought of coming to close quarters and
driving the enemy from their commanding position. Already more than
half the horses and a very large number of officers and men had gone
down before the pelting bullets.  Scottish Horse, Yeomanry, and Derbys
pushed on, the young soldiers of the two former corps keeping pace
with the veteran regiment.  'All the men bebaved simply splendidly,'
said a spectator, 'taking what little cover there was and advancing
yard by yard. An order was given to try and saddle up a squadron, with
the idea of getting round their flank.  I had the saddle almost on one
of my ponies when he was hit in two places.  Two men trying to saddle
alongside of me were both shot dead, and Lieutenant Wortley was shot
through the knee. I ran back to where I had been firing from and found
the Colonel slightly hit, the Adjutant wounded and dying, and men dead
and wounded all round.'  But the counter-attack soon began to make
way. At first the advance was slow, but soon it quickened into a
magnificent rush, the wounded Kekewich whooping on his men, and the
guns coming into action as the enemy began to fall back before the
fierce charge of the British riflemen. At six o'clock De la Rey's
burghers had seen that their attempt was hopeless, and were in full
retreat -- a retreat which could not be harassed by the victors, whose
cavalry had been converted by that hail of bullets into footmen.  The
repulse had been absolute and complete, for not a man or a cartridge
had been taken from the British, but the price paid in killed and
wounded was a heavy one.  No fewer than 161 had been hit, including
the gallant leader, whose hurt did not prevent him from resuming his
duties within a few days.  The heaviest losses fell upon the Scottish
Horse, and upon the Derbys; but the Yeomanry also proved on this, as
on some other occasions, how ungenerous were the criticisms to which
they had been exposed.  There are few actions in the war which appear
to have been more creditable to the troops engaged.

Though repulsed at Moedwill, De la Rey, the grim, long-bearded
fighting man, was by no means discouraged. From the earliest days of
the campaign, when he first faced Methuen upon the road to Kimberley,
he had shown that he was a most dangerous antagonist, tenacious,
ingenious, and indomitable. With him were a body of irreconcilable
burghers, who were the veterans of many engagements, and in Kemp he
had an excellent fighting subordinate. His command extended over a
wide stretch of populous country, and at any time he could bring
considerable reinforcements to his aid, who would separate again to
their farms and hiding-places when their venture was accomplished. For
some weeks after the fight at Moedwill the Boer forces remained quiet
in that district.  Two British columns had left Zeerust on October
17th, under Methuen and Von Donop, in order to sweep the surrounding
country, the one working in the direction of Elands River and the
other in that of Rustenburg. They returned to Zeerust twelve days
later, after a successful foray, which had been attended with much
sniping and skirmishing, but only one action which is worthy of
record.

This was fought on October 24th at a spot near Kleinfontein, upon the
Great Marico River, which runs to the north-east of Zeerust. Von
Donop's column was straggling through very broken and bush-covered
country when it was furiously charged in the flank and rear by two
separate bodies of burghers.  Kemp, who commanded the flank attack,
cut into the line of wagons and destroyed eight of them, killing many
of the Kaffir drivers, before he could be driven off. De la Rey and
Steenkamp, who rushed the rear-guard, had a more desperate contest.
The Boer horsemen got among the two guns of the 4th R.F.A., and held
temporary possession of them, but the small escort were veterans of
the 'Fighting Fifth,' who lived up to the traditions of their famous
north-country regiment. Of the gun crews of the section, amounting to
about twenty-six men, the young officer, Hill, and sixteen men were
hit. Of the escort of Northumberland Fusiliers hardly a man was left
standing, and forty-one of the supporting Yeomanry were killed and
wounded. It was for some little time a fierce and concentrated
struggle at the shortest of ranges.  The British horsemen came
galloping to the rescue, however, and the attack was finally driven
back into tbat broken country from which it had come. Forty dead Boers
upon the ground, with their brave chieftain, Ouisterhuisen, amongst
them, showed how manfully the attack had been driven home. The British
losses were twenty-eight killed and fifty-six wounded.  Somewhat
mauled, and with eight missing wagons, the small column made its way
back to Zeerust.

From this incident until the end of the year nothing of importance
occurred in this part of the seat of war, save for a sharp and
well-managed action at Beestekraal upon October 29th, in which
seventy~nine Boers were surrounded and captured by Kekewich's
horsemen. The process of attrition went very steadily forwards, and
each of the British columns returned its constant tale of prisoners.
The blockhouse system had now been extended to such an extent that the
Magaliesberg was securely held, and a line had been pushed through
from Klerksdorp and Fredericstad to Ventersdorp. One of Colonel
Hickie's Yeomanry patrols was roughly handled near Brakspruit upon
November 13th, but with this exception the points scored were all upon
one side. Methuen and Kekewich came across early in November from
Zeerust to Klerksdorp, and operated from the railway line.  The end of
the year saw them both in the Wolmaranstad district, where they were
gathering up prisoners and clearing the country.

Of the events in the other parts of the Transvaal, during the last
three months of the year 1901, there is not much to be said.  In all
parts the lines of blockhouses and of constabulary posts were
neutralising the Boer mobility, and bringing them more and more within
reach of the British.  The only fighting forces left in the Transvaal
were those under Botha in the south-east and those under De la Rey in
the west.  The others attempted nothing save to escape from their
pursuers, and when overtaken they usually gave in without serious
opposition.  Among the larger hauls may be mentioned that of Dawkins
in the Nylstrom district (seventy-six prisoners), Kekewich
(seventy-eight), Colenbrander in the north (fifty-seven), Dawkins and
Colenbrander (104), Colenbrander (sixty-two); but the great majority
of the captures were in smaller bodies, gleaned from the caves, the
kloofs, and the farmhouses.

Only two small actions during these months appear to call for any
separate notice.  The first was an attack made by Buys' commando, upon
November 20th, on the Railway Pioneers when at work near Villiersdorp,
in the extreme north-east of the Orange River Colony.  This corps,
consisting mainly of miners from Johannesburg, had done invaluable
service during the war.  On this occasion a working party of them was
suddenly attacked, and most of them taken prisoners.  Major Fisher,
who commanded the pioneers, was killed, and three other officers with
several men were wounded.  Colonel Rimington's column appeared upon
the scene, however, and drove off the Boers, who left their leader,
Buys, a wounded prisoner in our hands.

The second action was a sharp attack delivered by Muller's Boers upon
Colonel Park's column on the night of December 19th, at Elandspruit.
The fight was sharp while it lasted, but it ended in the repulse of
the assailants.  The British casualties were six killed and
twenty-four wounded.  The Boers, who left eight dead behind them,
suffered probably to about the same extent.

Already the most striking and pleasing feature in the Transvaal was
the tranquillity of its central provinces, and the way in which the
population was settling down to its old avocations.  Pretoria had
resumed its normal quiet life, while its larger and more energetic
neighbour was rapidly recovering from its two years of
paralysis. Every week more stamps were dropped in the mines, and from
month to month a steady increase in the output showed that the great
staple industry of the place would soon be as vigorous as ever.  Most
pleasing of all was the restoration of safety upon the railway lines,
which, save for some precautions at night, had resumed their normal
traffic. When the observer took his eyes from the dark clouds which
shadowed every horizon, he could not but rejoice at the ever-widening
central stretch of peaceful blue which told that the storm was nearing
its end.

Having now dealt with the campaign in the Transvaal down to the end of
1901, it only remains to bring the chronicle of the events in the
Orange River Colony down to the same date.  Reference has already been
made to two small British reverses which occurred in September, the
loss of two guns to the south of the Waterworks near Bloemfontein, and
the surprise of the camp of Lord Lovat's Scouts.  There were some
indications at this time that a movement had been planned through the
passes of the Drakensberg by a small Free State force which should aid
Louis Botha's invasion of Natal.  The main movement was checked,
however, and the demonstration in aid of it came to nothing.

The blockhouse system had been developed to a very complete extent in
the Orange River Colony, and the small bands of Boers found it
increasingly difficult to escape from the British columns who were for
ever at their heels.  The southern portion of the country had been cut
off from the northern by a line which extended through Bloemfontein on
the east to the Basuto frontier, and on the west to Jacobsdal. To the
south of this line the Boer resistance had practically ceased,
althougb several columns moved continually through it, and gleaned up
the broken fragments of the commandos. The north-west had also settled
down to a large extent, and during the last three months of 1901 no
action of importance occurred in that region.  Even in the turbulent
north-east, which had always been the centre of resistance, there was
little opposition to the British columns, which continued every week
to send in their tale of prisoners.  Of the column commanders,
Williams, Damant, Du Moulin, Lowry Cole, and Wilson were the most
successful.  In their operations they were much aided by the South
African Constabulary.  One young officer of this force, Major
Pack-Beresford, especially distinguished himself by his gallantry and
ability. His premature death from enteric was a grave loss to the
British army.  Save for one skirmish of Colonel Wilson's early in
October, and another of Byng's on November 14th, there can hardly be
said to have been any actual fighting until the events late in
December which I am about to describe.

In the meanwhile the peaceful organisation of the country was being
pushed forward as rapidly as in the Transvaal, although here the
problems presented were of a different order, and the population an
exclusively Dutch one.  The schools already showed a higher attendance
than in the days before the war, while a continual stream of burghers
presented themselves to take the oath of allegiance, and even to join
the ranks against their own irreconcilable countrymen, whom they
looked upon with justice as the real authors of their troubles.

Towards the end of November there were signs that the word had gone
forth for a fresh concentration of the fighting Boers in their old
haunts in the Heilbron district, and early in December it was known
that the indefatigable De Wet was again in the field.  He had remained
quiet so long that there bad been persistent rumours of his injury and
even of his death, but he was soon to show that he was as alive as
ever.  President Steyn was ill of a most serious complaint, caused
possibly by the mental and physical sufferings which he had undergone;
but with an indomitable resolution which makes one forget and forgive
the fatuous policy which brought him and his State to such a pass, be
still appeared in his Cape cart at the laager of the faithful remnant
of his commandos.  To those who remembered how widespread was our
conviction of the half-heartedness of the Free Staters at the outbreak
of the war, it was indeed a revelation to see them after two years
still making a stand against the forces which had crushed them.

It had been long evident that the present British tactics of scouring
the country and capturing the isolated burghers must in time bring the
war to a conclusion. From the Boer point of view the only hope, or at
least the only glory, lay in reassembling once more in larger bodies
and trying conclusions with some of the British columns.  It was with
this purpose that De Wet early in December assembled Wessels, Manie
Botha, and others of his lieutenants, together with a force of about
two thousand men, in the Heilbron district.  Small as this force was,
it was admirably mobile, and every man in it was a veteran, toughened
and seasoned by two years of constant fighting.  De Wet's first
operations were directed against an isolated column of Colonel
Wilson's, which was surrounded within twenty miles of Heilbron.
Rimington, in response to a heliographic call for assistance, hurried
with admirable promptitude to the scene of action, and joined hands
with Wilson. De Wet's men were as numerous, however, as the two
columns combined, and they harassed the return march into Heilbron.  A
determined attack was made on the convoy and on the rearguard, but it
was beaten off. That night Rimington's camp was fired into by a large
body of Boers, but he had cleverly moved his men away from the fires,
so that no harm was done.  The losses in these operations were small,
but with troops which bad not been trained in this method of fighting
the situation would have been a serious one. For a fortnight or more
after this the burghers contented themselves by skirmishing with
British columns and avoiding a drive which Elliot's forces made
against them.  On December 18th they took the offensive, however, and
within a week fought three actions, two of which ended in their
favour.

News had come to British headquarters that Kaffir's Kop, to the
north-west of Bethlehem, was a centre of Boer activity.  Three columns
were therefore turned in that direction, Elliot's, Barker's, and
Dartnell's. Some desultory skirmishing ensued, which was only
remarkable for the death of Haasbroek, a well-known Boer leader.  As
the columns separated again, unable to find an objective, De Wet
suddenly showed one of them that their failure was not due to his
absence. Dartnell bad retraced his steps nearly as far as Eland's River
Bridge, when the Boer leader sprang out of his lair in the Langberg
and threw himself upon him. The burghers attempted to ride in, as they
had successfully done at Brakenlaagte, but they were opposed by the
steady old troopers of the two regiments of Imperial Horse, and by a
General who was familiar with every Boer ruse. The horsemen never got
nearer than 150 yards to the British line, and were beaten back by the
steady fire which met them. Finding that he made no headway, and
learning that Campbell's column was coming up from Bethlehem, De Wet
withdrew his men after four hours' fighting.  Fifteen were hit upon
the British side, and the Boer loss seems to have been certainly as
great or greater.

De Wet's general aim in his operations seems to have been to check the
British blockhouse building. With his main force in the Langberg he
could threaten the line which was now being erected between Bethlehem
and Harrismith, a line against which his main commando was destined,
only two months later, to beat itself in vain.  Sixty miles to the
north a second line was being run across country from Frankfort to
Standerton, and had reached a place called Tafelkop. A covering party
of East Lancashires and Yeomanry watched over the workers, but De Wet
had left a portion of his force in that neighbourhood, and they
harassed the blockhouse builders to such an extent that General
Hamilton, who was in command, found it necessary to send in to
Frankfort for support. The British columns there had just returned
exhausted from a drive, but three bodies under Damant, Rimington, and
Wilson were at once despatched to clear away the enemy.

The weather was so atrocious that the veldt resembled an inland sea,
with the kopjes as islands rising out of it.  By this stage of the war
the troops were hardened to all weathers, and they pushed swiftly on
to the scene of action.  As they approached the spot where the Boers
had been reported, the line had been extended over many miles, with
the result that it had become very attenuated and dangerously weak in
the centre. At this point Colonel Damant and his small staff were
alone with the two guns and the maxim, save for a handful of Imperial
Yeomanry (91st), who acted as escort to the guns. Across the face of
this small force there rode a body of men in khaki uniforms, keeping
British formation, and actually firing bogus volleys from time to time
in the direction of some distant Boers.  Damant and his staff seem to
have taken it for granted that these were Rimington's men, and the
clever ruse succeeded to perfection.  Nearer and nearer came the
strangers, and suddenly throwing off all disguise, they made a dash
for the guns.  Four rounds of case failed to stop them, and in a few
minutes they were over the kopje on which the guns stood and had
ridden among the gunners, supported in their attack by a flank fire
from a number of dismounted riflemen.

The instant that the danger was realised Damant, his staff, and the
forty Yeomen who formed the escort dashed for the crest in the hope of
anticipating the Boers. So rapid was the charge of the others that
they had overwhelmed the gunners before the supports could reach the
hill, and the latter found themselves under the deadly fire of the
Boer rifles from above.  Damant was hit in four places, all of his
staff were wounded, and hardly a man of the small body of Yeomanry was
left standing. Nothing could exceed their gallantry. Gaussen their
captain fell at their head.  On the ridge the men about the guns were
nearly all killed or wounded.  Of the gun detachment only two men
remained, both of them hit, and Jeffcoat their dyLng captain
bequeathed them fifty pounds each in a will drawn upon the spot. In
half an hour the centre of the British line had been absolutely
annihilated.  Modern warfare is on the whole much less bloody than of
old, but when one party has gained the tactical mastery it is a choice
between speedy surrender and total destruction.

The wide-spread British wings had begun to understand that there was
something amiss, and to ride in towards the centre.  An officer on the
far right peering through his glasses saw those tell-tale puffs at the
very muzzles of the British guns, which showed that they were firing
case at close quarters.  He turned his squadron inwards and soon
gathered up Scott's squadron of Damant's Horse, and both rode for the
kopje.  Rimington's men were appearing on the other side, and the
Boers rode off.  They were unable to remove the guns which they had
taken, because all the horses had perished. 'I actually thought,' says
one officer who saw them ride away, 'that I had made a mistake and
been fighting our own men.  They were dressed in our uniforms and some
of them wore the tiger-skin, the badge of Damant's Horse, round their
hats.'  The same officer gives an account of the scene on the
gun-kopje.  'The result when we got to the guns was this, gunners all
killed except two (both wounded), pom-pom officers and men all killed,
maxim all killed, 91st (the gun escort) one officer and one man not
hit, all the rest killed or wounded; staff, every officer hit.'  That
is what it means to those who are caught in the vortex of the cyclone.
The total loss was about seventy-five.

In this action the Boers, who were under the command of Wessels,
delivered their attack with a cleverness and dash which deserved
success.  Their stratagem, however, depending as it did upon the use
of British uniforms and methods, was illegitimate by all the laws of
war, and one can but marvel at the long-suffering patience of officers
and men who endured such things without any attempt at retaliation.
There is too much reason to believe also, that considerable brutality
was shown by those Boers who carried the kopje, and the very high
proportion of killed to wounded among the British who lay there
corroborates the statement of the survivors that several were shot at
close quarters after all resistance had ceased.

This rough encounter of Tafelkop was followed only four days later by
a very much more serious one at Tweefontein, which proved that even
after two years of experience we had not yet sufficiently understood
the courage and the cunning of our antagonist.  The blockhouse line
was being gradually extended from Harrismith to Bethlehem, so as to
hold down this turbulent portion of the country.  The Harrismith
section had been pushed as far as Tweefontein, which is nine miles
west of Elands River Bridge, and here a small force was stationed to
cover the workers.  This column consisted of four squadrons of the 4th
Imperial Yeomanry, one gun of the 79th battery, and one pom-pom, the
whole under the temporary command of Major Williams of the South
Staffords, Colonel Firmin being absent.

Knowing that De Wet and his men were in the neighbourhood, the camp of
the Yeomen had been pitched in a position which seemed to secure it
against attack.  A solitary kopje presented a long slope to the north,
while the southern end was precipitous. The outposts were pushed well
out upon the plain, and a line of sentries was placed along the
crest. The only precaution which seems to have been neglected was to
have other outposts at the base of the southern declivity.  It appears
to have been taken for granted, however, that no attack was to be
apprehended from that side, and that in any esse it would be
impossible to evade the vigilance of the sentries upon the top.

Of all the daring and skilful attacks delivered by the Boers during
the war there is certainly none more remarkable than this one.  At two
o'clock in the morning of a moonlight night De Wet's forlorn hope
assembled at the base of the hill and clambered up to the summit. The
fact that it was Christmas Eve may conceivably have had something to
do with the want of vigilance upon the part of the sentries. In a
season of good will and conviviality the rigour of military discipline
may insensibly relax.  Little did the sleeping Yeomen in the tents, or
the drowsy outposts upon the crest, think of the terrible Christmas
visitors who were creeping on to them, or of the grim morning gift
which Santa Claus was bearing.

The Boers, stealing up in their stockinged feet, poured under the
crest until they were numerous enough to make a rush.  It is almost
inconceivable how they could have got so far without their presence
being suspected by the sentries -- but so it was. At last, feeling
strong enough to advance, they sprang over the crest and fired into
the pickets, and past them into the sleeping camp. The top of the hill
being once gained, there was nothing to prevent their comrades from
swarming up, and in a very few minutes nearly a thousand Boers were in
a position to command the camp. The British were not only completely
outnumbered, but were hurried from their sleep into the fight without
any clear idea as to the danger or how to meet it, while the hissing
sleet of bullets struck many of them down as they rushed out of their
tents. Considering how terrible the ordeal was to which they were
exposed, these untried Yeomen seem to have behaved very well. 'Some
brave gentlemen ran away at the first shot, but I am thankful to say
they were not many,' says one of their number.  The most veteran
troops would have been tried very high had they been placed in such a
position. 'The noise and the clamour,' says one spectator, 'were
awful. The yells of the Dutch, the screams and shrieks of dying men
and horses, the cries of natives, howls of dogs, the firing, the
galloping of horses, the whistling of bullets, and the whirr volleys
make in the air, made up such a compound of awful and diabolical
sounds as I never heard before nor hope to hear again. In the
confusion some of the men killed each other and some killed
themselves. Two Boers who put on helmets were killed by their own
people. The men were given no time to rally or to collect their
thoughts, for the gallant Boers barged right into them, shooting them
down, and occasionally being shot down, at a range of a few
yards. Harwich and Watney, who had charge of the maxim, died nobly
with all the men of their gun section round them. Reed, the
sergeant-major, rushed at the enemy with his clubbed rifle, but was
riddled with bullets. Major Williams, the commander, was shot through
the stomach as he rallied his men. The gunners had time to fire two
rounds before they were overpowered and shot down to a man. For half
an hour the resistance was maintained, but at the end of that time the
Boers had the whole camp in their possession, and were already
hastening to get their prisoners away before the morning should bring
a rescue.

The casualties are in themselves enough to show how creditable was the
resistance of the Yeomanry.  Out of a force of under four hundred men
they bad six officers and fifty-one men killed, eight officers and
eighty men wounded. There have been very few surrenders during the war
in which there has been such evidence as this of a determined
stand. Nor was it a bloodless victory upon the part of the Boers, for
there was evidence that their losses, though less than those of the
British, were still severe.

The prisoners, over two hundred in number, were hurried away by the
Boers, who seemed under the immediate eye of De Wet to have behaved
with exemplary humanity to the wounded. The captives were taken by
forced marches to the Basuto border, where they were turned adrift,
half clad and without food. By devious ways and after many adventures,
they all made their way back again to the British lines. It was well
for De Wet that he had shown such promptness in getting away, for
within three hours of the end of the action the two regiments of
Imperial Horse appeared upon the scene, having travelled seventeen
miles in the time. Already, however, the rearguard of the Boers was
disappearing into the fastness of the Langberg, where all pursuit was
vain.

Such was the short but vigorous campaign of De Wet in the last part of
December of the year 1901. It had been a briliant one, but none the
less his bolt was shot, and Tweefontein was the last encounter in
which British troops should feel his heavy hand. His operations, bold
as they had been, had not delayed by a day the building of that iron
cage which was gradually enclosing him. Already it was nearly
completed, and in a few more weeks he was destined to find himself and
his commando struggling against bars.

At theng of the year 1902 it was evident to every observer that
the Boer resistance, spirited as it was, must be nearing its close.
By a long succession of captures their forces were much reduced in
numbers. They were isolated from the world, and had no means save
precarious smuggling of renewing their supplies of ammunition.  It was
known also that their mobility, which had been their great strength,
was decreasing, and that in spite of their admirable horsemastership
their supply of remounts was becoming exhausted.  An increasing number
of the burghers were volunteering for service against their own
people, and it was found that all fears as to this delicate experiment
were misplaced, and that in the whole army there were no keener and
more loyal soldiers.

The chief factor, however, in bringing the Boers to their knees was
the elaborate and wonderful blockhouse system, which had been strung
across the whole of the enemy's country.  The original blockhouses had
been far apart, and were a hindrance and an annoyance rather than an
absolute barrier to the burghers.  The new models, however, were only
six hundred yards apart, and were connected by such impenetrable
strands of wire that a Boer pithily described it by saying that if
one's hat blew over the line anywhere between Ermelo and Standerton
one had to walk round Ermelo to fetch it. Use was made of such
barriers by the Spaniards in Cuba, but an application of them on such
a scale over such an enormous tract of country is one of the
curiosities of warfare, and will remain one of several novelties which
will make the South African campaign for ever interesting to students
of military history.

The spines of this great system were always the railway lines, which
were guarded on either side, and down which, as down a road, went
flocks, herds, pedestrians, and everything which wished to travel in
safety. From these long central cords the lines branched out to right
and left, cutting up the great country into manageable districts.  A
category of them would but weary the reader, but suffice it that by
the beginning of the year the south-east of the Transvaal and the
north-east of the Orange River Colony, the haunts of Botha and De Wet,
bad been so intersected that it was obvious that the situation must
soon be impossible for both of them. Only on the west of the Transvaal
was there a clear run for De la Rey and Kemp. Hence it was expected,
as actualy occurred, that in this quarter the most stirring events of
the close of the campaign would happen.

General Bruce Hamilton in the Eastern Transvaal had continued the
energetic tactics which had given such good results in the past. With
the new year his number of prisoners fell, but he had taken so many,
and had hustled the remainder to such an extent, that the fight seemed
to have gone out of the Boers in this district. On January 1st be
presented the first-fruits of the year in the shape of.twenty-two of
Grobler's burghers.  On the 3rd he captured forty-nine, while Wing,
co-operating with him, took twenty more. Among these was General
Erasmus, who had helped, or failed to help, General Lucas Meyer at
Talana Hill.  On the 10th Colonel Wing's column, which was part of
Hamilton's force, struck out again and took forty-two prisoners,
including the two Wolmarans.  Only two days later Hamilton returned to
the same spot, and was rewarded with thirty-two more captures.  On the
18th he took twenty-seven, on the 24th twelve, and on the 26th no
fewer than ninety. So severe were these blows, and so difficult was it
for the Boers to know how to get away from an antagonist who was ready
to ride thirty miles in a night in order to fall upon their laager,
that the enemy became much scattered and too demoralised for offensive
operations. Finding that they had grown too shy in this much shot over
district, Hamilton moved farther south, and early in March took a cast
round the Vryheid district, where he made some captures, notably
General Cherry Emmett, a descendant of the famous Irish rebel, and
brother-in-law of Louis Botha. For all these repeated successes it was
to the Intelligence Department, so admirably controlled by Colonel
Wools-Sampson, that thanks are mainly due.

Whilst Bruce Hamilton was operating so successfully in the Ermelo
district, several British columns under Plumer, Spens, and Colville
were stationed some fifty miles south to prevent the fugitives from
getting away into the mountainous country which lies to the north of
Wakkerstroom.  On January 3rd a small force of Plumer's New-Zealanders
had a brisk skirmish with a party of Boers, whose cattle they
captured, though at some loss to themselves.  These Boers were
strongly reinforced, however, and when on the following day Major
Vallentin pursued them with fifty men he found himself at Onverwacht
in the presence of several hundred of the enemy, led by Oppermann and
Christian Botha. Vallentin was killed and almost all of his small
force were hit before British reinforcements, under Colonel Pulteney,
drove the Boers off.  Nineteen killed and twenty-three wounded were
our losses in this most sanguinary little skirmish.  Nine dead Boers,
with Oppermaun himself, were left upon the field of battle. His loss
was a serious one to the enemy, as he was one of their most
experienced Generals.

>From that time until the end these columns, together with Mackenzie's
column to the north of Ermelo, continued to break up all combinations,
and to send in their share of prisoners to swell Lord Kitchener's
weekly list. A final drive, organised on April 11th against the
Standerton line, resulted in 134 prisoners.

In spite of the very large army in South Africa, so many men were
absorbed by the huge lines of communications and the blockhouse system
that the number available for active operations was never more than
forty or fifty thousand men.  With another fifty thousand there is no
doubt that at least six months would have been taken from the duration
of the war.  On account of this shorthandedness Lord Kitchener had to
leave certain districts alone, while he directed his attention to
those which were more essential.  Thus to the north of the Delagoa
Railway line there was only one town, Lydenburg, which was occupied by
the British.  They had, however, an energetic commander in Park of the
Devons. This leader, striking out from his stronghold among the
mountains, and aided by Urmston from Belfast, kept the commando of Ben
Viljoen and the peripatetic Government of Schalk Burger continually
upon the move.  As already narrated, Park fought a sharp night action
upon December 19th, after which, in combination with Urmston, he
occupied Dulstroom, only missing the government by a few hours. In
January Park and Urmston were again upon the war-path, though the
incessant winds, fogs, and rains of that most inclement portion of the
Transvaal seriously hampered their operations. Several skirmishes with
the commandos of Muller and Trichardt gave no very decisive result,
but a piece of luck befell the British on January 25th in the capture
of General Viljoen by an ambuscade cleverly arranged by Major Orr in
the neighbourhood of Lydenburg. Though a great firebrand before the
war, Viljoen had fought bravely and honourably throughout the contest,
and he had won the respect and esteem of his enemy.

Colonel Park had had no great success in his last two expeditions, but
on February 20th he made an admirable march, and fell upon a Boer
laager which lay in placid security in the heart of the hills.  One
hundred and sixty-four prisoners, including many Boer officers, were
the fruits of this success, in which the National Scouts, or 'tame
Boers,' as they were familiarly called, played a prominent part.  This
commando was that of Middelburg, which was acting as escort to the
government, who again escaped dissolution.  Early in March Park was
again out on trek, upon one occasion covering seventy miles in a
single day.  Nothing further of importance came from this portion of
the seat of war until March 23rd, when the news reached England that
Schalk Burger, Reitz, Lucas Meyer, and others of the Transvaal
Government had come into Middelburg, and that they were anxious to
proceed to Pretoria to treat. On the Eastern horizon had appeared the
first golden gleam of the dawning peace.

Having indicated the course of events in the Eastern Transvaal, north
and south of the railway line, I will now treat one or two incidents
which occurred in the more central and northern portions of the
country. I will then give some account of De Wet's doings in the
Orange River Colony, and finally describe that brilliant effort of
De la Rey's in the west which shed a last glory upon the Boer arms.

In the latter days of December, Colenbrander and Dawkins operating
together had put in a great deal of useful work in the northern
district, and from Nylstrom to Pietersburg the burghers were
continually harried by the activity of these leaders. Late in the
month Dawkins was sent down into the Orange River Colony in order to
reinforce the troops who were opposed to De Wet.  Colenbrander alone,
with his hardy colonial forces, swept through the Magaliesburg, and
had the double satisfaction of capturing a number of the enemy and of
heading off and sending back a war party of Linchwe's Kaffirs who,
incensed by a cattle raid of Kemp's, were moving down in a direction
which would have brought them dangerously near to the Dutch women and
children.  This instance and several similar ones in the campaign show
how vile are the lies which have been told of the use, save under
certain well-defined conditions, of armed natives by the British
during the war.  It would have been a perfectly easy thing at any time
for the Government to have raised all the fighting native races of
South Africa, but it is not probable that we, who held back our
admirable and highly disciplined Sikhs and Ghoorkas, would break our
self-imposed restrictions in order to enrol the inferior but more
savage races of Africa.  Yet no charge has been more often repeated
and has caused more piteous protests among the soft-hearted and
soft-headed editors of Continental journals.

The absence of Colenbrander in the Rustenburg country gave Beyers a
chance of which he was not slow to avail himself.  On January 24th, in
the early morning, he delivered an attack upon Pietersburg itself, but
he was easily driven off by the small garrison. It is probable,
however, that the attack was a mere feint in order to enable a number
of the inmates of the refugee camp to escape. About a hundred and
fifty made off, and rejoined the commandos.  There were three thousand
Boers in all in this camp, which was shortly afterwards moved down to
Natal in order to avoid the recurrence of such an incident.

Colenbrander, having returned to Pietersburg once more, determined to
return Beyers's visit, and upon April 8th he moved out with a small
force to surprise the Boer laager.  The Inniskilling Fusiliers seized
the ground which commanded the enemy's position. The latter retreated,
but were followed up, and altogether about one hundred and fifty were
killed, wounded, and taken.  On May 3rd a fresh operation against
Beyers was undertaken, and resulted in about the same loss to the
Boers.  On the other hand, the Boers had a small success against
Kitchener's Scouts, killing eighteen and taking thirty prisoners.

There is one incident, however, in connection with the war in this
region which one would desire to pass over in silence if such a course
were permissible. Some eighty miles to the east of Pietersburg is a
wild part of the country called the Spelonken.  In this region an
irregular corps, named the Bushveld Carbineers, had been operating.
It was raised in South Africa, but contained both Colonials and
British in its ranks. Its wild duties, its mixed composition, and its
isolated situation must have all militated against discipline and
restraint, and it appears to have degenerated into a band not unlike
those Southern 'bush-whackers' in the American war to whom the
Federals showed little mercy.  They had given short shrift to tho Boer
prisoners who had fallen into their hands, the excuse offered for
their barbarous conduct being that an officer who had served in the
corps had himself been murdered by the Boers.  Such a reason, even if
it were true, could of course offer no justification for
indiscriminate revenge.  The crimes were committed in July and August
1901, but it was not until January 1902 that five of the officers were
put upon their trial and were found to be guilty as principals or
accessories of twelve murders.  The corps was disbanded, and three of
the accused officers, Handcock, Wilton, and Morant, were sentenced to
death, while another, Picton, was cashiered.  Handcock and Morant were
actually executed.  This stern measure shows more clearly than volumes
of argument could do how high was the standard of discipline in the
British Army, and how heavy was the punishment, and how vain all
excuses, where it had been infringed.  In the face of this actual
outrage and its prompt punishment how absurd becomes that crusade
against imaginary outrages preached by an ignorant press abroad, and
by renegade Englishmen at home.

To the south of Johannesburg, half-way between that town and the
frontier, there is a range of hills called the Zuikerboschrand, which
extends across from one railway system to the other. A number of Boers
were known to have sought refuge in this country, so upon February
12th a small British force left Klip River Post in order to clear them
out.  There were 320 men in all, composing the 28th Mounted Infantry,
drawn from the Lancashire Fusiliers, Warwicks, and Derbys, most of
whom had just arrived from Malta, which one would certainly imagine to
be the last place where mounted infantry could be effectively
trained. Major Dowell was in command.  An advance was made into the
hilly country, but it was found that the enemy was in much greater
force than had been imagined. The familiar Boer tactics were used with
the customary success.  The British line was held by a sharp fire in
front, while strong flanking parties galloped round each of the wings.
It was with great difficulty that any of the British extricated
themselves from their perilous position, and the safety of a portion
of the force was only secured by the devotion of a handful of officers
and men, who gave their lives in order to gain time for their comrades
to get away.  Twelve killed and fifty wounded were our losses in this
unfortunate skirmish, and about one hundred prisoners supplied the
victors with a useful addition to their rifles and ammunition. A
stronger British force came up next day, and the enemy were driven out
of the hills.

A week later, upon February 18th, there occurred another skirmish at
Klippan, near Springs, between a squadron of the Scots Greys and a
party of Boers who had broken into this central reserve which Lord
Kitchener had long kept clear of the enemy.  In this action the
cavalry were treated as roughly as the mounted infantry had been the
week before, losing three officers killed, eight men killed or
wounded, and forty-six taken. They had formed a flanking party to
General Gilbert Hamilton's column, but were attacked and overwhelmed
so rapidly that the blow had fallen before their comrades could come
to their assistance.

One of the consequences of the successful drives about to be described
in the Orange River Colony wns that a number of the Free Staters came
north of the Vaal in order to get away from the extreme pressure upon
the south.  At the end of March a considerable number had reinforced
the local commandos in that district to the east of Springs, no very
great distance from Johannesburg, which had always been a storm
centre. A cavalry force was stationed at this spot which consisted at
that time of the 2nd Queen's Bays, the 7th Hussars, and some National
Scouts, all under Colonel Lawley of the Hussars. After a series of
minor engagements east of Springs, Lawley had possessed himself of
Boschman's Kop, eighteen miles from that town, close to the district
which was the chief scene of Boer activity.  From this base he
despatched upon the morningg of April 1st three squadrons of the Bays
under Colonel Fanshawe, for the purpose of surprising a small force of
the enemy which was reported at one of the farms.  Fanshawe's strength
was about three hundred men.

The British cavalry found themselves, however, in the position of the
hunter who, when he is out for a snipe, puts up a tiger. All went well
with the expedition as far as Holspruit, the farm which they had
started to search.  Commandant Pretorius, to whom it belonged, was
taken by the energy of Major Vaughan, who pursued and overtook his
Cape cart.  It was found, however, that Alberts's commando was camped
at the farm, and that the Bays were in the presence of a very superior
force of the enemy.  The night was dark, and when firing began it was
almost muzzle to muzzle, with the greatest possible difficulty in
telling friend from foe. The three squadrons fell back upon some
rising ground, keeping admirable order under most difficult
circumstances.  In spite of the darkness the attack was pressed
fiercely home, and with their favourite tactics the burghers rapidly
outflanked the position taken up by the cavalry.  The British moved by
alternate squadrons on to a higher rocky kopje on the east, which
could be vaguely distinguished looming in the darkness against the
skyline. B squadron, the last to retire, was actually charged and
ridden through by the brave assailants, firing from their saddles as
they broke through the ranks.  The British had hardly time to reach
the kopje and to dismount and line its edge when the Boers, yelling
loudly, charged with their horses up the steep flanks.  Twice they
were beaten back, but the third time they seized one corner of the
hill andd a hot fire upon the rear of the line of men who were
defending the other side.  Dawn was now breaking, and the situation
most serious, for the Boers were in very superior numbers and were
pushing their pursuit with the utmost vigour and determination. A
small party of officers and men whose horses had been shot covered the
retreat of their comrades, and continued to fire until all of them,
two officers and twenty-three men, were killed or wounded, the whole
of their desperate defence being conducted within from thirty to fifty
yards of the enemy. The remainder of the regiment was now retired to
successive ridges, each of which was rapidly outflanked by the Boers,
whose whole method of conducting their attack was extraordinarily
skilful. Nothing but the excellent discipline of the overmatched
troopers prevented the retreat from becoming a rout. Fortunately,
before the pressure became intolerable the 7th Hussars with some
artillery came to the rescue, and turned the tide.  The Hussars
galloped in with such dash that some of them actually got among the
Boers with their swords, but the enemy rapidly fell back and
disappeared.

In this very sharp and sanguinary cavalry skirmish the Bays lost
eighty killed and wounded out of a total force of 270.  To stand such
losses under such circumstances, and to preserve absolute discipline
and order, is a fine test of soldierly virtue. The adjutant, the
squadron leaders, and six out of ten officers were killed or
wounded. The Boers lost equally heavily. Two Prinsloos, one of them a
commandant, and three field-cornets were among the slain, with seventy
other casualties. The force under General Alberts was a considerable
one, not fewer than six hundred rifles, so that the action at
Holspruit is one which adds another name of honour to the battle-roll
of the Bays.  It is pleasing to add that in this and the other actions
which were fought at the end of the war our wounded met with kindness
and consideration from the enemy.

We may now descend to the Orange River Colony and trace the course of
those operations which were destined to break the power of De Wet's
commando. On these we may concentrate our attention, for the marchings
and gleanings and snipings of the numerous small columns in the other
portions of the colony, although they involved much arduous and useful
work, do not claim a particular account.

After the heavy blow which he dealt Firmin's Yeomanry, De Wet retired,
as has been told, into the Langberg, whence he afterwards retreated
towards Reitz.  There he was energetically pushed by Elliot's columns,
which had attained such mobility that 150 miles were performed in
three days within a single week.  Our rough schoolmasters had taught
us our lesson, and the soldiering which accomplished the marches of
Bruce Hamilton, Elliot, Rimington, and the other leaders of the end of
the war was very far removed from that which is associated with
ox-wagons and harmoniums.

Moving rapidly, and covering himself by a succession of rearguard
skirmishes, De Wet danced like a will-o'the-wisp in front of and round
the British columns. De Lisle, Fanshawe, Byng, Rimington, Dawkins, and
Rawlinson were all snatching at him and finding him just beyond their
finger-tips.  The master-mind at Pretoria had, however, thought out a
scheme which was worthy of De Wet himself in its ingenuity. A glance
at the map will show that the little branch from Heilbron to Wolvehoek
forms an acute angle with the main line. Both these railways were
strongly blockhoused and barbed-wired, so that any force which was
driven into the angle, and held in it by a force behind it, would be
in a perilous position.  To attempt to round De Wet's mobile burghers
into this obvious pen would have been to show one's hand too clearly.
In vain is the net laid in sight of the bird.  The drive was therefore
made away from this point, with the confident expectation that the
guerilla chief would break back through the columns, and that they
might then pivot round upon him and hustle him so rapidly into the
desired position that he would not realise his danger until it was too
late. Byng's column was left behind the driving line to be ready for
the expected backward break.

All came off exactly as expected.  De Wet doubled back through the
columns, and one of his commandos stumbled upon Byng's men, who were
waiting on the Vlei River to the west of Reitz.  The Boers seem to
have taken it for granted that, having passed the British driving
line, they were out of danger, and for once it was they who were
surprised.  The South African Light Horse, the New-Zealanders, and the
Queensland Bushmen all rode in upon them.  A fifteen-pounder, the one
taken at Tweefontein, and two pom-poms were captured, with thirty
prisoners and a considerable quantity of stores.

This successful skirmish was a small matter, however, compared to the
importance of being in close touch with De Wet and having a definite
objective for the drive. The columns behind expanded suddenly into a
spray of mounted men forming a continuous line for over sixty miles.
On February 5th the line was advancing, and on the 6th it was known
that De Wet was actually within the angle, the mouth of which was
spanned by the British line.  Hope ran high in Pretoria.  The space
into which the burgher chief had been driven was bounded by sixty-six
miles of blockhouse and wire on one side and thirty on the other,
while the third side of the triangle was crossed by fifty-five miles
of British horsemen, flanked by a blockhouse line between Kroonstad
and Lindley.  The tension along the lines of defence was extreme.
Infantry guarded every yard of them, and armoured trains patrolled
them, while at night searchlights at regular intervals shed their
vivid rays over the black expanse of the veldt and illuminated the
mounted figures who flitted from time to time across their narrow
belts of light.

On the 6th De Wet realised his position, and with characteristic
audacity and promptness he took means to clear the formidable toils
which had been woven round him. The greater part of his command
scattered, with orders to make their way as best they might out of the
danger.  Working in their own country, where every crease and fold of
the ground was familiar to them, it is not surprising that most of
them managed to make their way through gaps in the attenuated line of
horsemen behind them.  A few were killed, and a considerable number
taken, 270 being the respectable total of the prisoners.  Three or
four slipped through, however, for every one who stuck in the meshes.
De Wet himself was reported to have made his escape by driving cattle
against the wire fences which enclosed him.  It seems, however, to
have been nothing more romantic than a wire-cutter which cleared his
path, though cattle no doubt made their way through the gap which he
left.  With a loss of only three of his immediate followers be Wet won
his way out of the most dangerous position which even his adventurous
career had ever known. Lord Kitchener had descended to Wolvehoek to be
present at the climax of the operations, but it was not fated that he
was to receive the submission of the most energetic of his opponents,
and he returned to Pretoria to weave a fresh mesh around him.

This was not hard to do, as the Boer General had simply escaped from
one pen into another, though a larger one. After a short rest to
restore the columns, the whole pack were full cry upon his heels once
more. An acute angle is formed by the Wilge Biver on one side and the
line of blockhouses between Harrismith and Van Reenen upon the other.
This was strongly manned by troops and five columns; those of
Rawlinson, Nixon, Byng, Rimington, and Keir herded the broken
cornmandos into the trap.  From February 20th the troops swept in an
enormous skirmish line across the country, ascending hills, exploring
kloofs, searching river banks, and always keeping the enemy in front
of them.  At last, when the pressure was severely felt, there came the
usual breakback, which took the form of a most determined night attack
upon the British line.  This was delivered shortly after midnight on
February 23rd. It struck the British cordon at the point of juncture
between Byng's column and that of Rimington.  So huge were the
distances which had to be covered, and so attenuated was the force
which covered them, that the historical thin red line was a massive
formation compared to its khaki equivalent.  The chain was frail and
the links were not all carefully joined, but each particular link was
good metal, and the Boer impact came upon one of the best.  This was
the 7th New Zealand Contingent, who proved themselves to be worthy
comrades to their six gallant predecessors.  Their patrols were broken
by the rush of wild, yelling, firing horsemen, but the troopers made a
most gallant resistance. Having pierced the line the Boers, who were
led in their fiery rush by Manie Botha, turned to their flank, and,
charging down the line of weak patrols, overwhelmed one after another
and threatened to roll up the whole line.  They had cleared a gap of
half a mile, and it seemed as if the whole Boer force would certainly
escape through so long a gap in the defences. The desperate defence of
the New-Zealanders gave time, however, for the further patrols, which
consisted of Cox's New South Wales Mounted Infantry, to fall back
almost at right angles so as to present a fresh face to the attack.
The pivot of the resistance was a maxim gun, most gallantly handled by
Captain Begbie and his men.  The fight at this point was almost muzzle
to muzzle, fifty or sixty New-Zealanders and Australians with the
British gunners holding off a force of several hundred of the best
fighting men of the Boer forces.  In this desperate duel many dropped
on both sides. Begbie died beside his gun, which fired eighty rounds
before it jammed.  It was run back by its crew in order to save it
from capture.  But reinforcements were coming up, and the Boer attack
was beaten back. A number of them had escaped, however, through the
ng which they had cleared, and it was conjectured that the
wonderful De Wet was among them. How fierce was the storm which had
broken on the New-Zealanders may be shown by their roll of twenty
killed and forty wounded, while thirty dead Boers were picked up in
front of their picket line.  Of eight New Zealand officers seven are
reported to have been hit, an even higher proportion than that which
the same gallant race endured at the battle of Rhenoster Kop more than
a year before.

It was feared at first that the greater part of the Boers migbt have
escaped upon this night of the 23rd, when Manie Botha's storming party
burst through the ranks of the New-Zealanders.  It was soon discovered
that this was not so, and the columns as they closed in had evidence
from the numerous horsemen who scampered aimlessly over the hills in
front of them that the main body of the enemy was still in the toils.
The advance was in tempestuous weather and over rugged country, but
the men were filled with eagerness, and no precaution was neglected to
keep the line intact.

This time their efforts were crowned with considerable success. A
second attempt was made by the corraled burghers to break out on the
night of February 26th, but it was easily repulsed by Nixon.  The task
of the troopers as the cordon drew south was more and more difficult,
and there were places traversed upon the Natal border where an alpen
stock would have been a more useful adjunct than a horse.  At six
o'clock on the morning of the 27th came the end.  Two Boers appeared
in front of the advancing line of the Imperial Light Horse and held up
a flag.  They proved to be Truter and De Jager, ready to make terms
for their commando.  The only terms offered were absolute surrender
within the hour.  The Boers had been swept into a very confined space,
which was closely hemmed in by troops, so that any resistance must
have ended in a tragedy. Fortunately there was no reason for desperate
councils in their case, since they did not fight as Lotter had done,
with the shadow of judgment hanging over him.  The burghers piled
arms, and all was over.

The total number captured in this important drive was 780 men,
including several leaders, one of whom was De Wet's own son.  It was
found that De Wet himself had been among those who had got away
through the picket lines on the night of the 23rd. Most of the
commando were Transvaalers, and it was typical of the wide sweep of
the net that many of them were the men who had been engaged against
the 28th Mounted Infantry in the district south of Johannesburg upon
the 12th of the same month.  The loss of 2,000 horses and 50,000
cartridges meant as much as that of the men to the Boer army. It was
evident that a few more such blows would clear the Orange River Colony
altogether.

The wearied troopers were allowed little rest, for in a couple of days
after their rendezvous at Harrismith they were sweeping back again to
pick up all that they had missed.  This drive, which was over the same
ground, but sweeping backwards towards the Heilbron-Wolvehoek line,
ended in the total capture of 147 of the enemy, who were picked out of
holes, retrieved from amid the reeds of the river, called down out of
trees, or otherwise collected.  So thorough were the operations that
it is recorded that the angle which formed the apex of the drive was
one drove of game upon the last day, all the many types of antelope,
which form one of the characteristics and charms of the country,
having been herded into it.

More important even than the results of the drive was the discovery of
one of De Wet's arsenals in a cave in the Vrede district.  Half-way
down a precipitous krantz, with its mouth covered by creepers, no
writer of romance could have imagined a more fitting headquarters for
a guerilla chief.  The find was made by Ross's Canadian Scouts, who
celebrated Dominion Day by this most useful achievement.  Forty
wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies were taken out of the cave De
Wet was known to have left the north-east district, and to have got
across the railway, travelling towards the Vaal as if it were his
intention to join De la Rey in the Transvaal.  The Boer resistance had
suddenly become exceedingly energetic in that part, and several
important actions had been fought, to which we will presently turn.

Before doing so it would be as well to bring the chronicle of events
in the Orange River Colony down to the conclusion of peace. There were
still a great number of wandering Boers in the northern districts and
in the frontier mountains, who were assiduously, but not always
successfully, hunted down by the British troops.  Much arduous and
useful work was done by several small columns, the Colonial Horse and
the Artillery Mounted Rifles especially distinguishing themselves.
The latter corps, formed from the gunners whose field-pieces were no
longer needed, proved themselves to be a most useful body of men; and
the British gunner, when he took to carrying his gun, vindicated the
reputation which he had won when his gun had carried him.

>From the 1st to the 4th of May a successful drive was conducted by
many columns in the often harried but never deserted Lindley-Kroonstad
district.  The result was propitious, as no fewer than 321 prisoners
were brought in.  Of these, 150 under Mentz were captured in one body
as they attempted to break through the encircling cordon.

Amid many small drives and many skirmishes, one stands out for its
severity. It is remarkable as being the last action of any importance
in the campaign. This was the fight at Moolman's Spruit, near
Ficksburg, upon April 20th, 1902.  A force of about one hundred
Yeomanry and forty Mounted Infantry (South Staffords) was despatched
by night to attack an isolated farm in which a small body of Boers was
supposed to be sleeping.  Colonel Perceval was in command.  The farm
was reached after a difficult march, but the enemy were found to have
been forewarned, and to be in much greater strength than was
anticipated. A furious fire wasd on the advancing troops, who
were clearly visible ill the light of a full moon.  Sir Thomas Fowler
was killed and several men of the Yeomanry were hit. The British
charged up to the very walls, but were unable to effect an entrance,
as the place was barricaded and loopholed.  Captain Blackwood, of the
Staffords, was killed in the attack. Finding that the place was
impregnable, and that the enemy outnumbered him, Colonel Perceval gave
the order to retire, a movement which was only successfully carried
out because the greater part of the Boer horses had been shot.  By
morning the small British force had extricated itself, from its
perilous position with a total loss of six killed, nineteen wounded,
and six missing.  The whole affair was undoubtedly a cleverly planned
Boer ambush, and the small force was most fortunate in escaping
destruction.

One other isolated incident may be mentioned here, though it occurred
far away in the Vryheid district of the Transvaal.  This was the
unfortunate encounter between Zulus and Boers by which the latter lost
over fifty of their numbers under deplorable circumstances. This
portion of the Transvaal has only recently been annexed, and is
inhabited by warlike Zulus, who are very different from the debased
Kaffirs of the rest of the country.  These men had a blood-feud
against the Boers, which was embittered by the fact that they had lost
heavily through Boer depredations. Knowing that a party of fifty-nine
men were sleeping in a farmhouse, the Zulus crept on to it and
slaughtered every man of the inmates.  Such an incident is much to be
regretted, and yet, looking back upon the long course of the war, and
remembering the turbulent tribes who surrounded the combatants --
Swazis, Basutos, and Zulus -- we may well congratulate ourselves that
we have been able to restrain those black warriors, and to escape the
brutalities and the bitter memories of a barbarian invasion.

IT will be remembered that at the close of 1901 Lord Methuen and
Colonel Kekewich had both come across to the eastern side of their
district and made their base at the railway line in the Klerksdorp
section.  Their position was strengthened by the fact that a
blockhouse cordon now ran from Klerksdorp to Ventersdorp, and from
Ventersdorp to Potchefstroom, so that this triangle could be
effectively controlled.  There remained, however, a huge tract of
difficult country which was practically in the occupation of the
enemy.  Several thousand stalwarts were known to be riding with De la
Rey and his energetic lieutenant Kemp.  The strenuous operations of
the British in the Eastern Transvaal and in the Orauge River Colony
had caused this district to be comparatively neglected, and so
everything was in favour of an aggressive movement of the Boers.
There was a long lull after the unsuccessful attack upon Kekewich's
camp at Moedwill, but close observers of the war distrusted this
ominous calm and expected a storm to follow.

The new year found the British connecting Ventersdorp with Tafelkop by
a blockhouse line.  The latter place had been a centre of Boer
activity.  Colonel Hickie's column covered this operation.  Meanwhile
Methuen had struck across through Wolmaranstad as far as Vryburg.
In these operations, which resulted in constant small captures, he was
assisted by a column under Major Paris working from Kimberley. From
Vryburg Lord Methuen made his way in the middle of January to
Lichtenburg, meeting with a small rebuff in the neighbourhood of that
town, for a detachment of Yeomanry was overwhelmed by General
Celliers, who killed eight, wounded fifteen, and captured forty. From
Lichtenburg Lord Methuen continued his enormous trek, and arrived on
February 1st at Klerksdorp once more.  Little rest was given to his
hard-worked troops, and they were sent off again within the week under
the command of Von Donop, with the result that on February 8th, near
Wolmaranstad, they captured Potgieter's laager with forty Boer
prisoners. Von Donop remained at Wolmaranstad until late in FebruaTy;
On the 23rd he despatched an empty convoy back to Klerksdorp, the fate
of which will be afterwards narrated.

Kekewich and Hickie had combined their forces at the beginning of
February.  On February 4th an attempt was made by them to surprise
General De la Rey.  The mounted troops who were despatched under Major
Leader failed in this enterprise, but they found and overwhelmed the
laager of Sarel Alberts, capturing 132 prisoners.  By stampeding the
horses the Boer retreat was cut off, and the attack was so furiously
driven home, especialy by the admirable Scottish Horse, that few of
the enemy got away.  Alberts himself with all his officers were among
the prisoners.  From this time until the end of February this column
was not seriously engaged.

It has been stated above that on February 23rd Von Donop sent in an
empty convoy from Wolmaranstad to Klerksdorp, a distance of about
fifty miles.  Nothing bad been heard for some time of De la Rey, but he
had called together his men and was waiting to bring off some coup.
The convoy gave him the very opportunity for which he sought.

The escort of the convoy consisted of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, sixty
of Paget's Horse, three companies of the ubiquitous Northumberland
Fusiliers, two guns of the 4th R.F.A., and a pom-pom, amounting in all
to 630 men.  Colonel Anderson was in command. On the morning of
Tuesday, February 25th, the convoy was within ten miles of its
destination, and the sentries on the kopjes round the town could see
the gleam of the long line of white-tilted wagons. Their hazardous
voyage was nearly over, and yet they were destined to most complete
and fatal wreck within sight of port.  So confident were they that the
detachment of Paget's Horse was permitted to ride on the night before
into the town.  It was as well, for such a handful would have shared
and could not have averted the disaster.

The night had been dark and wet, and the Boers under cover of it had
crept between the sleeping convoy and the town.  Some bushes which
afford excellent cover lie within a few hundred yards of the road, and
here the main ambush was laid. In the first grey of the morning the
long line of the convoy, 130 wagons in all, came trailing past-guns
and Yeomanry in front, Fusiliers upon the flanks and rear.  Suddenly
the black bank of scrub was outlined in flame, and a furious rifle
fire wasd upon the head of the column. The troops behaved
admirably under most difficult circumstances. A counter-attack by the
Fusiliers and some of the Yeomanry, under cover of shrapnel from the
guns, drove the enemy out of the scrub and silenced his fire at this
point.  It was evident, however, that he was present in force, for
firing soon broke out along the whole left flank, and the rearguard
found itself as warmly attacked as the van. Again, bowever, the
assailants were driven off.  It was now broad daylight, and the
wagons, which had got into great confusion in the first turmoil of
battle, had been remarshalled and arranged. It was Colonel Anderson's
hope that he might be able to send them on into safety while he with
the escort covered their retreat.  His plan was certainly the best
one, and if it did not succeed it was due to nothing which he could
avert, but to the nature of the ground and the gallantry of the enemy.

The physical obstacle consisted in a very deep and difficult spruit,
the Jagd Spruit, which forms an ugly passage in times of peace, but
which when crowded and choked with stampeding mules and splintering
wagons, under their terrified conductors, soon became impassable. Here
the head of the column was clubbed and the whole line came to a stand.
Meanwhile the enemy, adopting their new tactics, came galloping in on
the left flank I and on the rear.  The first attack was repelled by
the steady fire of the Fusiliers, but on the second occasion the
horsemen got up to the wagons, and galloping down them were able to
overwhelm in detail the little knots of soldiers who were scattered
along the flank.  The British, who were outnumbered by at least three
to one, made a stout resistance, and it was not until seven o'clock
that the last shot was fired.  The result was a complete success to
the burghers, but one which leaves no shadow of discredit on any
officer or man among those who were engaged. Eleven officers and 176
men fell out of about 550 actually engaged.  The Boers, so the teams
were shot and the wagons burned before they withdrew.  The prisoners
too, they were unable to retain, and their sole permanent trophies
consisted of the two guns, the rifles, and the ammunition. Their own
losses amounted to about fifty killed and wounded.

A small force sallied out from Klerksdorp in the hope of helping
Anderson, but on reaching the Jagd Drift it was found that the
fighting was over and that the field was in possession of the
Boers. De la Rey was seen in person among the burghers, and it is
pleasant to add that he made himself conspicuous by his humanity to
the wounded. His force drew off in the course of the morning, and was
soon out of reach of immediate pursuit, though this was attempted by
Kekewich, Von Donop, and Grenfell.  It was important to regain the
guns if possible, as they were always a menace to the blockhouse
system, and for this purpose Grenfell with sixteen hundred horsemen
was despatched to a point south of Lichtenburg, which was conjectured
to be upon the Boer line of retreat.  At the same time Lord Methuen
was ordered up from Vryburg in order to cooperate in this movement,
and to join his forces to those of Grenfell.  It was obvious that with
an energetic and resolute adversary like De la Rey there was great
danger of these two forces being taken in detail, but it was hoped
that each was strong enough to hold its own until the other could come
to its aid.  The result was to show that the danger was real and the
hope fallacious.

It was on March 2nd that Methuen left Vryburg. The column was not his
old one, consisting of veterans of the trek, but was the Kimberley
column under Major Paris, a body of men who bad seen much less service
and were in every way less reliable.  It included a curious mixture of
units, the most solid of which were four guns (two of the 4th, and two
of the 38th R.F.A.), 200 Northumberland Fusiliers, and 100 Loyal North
Lancashires.  The mounted men included 5th Imperial Yeomanry (184),
Cape Police (233), Cullinan's Horse (64), 86th Imperial Yeomanry
(110), Diamond Fields Horse (92), Dennison' s Scouts (58), Ashburner's
Horse (126), and British South African Police (24).  Such a collection
of samples would be more in place, one would imagine, in a London
procession than in an operation which called for discipline and
cohesion.  In warfare the half is often greater than the whole, and
the presence of a proportion of halfhearted and inexperienced men may
be a positive danger to their more capable companions.

Upon March 6th Methuen, marching east towards Lichtenburg, came in
touch near Leeuwspruit with Van Zyl's commando, and learned in the
small skirmish which ensued that some of his Yeomanry were unreliable
and ill-instructed.  Having driven the enemy off by his artillery
fire, Methuen moved to Tweebosch, where he laagered until next
morning.  At 3 A.M. of the 7th the ox-convoy was sent on, under escort
of half of his little force.  The other half followed at 4.20, 50 as
to give the slow-moving oxen a chance of keeping ahead.  It was
evident, however, immediately after the column had got started that
the enemy were all round in great numbers, and that an attack in force
was to be expected.  Lord Methuen gave orders therefore that the
ox-wagons should be halted and that the mule-transport should close
upon them so as to form one solid block, instead of a straggling line.
At the same time he reinforced his rearguard with mounted men and with
two guns, for it was in that quarter that the enemy appeared to be
most numerous and aggressive.  An attack was also developing upon the
right flank, which was held off by the infantry and by the second
section of the guns.

It has been said that Methuen's horsemen were for the most part
inexperienced irregulars.  Such men become in time excellent soldiers,
as all this campaign bears witness, but it is too much to expose them
to a severe ordeal in thefield when they are still raw and
untrained.  As it happened, this particular ordeal was exceedingly
severe, but nothing can excuse the absolute failure of the troops
concerned to rise to the occasion.  Had Methuen's rearguard consisted
of Imperial Light Horse, or Scottish Horse, it is safe to say that the
battle of Tweebosch would have had a very different ending.

What happened was that a large body of Boers formed up in five lines
and charged straight home at the rear screen and rearguard, firing
from their saddles as they had done at Brakenlaagte.  The sight of
those wide-flung lines of determined men galloping over the plain
seems to have been too much for the nerves of the unseasoned troopers.
A panic spread through their ranks, and in an instant they had turned
their horses' heads and were thundering to their rear, leaving the two
guns uncovered and streaming in wild confusion past the left flank of
the jeering infantry who were lying round the wagons.  The limit of
their flight seems to have been the wind of their horses, and most of
them never drew rein until they had placed many miles between
themselves and the comrades whom they had deserted.  ' It was
pitiable,' says an eye-witness, 'to see the grand old General begging
them to stop, but they would not; a large body of them arrived in
Kraaipan without firing a shot,' It was a South African 'Battle of the
Spurs,'

By this defection of the greater portion of the force the handful of
brave men who remained were left in a hopeless position.  The two guns
of the 38th battery were overwhelmed and ridden over by the Boer
horsemen, every man being killed or wounded, including Lieutenant
Nesham, who acted up to the highest traditions of his corps.

The battle, however, was not yet over.  The infantry were few in
number, but they were experienced troops, and they maintained the
struggle for some hours in the face of overwhelming numbers.  Two
hundred of the Northumberland Fusiliers lay round the wagons and held
the Boers off from their prey. With them were the two remaining guns,
which were a mark for a thousand Boer riflemen.  It was while
encouraging by his presence and example the much-tried gunners of this
section that the gallant Methuen was wounded by a bullet which broke
the bone of his thigh.  Lieutenant Venning and all the detachment fell
with their General round the guns.

An attempt had been made to rally some of the flying troopers at a
neighbouring kraal, and a small body of Cape Police and Yeomanry under
the command of Major Paris held out there for some hours.  A hundred
of the Lancashire Infantry aided them in their stout defence.  But the
guns taken by the Boers from Von Donop's convoy had free play now that
the British guns were out of action, and they were brought to bear
with crushing effect upon both the kraal and the wagons. Further
resistance meant a useless slaughter, and orders were given for a
surrender.  Convoy, ammunition, guns, horses -- nothing was saved
except the honour of the infantry and the gunners.  The losses, 68
killed and 121 wounded, fell chiefly upon these two branches of the
service.  There were 205 unwounded prisoners.

This, the last Boer victory in the war, reflected equal credit upon
their valour and humanity, qualities which had not always gone hand in
hand in our experience of them.  Courtesy and attention were extended
to the British wounded, and Lord Methuen was sent under charge of his
chief medical officer, Colonel Townsend (the doctor as severely
wounded as the patient), into Klerksdorp.  In De la Rey we have always
found an opponent who was as chivalrous as he was formidable. The
remainder of the force reached the Kimberley-Mafeking railway line in
the direction of Kraaipan, the spot where the first bloodshed of the
war had occurred some twenty-nine months before.

On Lord Methuen himself no blame can rest for this unsuccessful
action.  If the workman's tool snaps in his hand he cannot be held
responsible for the failure of his task.  The troops who misbehaved
were none of his training.  'If you hear anyone slang him,' says one
of his men, 'you are to tell them that he is the finest General and
the truest gentleman that ever fought in this war.'  Such was the tone
of his own troopers, and such also that of the spokesmen of the nation
when they commented upon the disaster in the Houses of Parliament.  It
was a fine example of British justice and sense of fair play, even in
that bitter moment, that to hear his eulogy one would have thought
that the occasion had been one when thanks were being returned for a
victory.  It is a generous public with fine instincts, and Paul
Methuen, wounded and broken, still remained in their eyes the heroic
soldier and the chivalrous man of honour.

The De Wet country had been pretty well cleared by the series of
drives which have already been described, and Louis Botha's force in
the Eastern Transvaal had been much diminished by the tactics of Bruce
Hamilton and Wools-Sampson.  Lord Kitchener was able, therefore, to
concentrate his troops and his attention upon that wide-spread western
area in which General De la Rey had dealt two such shrewd blows within
a few weeks of each other.  Troops were rapidly concentrated at
Klerksdorp.  Kekewich, Walter Kitchener, Rawlinson, and Rochfort, with
a number of small columns, were ready in the third week of March to
endeavour to avenge Lord Methuen.

The problem with which Lord Kitchener was confronted was a very
difficult one, and he has never shown more originality and audacity
than in the fashion in which he handled it.  De la Rey's force was
scattered over a long tract of country, capable of rapidly
concentrating for a blow, but otherwise as intangible and elusive as a
phantom army.  Were Lord Kitchener simply to launch ten thousand
horsemen at him, the result would be a weary ride over illimitable
plains without sight of a Boer, unless it were a distant scout upon
the extreme horizon.  Delarey and his men would have slipped away to
his northern hiding-places beyond the Marico River.  There was no
solid obstacle here, as in the Orange River Colony, against which the
flying enemy could be rounded up.  One line of blockhouses there was,
it is true -- the one called the Schoonspruit cordon, which flanked
the De la Rey country.  It flanked it, however, upon the same side as
that on which the troops were assembled.  If the troops were only on
the other side, and De la Rey was between them and the blockhouse
line, then, indeed, something might be done.  But to place the troops
there, and then bring them instantly back again, was to put such a
strain upon men and horses as had never yet been done upon a large
scale in the course of the war.  Yet Lord Kitchener knew the mettle of
the men whom he commanded, and he was aware that there were no
exertions of which the human frame is capable which he might not
confidently demand.

The precise location of the Boer laagers does not appear to have been
known, but it was certain that a considerable number of them were
scattered about thirty miles or so to the west of Klerksdorp and the
Shoonspruit line.  The plan was to march a British force right through
them, then spread out into a wide line and come straight back, driving
the burghers on to the cordon of blockhouses, which had been
strengthened by the arrival of three regiments of Highlanders.  But to
get to the o~her side of the Boers it was necessary to march the
columns through by night.  It was a hazardous operation, but the
secret was well kept, and the movement was so well carried out that
the enemy had no time to check it.  On the night of Sunday, March
23rd, the British horsemen passed stealthily in column through the
Delarey country, and then, spreading out into a line, which from the
left wing at Lichtenburg to the right wing at Commando Drift measured
a good eighty miles, they proceeded to sweep back upon their traces.
In order to reach their positions the columns had, of course, started
at different points of the British blockhouse line, and some had a
good deal farther to go than others, while the southern extension of
the line was formed by Bochfort's troops, who had moved up from the
Vaal.  Above him from south to north came Walter Kitchener, Rawlinson,
and Kekewich in the order named.


On the morning of Monday, March 24th, a line of eighty miles of
horsemen, without guns or transport, was sweeping back towards the
blockhouses, while the country between was filled with scattered
parties of Boers who were seeking for gaps by which to escape. It was
soon learned from the first prisoners that De la Rey was not within
the cordon.  His laager had been some distance farther west.  But the
sight of fugitive horsemen rising and dipping over the rolling veldt
assured the British that they had something within their net. The
catch was, however, by no means as complete as might have been
desired. Three hundred men in khaki slipped through between the two
columns in the early morning. Another large party escaped to the south
wards.  Some of the Boers adopted extraordinary devices in order to
escape from the ever-narrowing cordon.  'Three, in charge of some
cattle, buried themselves, and left a small hole to breathe through
with a tube.  Some men began to probe with bayonets in the new.turned
earth and got immediate and vociferous subterranean yells.  Another
man tried the same game and a horse stepped on him.  He writhed and
reared the horse, and practically the horse found the prisoner for
us.'  But the operations achieved one result, which must have lifted a
load of anxiety from Lord Kitchener's mind. Three fifteen-pounders,
two pom-poms, and a large amount of ammunition were taken.  To
Kekewich and the Scottish Horse fell the honour of the capture,
Colonel Wools-Sampson and Captain Rice heading the charge and pursuit.
By this means the constant menace to the blockhouses was lessened, if
not entirely removed. One hundred and seventy-five Boers were disposed
of, nearly all as prisoners, and a considerable quantity of transport
was captured.  In this operation the troops had averaged from seventy
to eighty miles in twenty-six hours without change of horses.  To such
a point had the slow-moving ponderous British Army attained after two
years' training of that stern drill-master, necessity.

The operations had attained some success, but nothing commensurate
with the daring of the plan or the exertions of the soldiers.  Without
an instant's delay, however, Lord Kitchener struck a second blow at
his enemy.  Before the end of March Kekewich, Rawlinson, and Walter
Kitchener were all upon the trek once more.  Their operations were
pushed farther to the west than in the last drive, since it was known
that on that occasion De la Rey and his main commando had been outside
the cordon.

It was to one of Walter Kitchener's lieutenants that the honour fell
to come in direct contact with the main force of the burghers.  This
General had moved out to a point about forty miles west of Klerksdorp.
Forming his laager there, he despatched Cookson on March 30th with
seventeen hundred men to work further westward in the direction of the
Harts River.  Under Cookson's immediate command were the 2nd Canadian
Mounted Infantry, Damant's Horse, and four guns of the 7th R.F.A.  His
lieutenant, Keir, commanded the 28th Mounted Infantry, the Artillery
Mounted Rifles, and 2nd Kitchener's Fighting Scouts. The force was
well mounted, and carried the minimum of baggage.

It was not long before this mobile force found itself within touch of
the enemy.  The broad weal made by the passing of a convoy set them
off at full cry, and they were soon encouraged by the distant cloud of
dust which shrouded the Boer wagons.  The advance guard of the column
galloped at the top of their speed for eight miles, and closed in upon
the convoy, but found themselves faced by an escort of five hundred
Boers, who fought a clever rearguard action, and covered their charge
with great skill.  At the same time Cookson closed in upon his mounted
infantry, while on the other side Delarey's main force fell back in
order to reinforce the escort.  British and Boers were both riding
furiously to help their own comrades. The two forces were fairly face
to face.

Perceiving that he was in front of the whole Boer army, and knowing
that he might expect reinforcements, Cookson decided to act upon the
defensive. A position was rapidly taken up along the Brakspruit, and
preparations made to resist the impending attack.  The line of defence
was roughly the line of the spruit, but for some reason, probably to
establish a cross fire, one advanced position was occupied upon either
flank.  On the left flank was a farmhouse, which was held by two
hundred men of the Artillery Rifles.  On the extreme right was another
outpost of twenty-four Canadians and forty-five Mounted Infantry.
They occupied no defensible position, and their situation was
evidently a most dangerous one, only to be justified by some strong
military reason which is not explained by any account of the action.

The Boer guns hadd fire, and considerable bodies of the enemy
appeared upon the flanks and in front.  Their first efforts were
devoted towards getting possession of the farmhouse, which would give
them a POINT D'APPUI from which they could turn the whole line.  Some
five hundred of them charged on horseback, but.were met by a very
steady fire from the Artillery Rifles, while the guns raked them with
shrapnel.  They reached a point within five hundred yards of the
building, but the fire was too hot, and they wheeled round in rapid
retreat. Dismounting in a mealie-patch they skirmished up towards the
farmhouse once more, but they were again checked by the fire of the
defenders and by a pompom which Colonel Keir had brought up. No
progress whatever was made by the attack in this quarter.

In the meantime the fate which might have been foretold had befallen
the isolated detachment of Canadians and 28th Mounted Infantry upon
the extreme right.  Bruce Carruthers, the Canadian officer in command,
behaved with the utmost gallantry, and was splendidly seconded by his
men. Overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, amid a perfect hail of
bullets they fought like heroes to the end.  'There have been few
finer instances of heroism in the course of the campaign,' says the
reticent Kitchener in his official despatch.  Of the Canadians
eighteen were hit out of twenty-one, and the Mounted Infantry hard by
lost thirty out of forty-five before they surrendered.

This advantage gained upon the right flank was of no assistance to the
Boers in breaking the British line. The fact that it was so makes it
the more difficult to understand why this outpost was so exposed.  The
burghers had practically surrounded Cookson's force, and De la Rey and
Kemp urged on the attack; buL~ their artillery fire was dominated by
the British guns, and no weak point could be found in the defence. At
1 o'clock the attack had been begun, and at 5.30 it was finally
abandoned, and Delarey was in full retreat. That he was in no sense
routed is shown by the fact that Cookson did not attempt to follow him
up or to capture his guns; but at least he had failed in his purpose,
and had lost more heavily than in any engagement which he had yet
fought. The moral effect of his previous victories had also been
weakened, and his burghers had learned, if they had illusions upon the
subject, that the men who fled at Tweebosch were not typical troopers
of the British Army.  Altogether, it was a well-fought and useful
action, though it cost the British force some two hundred casualties,
of which thirty-five were fatal.  Cookson's force stood to arms all
night mitil the arrival of Walter Kitchener's men in the morning.

General Ian Hamilton, who had acted for some time as Chief of the
Staff to Lord Kitchener, had arrived on April 8th at Klerksdorp to
take supreme command of the whole operations against De la Rey.  Early
in April the three main British columns had made a rapid cast round
without success.  To the very end the better intelligence and the
higher mobility seem to have remained upon the side of the Boers, who
could always force a fight when Lhey wished and escape when they
wished.  Occasionally, however, they forced one at the wrong time, as
in the instance which I am about to describe.

Hamilton had planned a drive to cover the southern portion of
Delarey's country, and for this purpose, with Hartebeestefontein for
his centre, he was manoeuvring his columns so as to swing them into
line and then sweep back towards Klerksdorp.  Kekewich, Rawlinson, and
Walter Kitchener were all manoeuvring for this purpose.  The Boers,
however, game to the last, although they were aware that their leaders
had gone in to treat, and that peace was probably due within a few
days, determined to have one last gallant fall with a British column.
The forces of Kekewich were the farthest to the westward, and also, as
the burghers thought, the most isolated, and it was upon them,
accordingly, that the attack was made.  In the morning of April 11th,
at a place called Rooiwal, the enemy, who had moved up from
Wolmaranstad, nineteen hundred strong, under Kemp and Vermaas, fell
with the utmost impetuosity upon the British column.  There was no
preliminary skirmishing, and a single gallant charge by 1,500 Boers
bothd and ended the engagement.  'I was just saying to the staff
officer that there were no Boers within twenty miles,' says one who
was present, 'when we heard a roar of musketry and saw a lot of men
galloping down on us.'  The British were surprised but not shaken by
this unexpected apparition.  'I never saw a more splendid attack.
They kept a distinct line,' says the eye-witness.  Another spectator
says, 'They came on in one long line four deep and knee to knee.' It
was an old-fashioned cavalry charge, and the fact that it got as far
as it did shows that we have over rated the stopping power of modern
rifles.  They came for a good five hundred yards under direct fire,
and were only turned within a hundred of the British line.  The
Yeomanry, the Scottish Horse, and the Constabulary poured a steady
fire upon the advancing wave of horsemen, and the gunsd with
case at two hundred yards.  The Boers were stopped, staggered, and
turned. Their fire, or rather the covering fire of those who had not
joined in the charge, had caused some fifty casualties, but their own
losses were very much more severe. The fierce Potgieter fell just in
front of the British guns. 'Thank goodness he is dead! ' cried one of
his wounded burghers, 'for he sjamboked me into the firing line this
morning.'  Fifty dead and a great number of wounded were left upon the
field of battle.  Rawlinson's column came up on Kekewich's left, and
the Boer flight became a rout, for they were chased for twenty miles,
and their two guns were captured.  It was a brisk and decisive little
engagement, and it closed the Western campaign, leaving the last
trick, as well as the game, to the credit of the British.  From this
time until the end there was a gleaning of prisoners but little
fighting in De la Rey's country, the most noteworthy event being a
surprise visit to Schweizer-Renecke by Rochfort, by which some sixty
prisoners were taken, and afterwards the drive of Ian Hamilton's
forces against the Mafeking railway line by which no fewer than 364
prisoners were secured. In this difficult and well-managed operation
the gaps between the British columns were concealed by the lighting of
long veldt-fires and the discharge of rifles by scattered scouts. The
newly arrived Australian Commonwealth Regiments gave a brilliant start
to the military history of their united country by the energy of their
marching and the thoroughness of their entrenching.

Upon May 29th, only two days before the final declaration of peace, a
raid was made by a few Boers upon the native cattle reserves near
Fredericstad. A handful of horsemen pursued them, and were ambushed by
a considerable body of the enemy in some hilly country ten miles from
the British lines.  Most of the pursuers got away in safety, but young
Sutherland, second lieutenant of the Seaforths, and only a few months
from Eton, found himself separated from his horse and in a hopeless
position.  Scorning to surrender, the lad actually fought his way upon
foot for over a mile before he was shot down by the horsemen who
circled round him. Well might the Boer commander declare that in the
whole course of the war he had seen no finer example of British
courage.  It is indeed sad that at this last instant a young life
should be thrown away, but Sutherland died in a noble fashion for a
noble cause, and many inglorious years would be a poor substitute for
the example and tradition which such a death will leave behind.

It only remains in one short chapter to narrate the progress of the
peace negotiations, the ultimate settlement, and the final
consequences of this long-drawn war. However disheartening the
successive incidents may have been in which the Boers were able to
inflict heavy losses upon us and to renew their supplies of arms and
ammunition, it was none the less certain that their numbers were
waning and that the inevitable end was steadily approaching. With
mathematical precision the scientific soldier in Pretoria, with his
web of barbed wire radiating out over the whole country, was week by
week wearing them steadily down.  And yet after the recent victory of
De la Rey and various braggadocio pronouncements from the refugees at
The Hague, it was somewhat of a surprise to the British public when it
was announced upon March 22nd that the acting Government of the
Transvaal, consisting of Messrs. Schalk Burger, Lucas Meyer, Reitz,
Jacoby, Krogh, and Van Velden had come into Middelburg and requested
to be forwarded by train to Pretoria for the purpose of discussing
terms of peace with Lord Kitchener.  A thrill of hope ran through the
Empire at the news, but so doubtful did the issue seem that none of
the preparations were relaxed which would ensure a vigorous campaign
in the immediate future.  In the South African as in the Peninsular
and in the Crimean wars, it may truly be said that Great Britain was
never so ready to fight as at the dawning of peace.  At least two
years of failure and experience are needed to turn a civilian and
commercial nation into a military power.

In spite of the optimistic pronouncements of Mr. Fischer and the
absurd forecasts of Dr. Leyds the power of the Boers was really
broken, and they had come in with the genuine intention of surrender.
In a race with such individuality.it was not enough that the
government should form its conclusion.  It was necessary for them to
persuade their burghers that the game was really up, and that they had
no choice but to throw down their well-worn rifles and their
ill-filled bandoliers. For this purpose a long series of negotiations
had to be entered into which put a strain upon the complacency of the
authorities in South Africa and upon the patience of the attentive
public at home.  Their ultimate success shows that this complacency
and this patience were eminantly the right attitude to adopt.

On March 23rd the Transvaal representatives were despatched to
Kroonstad for the purpose ofng up the matter with Steyn and De
Wet.  Messengers were sent to communicate with these two leaders, but
had they been British columns instead of fellow-countrymen they could
not have found greater difficulty in running them to earth.  At last,
however, at the end of the month the message was conveyed, and
resulted in the appearance of De Wet, De la Rey, and Steyn at the
British outposts at Klerksdorp.  The other delegates had come north
again from Kroonstad, and all were united in the same small town,
which, by a whimsical fate, had suddenly become the centre both for
the making of peace and for the prosecution of the war, with the eyes
of the whole world fixed upon its insignificant litter of houses.  On
April 11th, after repeated conferences, both parties moved on to
Pretoria, and the most sceptical observers began to confess that there
was something in the negotiations after all. After conferring with
Lord Kitchener the Boer leaders upon April 18th left Pretoria again
and rode out to the commandos to explain the situation to them.  The
result of this mission was that two delegates were chosen from each
body in the field, who assembled at Vereeniging upon May 15th for the
purpose of settling the question by vote.  Never was a high matter of
state decided in so democratic a fashion.

Up to that period the Boer leaders had made a succession of tentative
suggestions, each of which had been put aside by the British
Government.  Their first had been that they should merely concede
those points which had been at issue at the beginning of the war. This
was set aside.  The second was that they should be allowed to consult
their friends in Europe.  This also was refused.  The next was that an
armistice should be granted, but again Lord Kitchener was obdurate.  A
definite period was suggested within which the burghers should make
their final choice between surrender and a war which must finally
exterminate them as a people.  It was tacitly understood, if not
definitely promised, that the conditions which the British Government
would be prepared to grant would not differ much in essentials from
those which had been refused by the Boers a twelvemonth before, after
the Middelburg interview.

On May 15th the Boer conferenced at Vereeniging.  Sixty-four
delegates from the commandos met with the military and political
chiefs of the late republics, the whole amounting to 150 persons.  A
more singular gathering has not met in our time.  There was Botha, the
young lawyer, who had found himself by a strange turn of fate
commanding a victorious army in a great war.  De Wet was there, with
his grim mouth and sun-browned face; De la Rey, also, with the
grizzled beard and the strong aquiline features.  There, too, were the
politicians, the grey-bearded, genial Reitz, a little graver than when
he looked upon 'the whole matter as an immense joke,' and the
unfortunate Steyn, stumbling and groping, a broken and ruined man.
The burly Lucas Meyer, smart young Smuts fresh from the siege of
Ookiep, Beyers from the north, Kemp the dashing cavalry leader, Muller
the hero of many fights -- all these with many others of their
sun-blackened, gaunt, hard-featured comrades were grouped within the
great tent of Vereeniging.  The discussions were heated and
prolonged. But the logic of facts was inexorable, and the cold still
voice of common-sense had more power than all the ravings of
enthusiasts.  The vote showed that the great majority of the delegates
were in favour of surrender upon the terms offered by the British
Government.  On May 81st this resolution was notified to Lord
Kitchener, and at half-past ten of the same night the delegates
arrived at Pretoria and set their names to the treaty of peace.  After
two years seven and a half months of hostilities the Dutch republics
had acquiesced in their own destruction, and the whole of South
Africa, from Cape Town to the Zambesi, had been added to the British
Empire.  The great struggle had cost us twenty thousand lives and a
hundred thousand stricken men, with two hundred millions of money;
but, apart from a peaceful South Africa, it had won for us a national
resuscitation of spirit and a closer union with our great Colonies
which could in no other way have been attained. We had hoped that we
were a solid empire when we engaged in the struggle, hut we knew that
we were when we emerged from it. In that change lies an ample
recompense for all the blood and treasure spent.

The following were in brief the terms of surrender

1.  That the burghers lay down their arms and acknowledge themselves
     subjects of Edward VII.
2.  That all prisoners taking the oath of allegiance be returned.
3.  That their liberty and property be inviolate.
4.  That an amnesty be granted-save in special cases.
5.  That the Dutch language be allowed in schools and law-courts.
6.  That rifles be ~lowed if registered.
7.  That self-government be granted as soon as possible.
8.  That no fr~nchise be granted for natives until after self-governinent.
9.  That no special ~nd tax be levied.
10. That the people be helped to reoccupy the farms.
11. That £3,000,000 be given to help the farmers.
12. That the rebels be disfranchised and their leaders tried, on
      condition that no death penalty be inflicted.

These terms were practically the same as those which had been refused
by Botha in March 1901. Thirteen months of useless warfare had left
the situation as it was.

It had been a war of surprises, but the surprises have unhappily been
hitherto invariably unpleasant ones.  Now at last the balance swung
the other way, for in all the long paradoxical history of South
African strife there is nothing more wonderful than the way in which
these two sturdy and unemotional races clasped hands the instant that
the fight was done. The fact is in itself a final answer to the
ill-natured critics of the Continent. Men do not so easily grasp a
hand which is reddened with the blood of women and children. From all
parts as the commandos. came in there was welcome news of the
fraternisation between them and the soldiers; while the Boer leaders,
as loyal to their new ties as they had been to their old ones, exerted
themselves to promote good feeling among their people.  A few weeks
seemed to do more to lessen racial bitterness than some of us had
hoped for in as many years.  One can but pray that it will last.

The surrenders amounted in all to twenty thousand men, and showed that
in all parts of the seat of war the enemy had more men in the field
than we had imagined, a fact which may take the sting out of several
of our later mishaps. About twelve thousand surrendered in the
Transvaal, six thousand in the Orange River Colony, and about two
thousand in the Cape olony, showing that the movement in the rebel
districts had always been more vexatious than formidable.  A
computation of the prisoners of war, the surrenders, the mercenaries,
and the casualties, shows that the total forces to which we were
opposed were certainly not fewer than seventy-five thousand well-armed
mounted men, while they may have considerably exceeded that number.
No wonder that the Boer leaders showed great confidence at the outset
of the war.

That the heavy losses caused us by the war were borne without a murmur
is surely evidence enough how deep was the conviction of the nation
that the war was not only just but essential -- that the possession of
South Africa and the unity of the Empire were at stake. Could it be
shown, or were it even remotely possible, that ministers had incurred
so immense a responsibility and entailed such tremendous sacrifices
upon their people without adequate cause, is it not certain that, the
task once done, an explosion of rage from the deceived and the
bereaved would have driven them for ever from public life? Among high
and low, in England, in Scotland, in Ireland, in the great Colonies,
how many high hopes had been crushed, how often the soldier son had
gone forth and never returned, or come back maimed and stricken in the
pride of his youth. Everywhere was the voice of pity and sorrow, but
nowhere that of reproach.  The deepest instincts of the nation told it
that it must fight and win, or for ever abdicate its position in the
world.  Through dark days which brought out the virtues of our race as
nothing has done in our generation, we struggled grimly on until the
light had fully broken once again.  And of all gifts that God has
given to Britain there is none to compare with those days of sorrow,
for it was in them that the nation was assured of its unity, and
learned for all time that blood is stronger to bind than salt water is
to part.  The only difference in the point of view of the Briton from
Britain and the Briton from the ends of the earth, was that the latter
with the energy of youth was more whole-souled in the Imperial cause.
Who has seen that Army and can forget it -- its spirit, its
picturesqueness -- above all, what it stands for in the future history
of the world? Cowboys from the vast plains of the North-West,
gentlemen who ride hard with the Quorn or the Belvoir, gillies from
the Sutherland deer-forests, bushmen from the back blocks of
Australia, exquisites of the Raleigh Club or the Bachelor's, hard men
from Ontario, dandy sportsmen from India and Ceylon, the horsemen of
New Zealand, the wiry South African irregulars -- these are the
Reserves whose existence was chronicled in no Blue-book, and whose
appearance came as a shock to the pedant soldiers of the Continent who
had sneered so long at our little Army, since long years of peace have
caused them to forget its exploits.  On the plains of South Africa, in
common danger and in common privation, the blood brotherhood of the
Empire was sealed.

So much for the Empire.  But what of South Africa?  There in the end
we must reap as we sow. If we are worthy of the trust, it will be left
to us.  If we are unworthy of it, it will be taken away. Kruger's
downfall should teach us that it is not rifles but Justice which is
the title-deed of a nation.  The British flag under our best
administrators will mean clean government, honest laws, liberty and
equality to all men.  So long as it continues to do so, we shall hold
South Africa. When, out of fear or out or greed, we fall from that
ideal, we may know that we are stricken with that disease which has
killed every great empire before us.

 

 

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Title:  The Great Boer War

Author:  Arthur Conan Doyle

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